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Abstract
My dissertation explores the legal boundaries of copyright law in the wake of artificial intelligence
(AI) technology. In building the theoretical foundations for my dissertation, I go through several
key phases. First, I highlight important historical events and milestones in AI. I further develop
the philosophical debate on AI legal personhood and deliberate whether we are approaching a
“singularity” – the next stage of AI evolution. I also explore the concept of AI as it matured through
the years.
In the second part, I theorize how AI can be regarded as an author under IP normative
standards. Part of accepting the argument that AI deserve copyright is a willingness to change the
perception that only human creations are worthy of copyright protection. I also seek an answer to
two sub-questions – the “who” and the “what”. The “who” considers the normative standards of
authorship in the ongoing struggle between an author’s right and the public domain. The “what”
raise the originality debate and discusses the standard of creation.
In the third part, I outline the many “candidates” for AI authorship – the programmer, the
user, the AI and an alternative legal framework for AI’s ownership like the public domain or
author-in-law. Finally, I discuss the outcomes of each model and provide my conclusions.
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PART I: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND: CONCEPTUALIZING AI
“I never think about the future – it comes soon enough.” (Albert Einstein)

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Technology and its interactions with humans have long captivated writers.1 An extensive and
wide-ranging literature has covered artificial intelligence (AI) technology in the fields of computer
science,2 philosophy,3 economy,4 religion,5 ethics6 and science-fiction.7 Indeed, the AI debate
encompasses a variety of technical, scientific and legal issues.8

1

Nils J Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence: A History of Ideas and Achievements (Cambridge University
Press, 2010) at 19, online (pdf): <ai.stanford.edu/~nilsson/QAI/qai.pdf>.
2
Vincent C Müller, ed, Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing
Switzerland, 2016) [Müller, “Fundamental Issues of AI”]; Vincent C Müller, ed, Philosophy and Theory of Artificial
Intelligence (Springer-Velrag Berlin Heidelberg, 2013) [Müller, “Philosophy and Theory of AI”].
3
Aristotle wrote: “For suppose that every tool we had could perform its function, either at our bidding or itself
perceiving the need ... of which the poet says that ‘self-moved they enter the assembly of gods’ – and suppose that
shuttles in a loom could fly to and fro[m] and a plucker play a lyre all self-moved, then manufacturers would have no
need of workers nor masters of slaves.” Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T A Sinclair (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1962) at 31. Thomas Hobbes referred in Leviathan to an artificial animal, stating: “NATURE … is by the Art of man,
as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion
of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines
that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the Heart but a Spring;
and the Nerves but so many Strings; and the Joynts but so many Wheels, giving motion to the whole Body, such as
was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rational and most excellent worke of Nature, Man.”
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed by C B Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) at 81. Nilsson stated that the
science historian, George Dyson, has referred to Hobbes as the patriarch of AI. Nilsson, supra note 1 at 21; See also
Pamela McCorduck, Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and Prospects of Artificial Intelligence
(W H Freeman and Company, 1979) at 3-29. Pamela McCorduck is one of the leading AI historians. In her book she
outlined the history of AI and machine intelligence.
4
US, Executive Office of the President, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy (2016), online (pdf):
<obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-AutomationEconomy.PDF> [AI & the Economy White Paper].
5
Jewish folklore contains stories about an animated anthropomorphic being that was created from clay or mud, called
Golem. The most famous Golem story is about the Golem of Prague. The Maharal (Judah Loew ben Bezalel) is said
to have created the Golem in the late 16th century to defend the Jewish ghetto from anti-Semitism. See Nathan
Ausubel, ed, A Treasury of Jewish Folklore (Crown Publishers Inc, 1948) at 605, online (pdf):
<http://www.bibleandjewishstudies.net/stories/The_Golem_of_Prague.pdf>. See also McCorduck, supra note 3 at 1213.
6
Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins, eds, Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence
(Oxford University Press, 2017); Nick Bostrom & Eliezer Yudkowsky, “The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence” in Keith
Frankish & William M Ramsey, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge University Press,
2014) at 316-334; Burkhard Schafer et al, “A Fourth Law of Robotics?: Copyright and the Law and Ethics of Machine
Co-Production” (2015) 23:3 AI & L 217 [A Fourth Law of Robotics]; See also Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig, eds,
Artificial Intelligence A Modern Approach, 3rd ed (Prentice Hall, 2010) at 1034-1040. Recently, the EU Commission
for the Efficiency of Justice has adopted ethical principles relating to the use of AI in judicial systems. These principles
include ensuring compatibility of the design and implementation of AI systems with fundamental rights, preventing
discrimination and bias, making data processing methods accessible and transparent, etc. See CEPEJ, European
Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their Environment, 3 December 2018
[2018].
1

In The Path of Law,9 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes proclaims that “the development of
our law has gone on for nearly a thousand years, like the development of a plant, each generation
taking the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a law of spontaneous growth.”10
Holmes’ pragmatic approach accepts the general idea of the law as a mechanism for mediating
social interactions. Hence, as Jack Balkin suggests, “When we consider how a new technology

7
Science fiction has contributed tremendously to human perceptions about AI. Star Trek: The Next Generation, for
example, introduced the AI humanoid robot Data. Data is in a constant search for his humanity, and throughout the
series (and movies) we realize how Data has evolved to become an equal member of the Enterprise (starship) crew.
See the interesting discussion during Data’s “trial” – Star Trek: The Next Generation, “The Measure of a Man” (13
February 1989), online (video): YouTube <www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJF-IRbTh0Q>. Another example is the
phenomenal HBO series Westworld. Westworld is an amusement park populated by synthetic androids called “hosts”.
During the first season we learn about the hosts’ thoughts and development. Several interesting discussions challenge
human perception, see the dialog between Bernard and Dr. Robert Ford (portrayed by Anthony Hopkins) about
consciousness, Westworld, “Trace Decay” (20 November 2016), online (video): YouTube
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=S94ETUiMZwQ>. Science fiction has also been driven by the fear from potential AI
catastrophes. In the film The Terminator (1984), an AI entity known as Skynet becomes self-aware, decides that
humanity poses a threat to its existence, and seeks to exterminate the human race in order to fulfill its original purpose.
See the recent Terminator opening scene, Terminator Genisys (22 June 2015), online (video): YouTube
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=3iMvFMMrNkA>. I should also indicate two important movies in the field of AI as
well: Ex Machina (2015) and Her (2013). Examples in the science fiction literature abound as well. Isaac Asimov is
considered an AI visionary. His book I, Robot (Random House Publishing Group, 2004) consists of nine stories about
robots that are very different from the common robot stories of the time. Asimov’s robots are not destructive by nature.
He is also known for Asimov’s rules of robotics. First Law: A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction,
allow a human being to come to harm. Second Law: A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings except
where such orders would conflict with the First Law. Third Law: A robot must protect its own existence as long as
such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. In later work, Robots and Empire (Doubleday Books,
1985), Asimov added a Fourth Law (also known as the Zeroth Law): A robot may not injure humanity or, through
inaction, allow humanity to come to harm. These examples reflect more than anything else the human fixation with
AI.
8
Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (Penguin Random House Canada, 2018); See also Jean-Gabriel
Castel & Matthew E Castel, “The Road to Artificial Intelligence: Has International Law a Role to Play?” (2016) 14
CJLT 1 [J G Castel & M Castel] (on the existential threat that AI poses to humanity); Fundamental Issues of AI, supra
note 2 (discusses fundamental issues regarding present and future AI from the perspectives of cognitive science,
computer science, neuroscience, and philosophy); “Focus Feature: Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Future of
Law” (2016) 66 UTLJ 423 (the authors argue, in four different articles, that future machines will develop capabilities
and perform many of the tasks currently performed by the legal community today); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence:
Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) (the author explores what will happen to humanity
when machines surpass human intelligence); Kevin Kelly, What Technology Wants (Viking, 2010) (Kelly offers
insights for the behaviour of technology as a natural system); Philosophy and Theory of AI, supra note 2; Russell &
Norvig, supra note 6; Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Penguin, 2005)
(leading the singularity debate); McCorduck, supra note 3.
9
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, “The Path of Law” (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457.
10
Ibid at 468.

2

affects law, our focus should not be on what is essential about the technology but on what features
of social life the technology makes newly salient.”11
In the coming decades, humanity will be forced to address new social issues induced by
scientific progress. It is reasonable to assume that these changes will affect social interactions and,
subsequently, the development of our legal norms.12 As James Boyle articulates: “Both the
definition of legal persons, and the rights accorded to those persons, have changed over time …
Progress may have been gradual, intermittent or savagely resisted by force. There may have been
back-sliding. But in the end the phrase ‘all men’ actually came to mean all men, and women too.”13
Indeed, when “our world fills with robotic and AI technologies, our lives and relationships of
social, political, and economic power will also change, posing new and unexpected challenges for
law.”14 The phenomena of the Internet and smartphones have taught us that we cannot predict

11

Jack M Balkin, “The Path of Robotics Law” (2015) 6 CALRC 45 at 46. See also Ryan Calo, “Robotics and the
Lessons of Cyberlaw” (2015) 103 Cal L Rev 513. Calo and Balkin contemplate on the benefits and challenges robots
and AI technology will bring.
12
In “The Path of Law: Towards Legal Singularity” (2016) 66 UTLJ 443, Benjamin Alarie coined the term “legal
singularity.” Alarie offers, ibid at 445, that “we can be confident that technological development over the course of
this century will lead to (a) a significantly greater quantification of observable phenomena in the world (‘more data’)
and (b) more accurate pattern recognition using new technologies and methods (‘better inference’) … The culmination
of these trends will be what I shall term the ‘legal singularity’.” According to Alarie, ibid at 446, “[t]he legal singularity
contemplates the elimination of legal uncertainty and the emergence of a seamless legal order, which is universally
accessible in real time. In the legal singularity, disputes over the legal significance of agreed facts will be rare. There
may be disputes over facts, but, once found, the facts will map onto clear.” In the second paper, “Self Driving Laws”
(2016) 66 UTLJ 429 at 430, Anthony J Casey & Anthony Niblett claim that “law will exist in a catalogue of precisely
tailored directives, specifying exactly what is permissible in every unique situation.” See also Anthony Casey &
Anthony Niblett, “The Death of Rules and Standards” (2017) 92:4 Ind L Rev 1401; Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell,
“Four Futures of Legal Automation” (2015) 63 UCLA L Rev 26; Jesse Beatson, “AI-Supported Adjudicators: Should
Artificial Intelligence Have a Role in Tribunal Adjudication?” (2018) 31 CJALP 307. Brian Sheppard discusses how
technology developments could change “essential features” of our legal system and norms. See Brian Sheppard,
“Warming Up to Inscrutability: How Technology Could Challenge Our Concept of Law” (2018) 68:1 UTLJ 36.
13
James Boyle, Endowed by Their Creator? The Future of Constitutional Personhood (Brookings, 2011) at 7, online
(pdf): <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0309_personhood_boyle.pdf>. See also Jeffrey Rosen &
Benjamin Wittes, eds, Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change (Brookings, 2011). I should clarify that,
even if the normative conclusion leads to recognising legal rights for AI, this does not necessarily mean that AI will
earn the same rights as humans. For example, I do not believe that AI rights are to be bestowed “naturally” upon
creation.
14
Balkin, supra note 11 at 49. See also Andrew J Wu, “From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning
Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer Programs” (1997) 25 AIPLA QJ
131.
3

technological effects on our laws and norms, while many expected changes turn out to be
insignificant.15 Further, as Balkin opines, “The characteristics of a new technology, in short, are
partly the product of current use and partly the work of human imagination about potential
affordances and opportunities, dangers and threats.”16 Balkin claims that the law will resort to legal
fictions in the face of difficulties and “substitute robot for human to allow the law to function
effectively in the face of the legal enigmas posed by emergent behaviour. Or we might adopt legal
fictions to keep existing legal doctrines working provisionally until we can produce more thorough
and coherent reforms.”17

15

In 1991, for example, the World Wide Web’s “essential features were its abilities to cross jurisdictional lines at will,
to send digital information quickly and cheaply, and to facilitate anonymous communication.” However, by 1999 “it
was clearer that states could control features of the Internet traffic and that the degree of truly anonymous
communication the Internet afforded was overstated.” Balkin, supra note 11 at 47.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid at 58. As Boyle, supra note 13 at 17, indicated, Legal fictitious are not absent from law – “corporations are
artificial entities and yet we have chosen to classify them as legal persons to which many constitutional rights adhere.”
4

For many, the AI future is bright and promising. Predictions about future applications of
AI-based technology fill our books, academic papers, and news. Think about the prospects of
caregivers’ robots for the elderly, nanny-bots for infants or the promise of AI doctors,18
psychologies,19 lawyers,20 drivers,21 etc. Indeed, AI technology is affecting transportation,22 home
services,23 healthcare,24 education,25 public safety,26 employment and businesses,27 food
production and productivity,28 investment and finance,29 entertainment,30 government services,31
journalism,32 and may even provide an alternative to human interaction.33

18

See e.g. Parmy Olson, “This AI Just Beat Human Doctors On A Clinical Exam” (28 June 2018), online: Forbes
<forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2018/06/28/ai-doctors-exam-babylon-health/#63b1b1e312c0>.
19
Sam Shed, “Apple is hiring a counsellor to help Siri have ‘serious conversations’” (15 September 2017), online:
Business Insider <uk.businessinsider.com/apple-is-hiring-a-psychologist-to-help-siri-have-serious-conversations2017-9>.
20
The Legal-Tech industry provides a variety of research tools and services that could enhance lawyer’s work
significantly. Codex classified legal technologies into nine groups: marketplace, document automation, practice
management, legal research, legal education, online dispute resolution, e-discovery, analytics, and compliance.
Recently, Ontario Superior Court capped the costs awarded in a liability case stating that “[i]f artificial intelligence
sources were employed, no doubt counsel’s preparation time would have been significantly reduced.” Cass v 1410088
Ontario In, 2018 ONSC 6959. The Superior Court decision is interesting giving the possible impact on practicing
lawyers that would require to use AI legal search engines to save costs. See also Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett &
Albert H Yoon, “Law in the Future” (2016) 66:4 UTLJ 423; Beverley McLachlin, “The Legal Profession in the 21st
Century” (Remarks delivered at the 2015 Canadian Bar Association Plenary, Calgary, 14 August 2015); Chris
Johnson, “Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services” (2009) 23 Harv JL & Tech 259; Bernard Marr, “How
AI And Machine Learning Are Transforming Law Firms And The Legal Sector” (23 May 2018), online: Forbes
<forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/23/how-ai-and-machine-learning-are-transforming-law-firms-and-the-legalsector/#605ba3ab32c3>; Dan Mangan, “Lawyers could be the next profession to be replaced by computers” (17
February 2017), online: CNBC News <cnbc.com/2017/02/17/lawyers-could-be-replaced-by-artificialintelligence.html>.
21
There is an abundance of information concerning self-driving cars. See e.g. online: The Guardian recent reports
from November and October 2018 <www.theguardian.com/technology/self-driving-cars>. See also Harari, supra note
8, chapter 2 “work”.
22
Nevada passed legislation to authorize the use of driver-assistive platooning technology and the use of a fully
autonomous vehicle to provide transportation services. See US, AB 69, An Act Relating to Transportation, 2017, Sen
Assem, Nev 2017. See also recent discussions regarding self-driving legislation at the US, HR, Self-Driving Vehicle
Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection, 115 Cong (2017),
online: <energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/self-driving-vehicle-legislation>. On the Federal level, see US,
Department of Transportation, Automated Driving Systems 2.0 A Vision for Safety (2017), online (pdf):
<nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf>. According to the 100 Year
Study “[t]ransportation is likely to be one of the first domains in which the general public will be asked to trust the
reliability and safety of an AI system for a critical task”, Peter Stone et al, Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030 One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel (Stanford University Press,
2016) at 18, online (pdf): <ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report> [The 100 Year Study]. The 100 Year Study is the first in
a planned series of studies on AI. The purpose of the study is “to provide a collected and connected set of reflections
about AI and its influences as the field advances.” Ibid at 1. In Australia, a recent policy paper by the National
Transport Commission outline possible legislation changes concerning automated and self-driving cars, AUS,
National Transport Commission, Changing Driving Laws to Support Automated Vehicles (2017), online (pdf):
5

<ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(E5695ACE-993C-618F-46E1-A876391B8CD9).pdf>. See also Noah Zon & Sara Ditta,
Robot, Take the Wheel: Public Policy for Automated Vehicles (Mowat Research Publications, 2016) at 118; Janet
Fleetwood, “Public Health, Ethics, and Autonomous Vehicles” (2017) 107 AJPH 532; Patrick Lin, “Why Ethics
Matter for Autonomous Cars” in Markus Maurer, J, eds, Autonomous Driving: Technical, Legal and Social Aspects
(Springer, 2016) at 69-85. MIT Moral Machine experiment can highlight, in a very vivid way, the dilemmas that
engineers are facing in designing automated/self-driving cars, see <moralmachine.mit.edu>.
23
In the next decade (or even before), caregiver’s robots and other automated systems/AIs would be able to take over
a great load of our work at home and the office: “Special purpose robots will deliver packages, clean offices, and
enhance security, but technical constraints and the high costs of reliable mechanical devices will continue to limit
commercial opportunities to narrowly defined applications for the foreseeable future.” The 100 Year Study, ibid at
24.
24
I Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch & Effy Vayena, eds, Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge
University Press, 2018); Daniel Akst, “Computers Turn Medical Sleuths and Identify Skin Cancer” (10 February
2017), online: The Wall Street Journal <wsj.com/articles/computers-turn-medical-sleuths-and-identify-skin-cancer1486740634>; See also the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 25. AI-based systems can provide a better and most
accurate diagnostic while AI robots can change the clinical setting replacing humans as surgeons. In China, for
example, a robot dentist performed the first successful autonomous implant surgery recently. See Alice Yan, “Dentists
in China Successfully Used a Robot to Perform Implant Surgery Without Human Intervention” (1 September 2017),
online: Business Insider <businessinsider.com/dentists-in-china-used-a-robot-to-perform-implant-surgery-2017-9>.
For a futuristic example, see the short clip from Elysium (7 August 2013), online (video): YouTube
<youtube.com/watch?v=RyMoJHf7rCQ>.
25
AI promise to change our education system as well. Though, as the 100 Year Study have indicated, ibid at 31,
“computer-based learning systems are not likely to fully replace human teaching in schools,” AI technologies will
probably play an important role as an assistant tool for teachers and university professors. Even today, the use of
Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) applications in US high schools, universities and the military is growing. Students,
teachers and professors are getting used to online and other technological services. Recently, Osgoode Hall Law
School and the Faculty of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo, have offered an online course – Advanced
Research Topics: Artificial Intelligence: Law, Ethics, and Policy – in which the lecturer used a video conference
interface to broadcast the seminar from Waterloo to Toronto. I assume that in the future universities will offer more
interactive courses, which in turn will allow more people access to high education. Furthermore, other advantages in
technology will enhance the learning experience and effectively more students/users will prefer the online selflearning opportunities over the orthodox teaching methods. One possibility is using virtual and augmented realitybased technology. The future opportunities that AI presents in education probably will have a positive effect in third
world countries as well.
26
Deploying AI based technology to improve safety in cities has both positive and negative implications on our day
to day life. Take surveillance cameras for example. Using AI and machine-learning capabilities can improve the
chances of detecting crime and potential dangers (including terror activates) before posing any risk. AI systems would
be able to identify if someone is expressing tension or odd behaviour and dispatch law enforcement agencies to prevent
the crime. On the other hand, we might lose the minimal privacy we have left with making us all “naked” to the world.
There are several successful examples of using AI to detect and prevent Cybercrime. See Shannon Bond, “Artificial
Intelligence and Quantum Computing Aid Cyber Crime Fight” (24 May 2017), online: Financial Times
<ft.com/content/1b9bdc4c-2422-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025>.
6

27

As the 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 39, states “[t]he economic effects of AI on cognitive human jobs will be
analogous to the effects of automation and robotics on humans in manufacturing jobs. Many middle-aged workers
have lost well-paying factory jobs and the socio-economic status in family and society that traditionally went with
such jobs. However, at the end these changes might eventually create more work and raise the economic value of a
certain field.” Spyros Makridakis shares these views arguing that “[t]he expected changes being brought by AI
technologies will be just as, or even more significant as those of the Industrial revolution and much harder to predict.”
See Spyros Makridakis, “The Forthcoming Artificial Intelligence (AI) Revolution: Its Impact on Society and Firms”
(2017) 90 Futures 46 at 53. AI might also influence the location and size of the workforce making certain jobs in the
organization done by AI and effectively hire few people. Managing the workforce can also be done by an AI and from
a virtual office (saving the cost of maintaining offices). See also “Artificial intelligence will create new kinds of work”
(26 August 2017), online: The Economist <economist.com/news/business/21727093-humans-will-supply-digitalservices-complement-ai-artificial-intelligence-will-createnew?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/artificialintelligencewillcreatenewkindsofwork>; Harari, supra note 8, chapter 2. Several
people have expressed concern about high unemployment rates. See, e.g. Michael A Peters, “Technological
Unemployment: Educating for the Fourth Industrial Revolution” (2017) 5:1 Journal of Self-Governance and
Management Economics 25; John Barnett, “Will AI Revolution Lead to Mass Unemployment?” (24 April 2017),
online: Business <business.com/articles/john-barnett-artificial-intelligence-job-market>. However, as Mark Lemley
answers rhetorically: “What will people do when they no longer have to work to produce the goods and services they
need and want? I don’t know. But I am doubtful the answer is ‘nothing’.” see Mark Lemley, “IP in a World Without
Scarcity” (2015) 90 NYU L Rev 460 at 513 [Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity].
28
The World Economic Forum argues that new technology, AI included, “can create significant new value through
innovations for food systems.” See World Economic Forum, Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios
Analysis
(2017)
at
22,
online
(pdf):
<www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2016/NVA/WEF_FSA_FutureofGlobalFoodSystems.pdf>; A T Kearney, Technology
and Innovation for the Future of Production: Accelerating Value Creation (World Economic Forum, 2017), online
(pdf): <www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_White_Paper_Technology_Innovation_Future_of_Production_2017.pdf>.
Forbes offer several AI implications on improving agriculture (AgTech) such as automated harvesting and image
recognition systems that can detect plant’s pests. See Rob Trice, “Can Artificial Intelligence Help Feed The World?”
(5 September 2017), online: Forbes <forbes.com/sites/themixingbowl/2017/09/05/can-artificial-intelligence-helpfeed-the-world/#1d8854e446db>. See recently, The Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, “From Prediction to
Reality:
Ontario’s
AI
Opportunity”
(2018),
online
(pdf):
<competeprosper.ca/uploads/2018_From_prediction_to_reality_Ontarios__AI_opportunity.pdf>
[Ontario’s AI
Opportunity Report].
29
PWC has published a report assessing the impact of AI on the insurance industry. According to the report, AI is
expected to improve efficiencies and automating existing underwriting and claims processes. See PWC, “Top Issues:
AI in Insurance: Hype or Reality?” (2016), online (pdf): <pwc.com/us/en/insurance/publications/assets/pwc-topissues-artificial-intelligence.pdf>. Banks and stock markets are using AI algorithms with prediction analysis for
investments. See Matt Turner, “Machine Learning Is Now Used in Wall Street Dealmaking, and Bankers Should
Probably Be Worried” (4 April 2017), online: Business Insider <www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-using-machinelearning-in-investment-banking-2017-4>. See also Martin Arnold & Laura Noonan, “Robots enter investment banks’
trading floors’” (6 July 2017), online: Financial Times <www.ft.com/content/da7e3ec2-6246-11e7-88140ac7eb84e5f1>; Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, “Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You Ready to
Replace Your Bank?” (2016) 53 Hous L Rev 1211.
30
Makridakis, supra note 27 at 53, states the transition of the newspaper industry as an example to the change
technology might have on the markets. It is difficult to predict how AI technology will affect the entertainment
business. We can, however, suggest that it will not necessarily harm the industry by examining the effects of the
Internet on the same business. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27 at 487, explains that the Internet
Revolution did not harm the entertainment industry, on the contrary “the overall industry grew from $449 billion in
1998 to $745 billion in 2010.” See also Peter Menell & Ben Depoorter, “Using Fee Shifting to Promote Fair Use and
Fair Licensing” (2014) 102 Cal L Rev 53. Virtual and augmented reality have great potential for the entertainment
industry. See Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, “Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality” (2018) 166:5 Penn St
L Rev 1051.
31
Aviv Gaon & Ian Stedman, “A Call to Action: Moving Forward with the Governance of Artificial Intelligence in
Canada”, 56:4 Alta L Rev [forthcoming in 2019]. One example is using AI for decision making in processing
immigration applications, see Teresa Wright, “Canada’s Use of Artificial Intelligence in Immigration Could Lead to
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Even the orthodox and conservative field of legal services have not escaped AI technology
influence, to some extent.34 In a recent book, Richard and Daniel Susskind argue for two possible
scenarios for the future of professions in the age of AI: The first is a “more efficient version of
what we already have today.” The working force will remain relatively the same but will “heavily
standardize and systemize their routine activities.” The other scenario involves a “transformation
in the way that expertise of professionals is made available in society.” The Susskinds argue that
“capable systems will … displace much of the work of traditional professionals.”35 These scholarly
discussions might seem fruitless, given the current stage of AI; however, there are significant
advancements in the commercial application of AI technology and, as several reports have
indicated, AI is expected to affect many creative industries.36
Others view these expected developments as a real threat to humanity. The late theoretical
physicist, Stephen Hawking, has stated that “success in creating AI would be the biggest event in
human history. Unfortunately, it might also be the last.”37 Elon Musk shares Hawking’s

Break of Human Rights: Study” (26 September 2018), online: Global News <globalnews.ca/news/4487724/canadaartificial-intelligence-human-rights>.
32
Noam Lemelshtrich Latar observes that “within 5-10 years, the majority of all journalistic text stories will be written
by robots.” Noam L Latar, Robot Journalism: Can Human Journalism Survive? (World Scientific Publishing Co Pte
Ltd, 2018) at 29.
33
Sex robots for example. Ian Yeoman and Michelle Mars discuss the benefits of sex robots (mainly in the sex
industry) and provide several scenarios for that future. See Ian Yeoman & Michelle Mars, “Robots, men and sex
tourism” (2012) 44 Future 365. Will human “fall in love” with robots? See Noel Sharkey et al, “Our Sexual Future
with
Robots”
(2017),
online
(pdf):
<responsible-robotics-myxf6pn3xr.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/FRR-Consultation-Report-Our-Sexual-Future-with-robots-1-1.pdf>.
34
See e.g. Beatson, supra note 12; Kevin D Ashley, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Analytics: New Tools for Law
Practice in the Digital Age (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Lauren H Scholz, “Algorithmic Contracts” (2017)
20 Stan Tech L Rev 128; David A Larson, “Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the Demise of the Human
Mediator” (2010) 25:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 105.
35
Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of
Human Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 9.
36
See e.g. Hasan Bakhshi, Carl B Frey & Michael Osborne, Creativity Vs. Robots: The Creative Economy and the
Future
of
Employment
(NESTA,
2015),
online
(pdf):
<robots.ox.ac.uk/~mosb/public/pdf/1866/creativity_vs._robots_wv.pdf>.
37
Stephen Hawking et al, “Stephen Hawking: ‘Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence - but
are
we
taking
AI
seriously
enough?’”
(1
May
2014),
online:
The
Independent
<independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificialintelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html>.
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assessment, stating that if he had to guess what is humanity biggest risk, AI might be it.38 Jean
Gabriel Castel has predicted that when AI reaches the next stage of evolution (superintelligence),39 it will become the most powerful being on Earth.40
I do not share these ominous predictions. As the 100 Year Study suggests, with all the risks
AI might pose to humanity it has a greater positive potential “to make driving safer, help children
learn, and extend and enhance people’s lives.”41 Nevertheless, we should embrace AI technology
with caution, addressing the many legal, ethical and technological challenges posed by AI. As
Ryan Calo recently offered, “[D]evoting disproportionate attention and resources to the AI
apocalypse has the potential to distract policymakers from addressing AI’s more immediate harms
and challenges and could discourage investment in research on AI’s present social impacts.”42
Part I lays the groundwork for the theoretical part that follows. I first discuss AI from three
different angles: I highlight important historical milestones in the development of AI, briefly
explaining the current state of AI research, and offer projections and analysis for the upcoming
decades. I then expand on the concept of AI, delving deeper into the origin of the “artificial
intelligence” concept in a quest to refine and redefine the term from a legal perspective. Finally, I

38

Samuel Gibbs, “Elon Musk: Artificial Intelligence Is Our Biggest Existential Threat” (27 October 2014), online:
The Guardian <theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/27/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-ai-biggest-existentialthreat>.
39
Bostrom defines superintelligence as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in
virtually all domains of interest.” Bostrom, supra note 8 at 22.
40
J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 4. The Centre of Existential Risk at Cambridge and The Future of Humanity
Institute at Oxford University warns from the risks AI technology might pose. See e.g. Strategic Artificial Intelligence
Research Centre <fhi.ox.ac.uk/research/research-areas/strategic-centre-for-artificial-intelligence-policy>. See also
Edward M Geist, “Is Artificial Intelligence Really an Existential Threat to Humanity?” (9 August 2015), online:
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Book Review <thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threathumanity8577>. These ominous predictions are not shared by everyone. See Eric Sofge, “Why Artificial Intelligence
Will Not Obliterate Humanity: It’s Not Smart Enough to Turn Sinister” (19 March 2015), online: Popular Science
<popsci.com/why-artificial-intelligence-will-not-obliterate-humanity>.
41
The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 6.
42
Ryan Calo, “Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and a Road Map” (2017) 51:2 UC Davis L Rev 399 at 431
[Calo – AI Policy].
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conclude the discussion and segue into Part II, where I outline the IP theoretical discussion and
consider whether AI technology is applicable to one or more of IP theories. In Part II, I also discuss
the developments of computer software legal protection and the implications of IP laws for
technology in the future. In Part III, I further develop the copyright discussion seeking an answer
to the question of “who” is the author of AI creation – the programmer, the user, the AI - or whether
AI creations should be left in the public domain. I also examine copyright standards and machine
creativity. In Part IV, I discuss my conclusions and provide a road map for AI authorship.
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1.2 THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR
1.2.1

The AI Momentum

AI technology is in some respects older than many people realize. The term “artificial intelligence”
was coined during the mid-1950s.43 However, the origins of AI as a field of research go back to
Alan Turing’s investigations of computer intelligence.44 Though many continued Turing’s
research in the ensuing decades, it was not until the mid-late 1990s or early 2000s that AI gained
momentum as a field.45
In his popular book, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology,46 Ray
Kurzweil47 reflects on the future of humanity in the upcoming decades of meta-ideas and mass
information.48 Kurzweil defines singularity as “a future period during which the pace of
technological change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly
transformed.”49 “The key idea,” explains Kurzweil, “is that the pace of change of our humancreated technology is accelerating, and its powers are expanding at an exceptional pace.”50 Given
recent developments, Kurzweil argues that information-based technology will engulf all human

43

Russell & Norvig, supra note 6; McCorduck, supra note 3; John McCarthy et al, “A Proposal for the Dartmouth
Summer Project on Artificial Intelligence” (Dartmouth University, 1955), online: <wwwformal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html> [The Dartmouth Proposal].
44
Alan M Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) LIX:236 Mind 433. Alan Turing was a British
mathematician who played a major role during the Second World War in the decryption of the infamous Nazi
“Enigma” machine.
45
US, Executive Office of the President, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence (2016) at 5-6, online (pdf):
<obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_futur
e_of_ai.pdf> (providing a short summary of the history of AI) [Preparing for the Future of AI Report]; US, Executive
Office of the President, The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan (2016) at 12,
online (pdf): <nitrd.gov/PUBS/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf> (outline the current state of AI) [US AI Strategic
Plan]; The 100 Year Study, supra note 22 at 50-2 (a concise summary of AI history).
46
Kurzweil, supra note 8 at 7; See also Murray Shanahan, The Technological Singularity (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 2015).
47
Ray Kurzweil is a distinguished computer science researcher and considered the “guru” of artificial intelligence. He
is the Director of Engineering at Google since 2012. His blog <kurzweilai.net> is a main source for information about
AI technology.
48
Kurzweil, supra note 8 at 3.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid at 7-8.
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knowledge and proficiencies in the upcoming decades, “ultimately including the patternrecognition powers, problem-solving skills, and emotional and moral intelligence of the human
brain itself.”51
We can find support for Kurzweil’s predictions in books, articles, and scientific progress.52
Take, for example, the fact that the computational capacity of the human brain was estimated in
2015 to be in the range of 1018 computations per second, whereas computer speeds between 2007
and 2015 grew at a rate of 82 percent per year.53 However, not everyone shares Kurzweil’s
optimism. Despite the progress in recent years, most of the AI advancement has been made in an
area considered “narrow AI”.54 Little progress, if any, has been attributed in “general AI”.55
William Nordhaus challenges Kurzweil’s assumptions as well.56 Nordhaus claims that we
are not on the verge of accelerated change – or at least not soon, as Kurzweil, Schmidt, and Cohen
contend.57 Nordhaus offers a rebuttal: where are the economic signs of singularity? If we are indeed

51

Ibid at 8.
J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at 1; See also Gordon E Moore, “Moore’s Law at 40” in David C Brock, ed,
Understanding Moore’s Law: Four Decades of Innovation (Philadelphia: Chemical Heritage Foundation, 2006);
Vincent C Müller & Nick Bostrom, “Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert opinion” in Vincent
C Müller, ed, Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Springer Berlin, 2016) at 553; Bostrom, supra note 8.
53
William D Nordhaus, “Are We Approaching an Economic Singularity? Information Technology and the Future of
Economic Growth” (2015) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 2021 at 4. J G Castel & M Castel, supra note 8 at
footnote 7, indicate that “one of the world’s fastest supercomputers is China’s Tianhe-2 which has very large hardware,
uses megawatts of power and cost US $390 million to build. Its total calculations per second can reach 33.86
Petaflops/s (quadrillion) which is much more than a human brain’s capacity to calculate.”
54
US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 14. The report explains the difference between narrow and general AI, ibid
at 19: “Narrow AI systems perform individual tasks in specialized, well-defined domains, such as speech recognition,
image recognition, and translation … the long-term goal of general AI is to create systems that exhibit the flexibility
and versatility of human intelligence in a broad range of cognitive domains, including learning, language, perception,
reasoning, creativity, and planning. Broad learning capabilities would provide general AI systems the ability to transfer
knowledge from one domain to another and to interactively learn from experience and from humans.”
55
US AI Strategic Plan, supra note 45 at 14. The recent UK report on AI have reached a similar conclusion. See UK,
Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: Ready, Willing and Able? (16 April 2018) at 15, online
(pdf): <publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf> [AI in the UK report].
56
Nordhaus, supra note 53.
57
Eric Schmidt & Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business (London:
John Murray, 2013). See also Shanahan, supra note 46; Ryan Calo, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, Or: Why Weak AI Is
Interesting Enough” (30 August 2011), online (blog): The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School
Blog <cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2011/08/sorcerers-apprentice-or-why-weak-ai-interesting-enough>.
52
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on the brink of an accelerated technological era, there should already be signs indicating that the
“singularity” is indeed near. Nordhaus’ research reveals few indications that support the
accelerated singularity argument; in fact, he finds that only two of seven economic tests indicate
an imminent singularity.58 It is his view that “the time at which the economy might plausibly cross
the Singularity is 100 years or more” in the future.59
A prudent approach might prove to be a good idea. After all, humanity is inclined to reject
revolutionary ideas until they materialize. In 1828, it was the famous economist Jean-Baptiste Say
who concluded that no machine would ever be able to perform what even the worst horses could.60
He was wrong. In less than 200 years humanity moved from horses to automated vehicles. From
a historical perspective, these advancements were as fast as a lightning strike.
In the past decade, several surveys and studies have sought to answer the very same and
intriguing question – when will we reach high-level machine intelligence?61 Indeed, with no
substantive scientific evidence that can point to a conclusive result, expert opinions might be the
most reliable source we have to establish whether an AI revolution is indeed upon us, and if so,
when.
The first surveys were taken in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, attendees of the AI@50 conference
were given a set of questions. 41% agreed that computers would be able to simulate every aspect

58

Which Nordhaus defines as “a time when the economic growth rate crosses 20% per year.” Nordhaus, supra note
53 at 28-9.
59
Ibid at 28. The singularity argument is relevant to the question of when we can expect a singularity “moment”. If
we accept Kurzweil’s argument, we might as well accept the general idea that in a decade or two AI will become a
significant part of our lives. On the other hand, if we accept Nordhaus’ argument, we might agree with Arthur Miller’s
statement that these issues are too futuristic, and we should address them in due course. I shall contend that even if
Nordhaus is correct, and the singularity era is in no way near, it is nonetheless important to consider the effects of
singularity. For Miller’s work see Arthur R Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since Contu?” (1993) 106 Harv L Rev 977.
60
Jean B Say, Cours Complet D’economie Politique Pratique (Chez Rapilly, 1828).
61
AGI, or General AI, is the term used in computer science to describe future AI systems that can express human level
intelligence. See also supra note 54.
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of human intelligence in more than 50 years, while the same percentage thought this scenario
would never happen.62 Bruce Klein took a different survey the following year.63 Klein asked only
one specific question: “When would AI surpass human intelligence?” Most respondents expressed
the notion that AI will surpass human intelligence during the next half of the century.64
The next survey was initiated during the second conference on artificial general
intelligence held in 2009 (AGI-09).65 The AGI-09 attendees (21 in total) were given a survey on
the theme of “How long till AGI?”66 According to Baum, Goertzel and Goertzel, “[M]ost experts
expect human-level AI to be reached within upcoming decades, and all experts give at least some
chance that some milestones will be reached within this time.”67 75% expect that AI will pass the
Turing test by 2050 and 50% believe that AI will reach the stage of superhuman by the year 2045.
Most experts assume, with almost certainty, that AI will surpass human capabilities by the end of
this century.68
Not surprisingly, most respondents believe that massive AI funding “would cause the AI
milestones to be reached sooner.”69 The study also revealed a disagreement concerning the order
of the developments (which stages come first).70 In referring to the earlier studies from 2006 and
62

Seth D Baum, Ben Goertzel & Ted G Goertzel, “How Long Until Human-Level AI? Results from an Expert
Assessment” (2011) 78:1 Tech Forecasting & Soc Change 185 at 186 [Baum, Goertzel & Goertzel]. See also, online:
<aiimpacts.org/ai50-survey>.
63
Klein survey is hard to access, though mentioned in both Müller & Bostrom’s, supra note 52, and Baum, Goertzel
& Goertzel’s, supra note 62 at 187. There are several limitations to Klien’s survey. First, it is an informal study. Klein
relays on a broad population – 888 responses – consists of non-experts. Second, the study focuses on one issue –
superhuman AI.
64
150 (17%) stated that superhuman AI will be reached between 2020 and 2030 while 231 (26%) believed superhuman
AI will be reached between 2030 and 2050. 81 (9%) responded that superhuman AI is expected beyond the year 2100.
Only 64 (7%) responded that superhuman AI will never happen. Baum, Goertzel & Goertzel, supra note 62 at 187.
65
James Barrat & Ben Goertzel, “How Long Till AGI? — Views of AGI-11 Conference Participants” (16 September
2011), online: Images <hplusmagazine.com/2011/09/16/how-long-till-agi-views-of-agi-11-conference-participants>.
66
Baum, Goertzel & Goertzel, supra note 62 at 188. The participants “have a range of levels of expertise, from
graduate students to senior researchers.”
67
Ibid at 185.
68
Ibid at 189-190.
69
Ibid at 190. It should be noted, however, that for most respondents the difference was small – a few years only.
70
Ibid at 191. For example, one expert stated that an AI might wish to hide its mental superiorities.
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2007, Baum, Goertzel and Goertzel conclude that “it is likely that AGI at the human level or
beyond will occur around the middle of this century, and plausibly even sooner.”71
During the same year that Baum, Goertzel and Goertzel published their study, James Barrat
conducted an informal survey of his own among 200 attendees of the 2011 Artificial General
Intelligence conference (AGI-11). Barrat’s informal survey, published later in his book,72 showed
similar results to the AGI-09 survey.73
Finally, Vincent Müller and Nick Bostrom’s 2016 study collected predictions from 550 AI
experts. The survey focused on individuals from four different groups: AI philosophers and
theorists, technical experts, members of the Greek Association for AI and top AI authors.74 Müller
and Bostrom were interested in the probability of a high-level machine intelligence (HLMI) in the
future.75 Most of the respondents asserted that AI was likely to reach human ability by 2040-50
(over 50%),76 and 90% believe it is very likely to happen by 2075. 10% responded that after
reaching human capacity, it would take two more years for an AI to become superintelligence,
while 75% thought that it would take longer – up to 30 years (or less). Only 31% believe that these
developments would turn out to be bad or extremely bad for humanity.

71

Ibid at 194.
James Barrat, Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era (New York: Thomas Dunne
Books, 2013).
73
Ibid at 196.
74
Müller & Bostrom, supra note 52 at 2.
75
The exact phrasing of the question, ibid at 9: “For the purposes of this question, assume that human scientific activity
continues without major negative disruption. By what year would you see a (10% / 50% / 90%) probability for such
HLMI to?” For each of these three probabilities, the respondents were asked to select a year [2012–5000, in one-year
increments] or check a box marked “never”.
76
Ibid at 14-5. Kurzweil “set the date for the Singularity – representing a profound and disruptive transformation in
human capability – as 2045. The nonbiological intelligence created in that year will be one billion times more powerful
than all human intelligence today.” See Ray Kurzweil, “Singularity Q&A” (9 December 2011), online (blog): Ray
Kurzweil <kurzweilai.net/singularity-q-a>.
72
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Given the futuristic nature of these questions, no expert can provide any substantial
evidence for such forecasts.77 The studies I have outlined offer different perspectives to the
prospect of AI intelligence. It seems that there is a consensus that we will reach human-level
intelligence (or artificial general intelligence) within the next three decades (between 2020 and
2050) and following singularity, superhuman intelligence is expected soon after. Among the many
experts, only a small fraction is willing to indicate that we will never achieve human-level
intelligence.78 Thus, there is overwhelming support among leading experts for the probability that
AI will reach singularity in the coming decades. However, it might not matter when exactly
singularity happens. Whenever it might be reached, there is no reason not to be planning for its
legal consequences.
A review of the recent history of computer science developments can provide guidance,
allowing us to understand better what lies ahead.
1.2.2

A Look Back – A Brief History of AI

AI development began with dreams. Throughout history, humans have always been fascinated by
the concept of non-human creations. Pamela McCorduck has traced several routes to AI:
imagination (“what might be”); philosophical inquiry (“the bridge between imagination and what
is”); what is or present realities (“artificial intelligence as it has been realized since the
development of the digital computer”).79
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In the “imagination era”, AI was treated much like the product of the Gods of old. Gods
created non-human beings to protect or to threaten humans, and stories in Greek and Egyptian
mythology stand as a testament to human imagination.80 However, imagination was only the
beginning: “From the sixteenth century on, a population explosion of automata took place,” and
soon what people perceived as the power of Gods (or magic) came to life.81 McCorduck explains
that “[t]he art of mechanical statues flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”82 and,
by the nineteenth century, the AI “that penetrated and dwelled in people’s imaginations [was]
composed of the printed word rather than wood and metal and cloth.”83
Calculating machines were the next evolutionary step. Blaise Pascal built the first
calculating machine in 1642,84 and, in 1822, Charles Babbage “constructed a small working model
of his automatic table calculator.”85 Practical problems drove Babbage and his predecessors and
successors. However, “artificial intelligence … did not originate in the search for solutions to
practical problems, though even its severest critics agree that it has made many useful
contributions.”86
Contrary to common belief, the German engineer Konrad Zuse (and not British or
American engineers) created the first general-purpose program-controlled digital computer.87
Russell and Norvig argue that the first AI work was done by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts
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in 1943. McCulloch and Pitts “proposed a model of artificial neurons in which each neuron is
characterized as being ‘on’ or ‘off,’ with a switch to ‘on’ occurring in response to stimulation by
a sufficient number of neighboring neurons.”88
In 1946, Alan Turing mentioned “the idea of a computer showing ‘intelligence,’ with
chess-playing as a paradigm.”89 Turing is best known for his “imitation game”, the name Turing
gave to his AI test (known simply as the Turing test). In 1950, Turing published the paper
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence”,90 in which he argued for the possibility of creating a
human level of intelligence in computer programs. In 1952, Turing played a game “in which he
simulated the computer, taking about half an hour per move” as he possessed no computer with
the requisite capabilities.91 Turing aspired to “test whether the artifact was indistinguishable from
a person with regard to what he took to be pertinent property, verbal behavior.”92
Turing proposed to answer the question, “Can machines think?” However, Turing rejected
the idea of defining the terms “machine” and “think” with “the normal use of the words”. Turing
claimed that this attitude is “dangerous”, and might make it “difficult to escape the conclusion that
the meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can machines think?’ is to be sought in a statistical
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survey such as a Gallup poll.” Instead, Turing offered to “replace the question by another, which
is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words.”93
Unlike a metric measurement or other technical tests, “the identification of the pertinent
properties for intelligence are subtle, and ramified widely in the foundation of the philosophy of
the mind.”94 Turing’s test was designed to establish which element in the “game” is human and
which is machine through verbal interrogation; if the interrogator cannot ascertain which of the
players is human, the machine has passed the imitation game, since the machine is able to imitate
human behaviour. However, even if a machine does “pass” the imitation test and “tricks” the
human interrogator, does it mean that this machine is indeed capable of thoughts and possesses
intelligence?95
The first stage of AI development following the Turing era, was nicknamed the “Toy
Problem” stage. As Nils Nilsson explains, “Solving puzzles, playing games such as chess and
checkers,96 proving theorems, answering simple questions, and classifying visual images were
among some of the problems tackled by the early pioneers during the 1950s and early 1960s.”97
During that decade, three important meetings coincided with the emergence of AI as a full-fledged
field of research: the 1955 Session on Learning Machines that was held in conjunction with the
1955 Western Joint Computer Conference in Los Angeles; the 1956 Summer Research Project on
AI held at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire; and the 1958 symposium on the
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Mechanization of Thought Processes held at the National Physical Laboratory, Teddington,
Middlesex, England.98
The Dartmouth workshop is considered the first conference to coin the term AI.99 The
workshop was spearheaded by the founding fathers of AI: John McCarthy (mathematician),
Nathaniel Rochester (computer scientist), Claude Shannon (mathematician) and Marvin Minsky
(cognitive scientist).100 The scope of the workshop was described in the proposal written by
McCarthy for the Rockefeller Foundation in August 1955:101
“The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any
other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can
be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to find how to make machines use language,
form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and
improve themselves …
… For the present purpose the artificial intelligence problem is taken to be that of making
a machine behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a human were so behaving.”

The Mechanization of Thought Processes symposium was the third important event in the field of
AI. Held in the UK in 1958, only a few years after the conclusion of the Dartmouth workshop, the
symposium’s goal was “to bring together scientists studying artificial thinking, character and
pattern recognition, learning, mechanical language translation, biology, automatic programming,
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industrial planning and clerical mechanization.”102 Several of the papers that were presented during
this symposium influenced the history of AI significantly.
From the early stages of AI development, researchers felt confident enough to share their
prediction about the foreseeability of AI success. Herbert Simon, for example, stated that “within
10 years a computer would be chess champion, and a significant mathematical theorem would be
proved by machine.”103 These predictions would come true four decades later.
During the 1950s and 1960s, scientists were focused on the Logic Theorist (LT) software104
as well as pattern recognition105 of two-dimensional segments such as photographs or pages.
Russell and Norvig outline three difficulties AI faced during that decade. First, “early programs
knew nothing of their subject matter; they succeeded by means of simple syntactic
manipulations.”106 The attempts to translate Russian scientific papers after Sputnik’s launch in
1957 serve as a vivid example of this difficulty. As every Google-translate user knows today, it is
highly complex to translate words in their original context, and an accurate translation requires a
background in both languages to resolve ambiguities. For this reason, the early attempts to use
programs in these efforts failed miserably. Subsequently, the US government dropped the idea and
all the funding for academic translation was cancelled. The second difficulty “was the intractability
of many of the problems that AI was attempting to solve.”107 Third, there were “some fundamental
limitations on the basic structures being used to generate intelligent behavior.”108
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During the 1960s and into the 1970s, AI research progressed modestly.109 Developments
in the 1960s were influenced by several factors, including new computer languages, computer
vision,110 mobile robots,111 problem-solving of mechanizing intelligent behaviour,112 government
agencies support,113 and the founding of the Automatic Language Processing114 Advisory
Committee (ALPAC).115 Books116 and conferences also promoted developments in the field of AI
during this decade.117
The 1970s saw a shift from “toy problems” and controlled laboratory environments toward
applied work dealing with “real world” issues.118 Nilsson points to two possible reasons for this
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shift: the increase in power of AI methods and US government investment in research relevant to
military needs.119 The 1970s witnessed an increase in speech recognition research as well,120 and
a study group was formed “to make recommendations concerning the launching of a major
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) – supported project in speech
understanding.”121
By the mid-1970s, the pressure for militarily useful systems intensified, and DARPA
focused on shifting resources based on the agenda of the US Department of Defense (DoD).122
Computer vision “grew into a highly developed subspecialty of AI, joining other specialized areas
such as natural language processing, robotics, knowledge representation, and reasoning.”123 In
1976, DARPA launched its Image Understanding Program. The goals of the program were
outlined in a 1977 workshop: “The Image Understanding Program is planned to be a five year
research effort to develop the technology required for automatic and semiautomatic interpretation
and analysis of military photographs and related images.”124 By 1979, the Image Understanding
Program’s goals extended to mapping and cartography.125 Though it was supposed to end in 1981,
it ended up lasting until 2001.126
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The early 1980s saw progress in expert systems and AI technologies such as image and
speech understanding, as well as natural language processing. This accompanied dramatic progress
in communications technology, computer networks, and processing technology.127 The American
Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)128 was founded in this decade, as was Japan’s Fifth
Generation Computer System AI initiative.129 The goal of the Japanese initiative “was to produce
computers that could perform AI-style inferences from large data and knowledge bases and
communicate with humans using natural language.”130 The Fifth Generation, besides having
sophisticated software, was built to involve many parallel processors using ultra-large-scale
integration.131
Growing Japanese dominance in consumer electronics and manufacturing made the
American computer industry worry that its world leadership in technology might be weakening.
The nonprofit Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) was therefore
formed in 1983. The MCC focused on four areas: advanced computer architectures, software
technology, microelectronics packaging, and computer-aided design of very large-scale
integration circuitry.132 Concern about the Japanese initiative contributed to DARPA’s new
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“Strategic Computing Program”,133 in which AI played a major role.134 The British reacted to the
Japanese project by forming a committee,135 while the European Economic Community
established the European Strategic Program of Research in Information Technology (ESPRIT).136
Throughout the 1980s, AI enjoyed increased popularity and commercial success. “New
results unfolded in all of its subfields, including reasoning and representation, machine learning,137
natural language processing, and computer vision.”138 In the beginning of the 1980s many,
including government and industry leaders, shared great expectations of the potential for AI. As
Russell and Norvig offer, “Overall, the AI industry boomed from a few million dollars in 1980 to
billions of dollars in 1988, including hundreds of companies building expert systems, vision
systems, robots, and software and hardware specialized for these purposes.”139
However, this honeymoon period did not last, and the end of the decade was nicknamed
the “AI Winter”.140 During the AI Winter, funding to AI was cut, and many companies went out
of business. The common explanation for the change toward AI research is the high expectations
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driven by the over-optimism of AI scientists. When the realization grew that an AI singularity was
not on the horizon, confidence in AI’s ability sank, and, with it, funding.141
The late 1980s also marked the growing interest of the legal community in AI. One
significant event occurred in May 1987 with the first international conference on AI & law (known
since as ICAIL) in Boston, US.142 The ICAIL is considered the “birth of an AI and Law
community.”143 Few other indications for the emergence of an AI & Law community followed the
establishment of what would soon become ICAIL traditions. First came the EU Jurix conferences
that have been held since 1988 annually. Second came the founding, in 1992, of the AI & Law
Journal. Third came the holding of the international association for AI and Law inaugural meeting
in 1991 during the third ICAIL.144
1.2.3

Current Trends in AI – Assessing the AI Potential and Risks

1.2.3.1 The (Re)emergence of AI Technology
The 1990s and 2000s marked a new era for AI as developments in computer science (especially in
neural-networks in the mid-2000s) increased its potential.145 Since then there were several
significant achievements, mainly after the 1997 victory of IBM’s Deep Blue computer over the
chess champion Garry Kasparov.146 In 2011, IBM’s Watson won the trivia game show Jeopardy!,
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and in the same year DARPA developed CALO (Cognitive Agent that Learns and Organizes),
which would lead to Apple’s Siri.147 In early 2016, an AI computer (AlphaGo) defeated a human
master in the game of Go,148 and in January 2017, Libratus, an AI computer program, beat the best
poker players in the world in matches worth more than $1.7 million USD in chips.149
Machines are outsmarting humans not only in games but also in the labour market.
Algorithms are increasingly being used in fields like insurance, finance, human resources and
medicine.150 Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett and Albert Yoon offer that “[m]achines today not
only perform mechanical or manual tasks once performed by humans, but they are also performing
thinking tasks, where it was long believed that human judgment was indispensable. From selfdriving cars to self-flying planes, and from robots performing surgery on a pig to artificially
intelligent personal assistants, so much of what was once unimaginable is now reality.”151
These advancements in AI have become possible as a result of developments in AI
research. Russell and Norvig suggest that one of the most important effects on AI research was the
Internet: AI systems become very common in web-based applications, and AI technologies
underlie many Internet tools such as search engines.152 During that time, researchers were drawn
back to early aspirations to create a general intelligent agent – AI that can perform a wide range of
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tasks and can learn and use knowledge in a similar way to humans.153 Further, AI has become
dominant in other fields, creating a mixture of approaches which in turn speeds up progress in
areas such as robotic cars.154
The US AI Strategic Plan describes three waves of technological advancement in recent
decades. The first focused on handcrafted knowledge, with a strong rule-based expert system “in
which knowledge was collected from a human expert, expressed in ‘if-then’ rules, and then
implemented in hardware.” The second wave began with the new millennium and characterized
by the advancement of machine learning.155 The current wave of progress began around 2010 and
is driven by three factors.156 First is the availability of big data from sources including social media,
business, e-commerce, science, and government.157 Second, these data provide the raw material
for improving machine-learning approaches and algorithms.158 Third, the latter in turn rely on the
capabilities of more powerful computers.159
In a hearing before the US Senate Committee on Commerce Subcommittee on Space,
Science and Competitiveness in 2016,160 Eric Horvitz concurred with the assessment that a key
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factor in the rate of AI development is “the availability of unprecedented streams of data, coupled
with drops in the cost of storing and retrieving that data.”161 Other important factors “include
dramatic increases in available computing power, and jumps in the prowess of methods for
performing machine learning and reasoning. The past thirty years of AI research also saw the rise
and maturation of methods for representing and reasoning under uncertainty.”162
As the US AI Strategic Plan has indicated: “[F]rom 2013 to 2015 the number of Web of
Science-indexed journal articles mentioning ‘deep learning’ increased six-fold ... The trends also
reveal the increasingly global nature of research, with the United States no longer leading the world
in publication numbers, or even publications receiving at least one citation.”163 Further, the US AI
Strategic Plan stated a sharp increase “in the number of patents that use the term ‘deep learning’
or ‘deep neural net’ … a four-fold increase in venture capital directed to AI startups” (between
2013 and 2014) and other significant implications on financial systems and large businesses.164
It seems that humanity has already passed through the three routes described by
McCorduck.165 We are now climbing the steps toward the next route: singularity. This route is
much different from the others since in many ways humans might not be able to control their pace
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– or turn back. None can tell what we might find when we push forward in this direction.
Humanity’s dreams (or nightmares) may come true.
1.2.3.2 Regulating AI166
Recent developments have stirred both interest in and concern about the AI revolution. Several
authors have discussed the urgency with which we must think about prudent AI policy and have
offered suggestions for regulatory changes that can minimize risks without hindering innovation.
Under former US president, Barack Obama, the US has made significant progress in developing
AI policy.
The Obama administration formed the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
subcommittee on machine learning and AI. Soon after, NSTC instructed the Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) subcommittee to establish a
National AI Research and Development (R&D) Strategic Plan, founding a “task force” on AI to
shape the US Federal Strategic Plan for AI R&D.
The US AI Strategic Plan supports priorities areas that are unlikely to be addressed by the
industry itself167 “and thus areas that are most likely to benefit from Federal investment.”168 The
US AI Strategic Plan’s report concluded with two recommendations: First, “[d]evelop an AI R&D
implementation framework to identify S&T [science and technology] opportunities and support
effective coordination of AI R&D investments”; second, “[s]tudy the national landscape for
166
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creating and sustaining a healthy AI R&D workforce.”169 The Obama administration published
two additional reports on future considerations on AI: “Preparing for the Future of AI” and “AI
and the Economy”. Both reports survey expected changes (market, labour force, etc.), AI and
automation potential to the US economy and make recommendations.170
In Canada, the 2017 and the 2018 budgets emphasized Canada’s strategic plan in the
“digital future”, committing $125 million in its 2017 budget to launch a “Pan-Canadian Artificial
Intelligence Strategy for research and talent,” and $1.7 billion over five years for research in the
2018 budget.171 The 2017 budget set the stage for building an AI policy in Canada by shifting
resources toward AI R&D.172 The task of managing the AI funds was assigned to the Canadian
Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), which will implement the AI Strategy in order to
promote collaboration between Canada’s main centres of expertise.
Following the 2017 budget, the Federal Government has recognized the strategic
importance of AI to Canada and has invested heavily in AI including earmarked $950 million to
fund the AI superclusters and executing AI strategy.173 Among Canada’s provinces, Ontario’s AI
initiatives focus mainly on education.174 According to a recent report, Canadian efforts are starting
169
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to pay off and “[t]he country is being recognized on the world stage for creating products and
services that are leading the field.”175
Matthew Castel and Jean Gabriel Castel have outlined several policy considerations that
provincial and the federal governments should address regarding AI risks and concerns.176 They
suggest imposing a legal status on self-driving cars and other AIs and robots,177 and recommend
introducing a registration system for advanced robots.178 The Castels go as far as to support
entitling AI to the full protections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a bold, and
somewhat premature, proposal.179 I share the Castels’ view that the most pressing issue in the field
of AI is self-driving cars and their concern that the current laws in Canada are not suitable for
introducing this technology as well as other urgent challenges posed by developments in AI.180
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In the UK, the Science and Technology Committee of the House of Commons raised the
call to “establish a RAS [Robotics and Autonomous Systems] Leadership Council.”181 Following
the announcement, the House of Lords appointed a Select Committee on AI “to consider the
economic, ethical and social implications of advances in artificial intelligence.”182 The committee
has recently published its final report on April 2018 asserting that the UK is in a strong position to
become a leading country in AI development offering several recommendations to mitigate AI
risks and providing policy suggestions.183
The EU produced several policy papers further highlighted the need to establish a legal
mechanism for AI.184 In 2016, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs urged the EU
Commission “to consider creating a European agency for robotics and artificial intelligence to
supply public authorities with technical, ethical and regulatory expertise” (a suggestion that the
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Castels are willing to see adopted in Canada as well).185 Japan,186 China,187 Singapore,188
Australia189, Israel190 and other countries have invested and are investing resources in emerging
technologies, and have introduced regulatory changes concerning AI. It seems that all the key
players in the world are interested in investigating AI’s potential and coming up with the right AI
policy.
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First, why do we need an AI policy to begin with?191 Why do governments need to invest
in and support areas that are currently driven efficiently by large and well-funded corporations
such as Google,192 Facebook,193 Microsoft,194 Uber and others? Indeed, there are risks. Although,
as most scientists have indicated, far less imminent than the dangers posed by North Korea, Iran,
the war on terror, and global warming, especially since there is no consensus among scientists that
AI might even pose any significant risks in the future. Why should we not allow the market to
regulate itself and adopt its own ethical guidelines?
One reason is that the fact that there are larger risks does not mean we should avoid lower
level risks posed by AI, algorithms, and machine-learning technology. Another reason, as Ryan
Calo suggested, is that the industry might not be willing to adopt policies or guidelines unless
forced to do so.195 The market is not always the best regulator and Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”
cannot provide the assurances of safety required by the public. This is especially true in markets
where profit-maximizing interests foster fake news and foreign-government interference in the
democratic process. Furthermore, in areas in which there is a higher probability of risk, there is an
even stronger argument for imposing government restrictions. True, given certain liability factors
– the current laws shift the responsibility to damages inflicted by technology to the programmers
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or owners – there is a strong incentive for companies to self-regulate.196 However, the fact that
several “big players” are involved in different countries makes this goal of self-regulation an even
bigger challenge. On a more practical level, each company might come up with a different set of
guidelines and ethical codes for its own agenda and business vision, creating an AI “Tower of
Babel”. Governments should not leave the policy field in the hands of private corporations.
For some, AI policy means AI laws. I do not believe that this is the right approach. I share
Calo’s opinion that “[i]t may not be wise or even feasible to pass general laws about artificial
intelligence at this early stage.”197 Imposing AI laws and regulations, as some reports suggested,
can create distraction and uncertainty.198 However, that does not mean that we should avoid any
government intervention. Crafting an AI policy that can foster the positive effects AI might have
on society while trying to avoid the negative effects is wise and timely. As Calo offers “[p]olicy
conveys the necessity of exploration and planning, the finality of law, and the primacy of public
interest without definitely endorsing or rejecting regulatory intervention.”199
Policy is the line between laws and regulations and ethical codes and guidelines. It can
signal to the public and industry where the government is hoping to get without imposing
restrictive rules at first. Though policy might eventually translate into laws, there are no guarantees
that a particular policy will be adopted. Further, policy discussions among the government,
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academia, consumers, NGOs and the industry is the most efficient way to design careful measures
that can allow for the development of a given field without endangering public interests.200
Calo offers a roadmap for AI policy. In doing so, he discusses challenges in several
domains in which he believes attention is required, including justice and equity, use of force and
safety, privacy, and employment. Justice and equity is the capacity to “program” or “translate”
human values, such as fairness, transparency, accountability, and other moral considerations to
algorithms and AI systems.201 The concepts of justice, equity, and other abstract forms of thinking
are what make humans unique. Developing a set of moral and ethical considerations for AI
programs has great potential in eliminating human bias and inequality.
There are several indications of design bias in programs “from a camera that cautions
against taking a Taiwanese-American blogger’s picture because the software believes she is
blinking […] to a translation engine that associates the role of engineer with being male and the
role of nurse with being female.”202 Since minorities and other disadvantaged groups are not the
main concern of the private sector, there is a high likelihood that without government intervention,
structural bias toward these groups will “echo” within AI programs.203 This brings me to the first
rule in shaping AI policy: act wherever and whenever there is a low probability that the private
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sector will address an issue by itself. One way the government can affect these concerns is by
policing the use of data – the fuel and currency of AI.204
Future policy challenges include developing rules that can assist in decision-making
processes, anticipating AI programs that may eventually be able to make certain decisions and
even replace parts of our legal system. Investing resources in AI decision-making capabilities is
an important goal for governments.205 As with bias and inequality, it initially seems complex and
daunting to imagine ways in which AI systems could replace human judges. However, this is not
necessarily true. Ben Alarie has predicted that the legal standards that currently uphold complex
sets of rules will be replaced by AI that offers greater reliability, accessibility, and predictability.206
The current legal system is based on “valve concepts” such as good faith, reasonableness,
probability and other concepts that are shaped and decided by judges and lawyers. AI might not
require these set of ambiguous concepts and develop a more reliable and predictable way to
analyze a legal case and make decisions. In fact, the AI “judge” might provide a solution to one of
the most challenging struggles in the legal system – equal sentences and damages. Obviously, not
all decision making can rely on AI, and “[c]ertain decisions, such as the decision to take an
204
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individual off of life support, raise fundamental concerns over human dignity and thus perhaps
cannot be made even by objectively well-designed machines.”207
Finding a way to teach AI abstract concepts that humans find difficult to define (such as
the concept of justice or good faith) might be a misguided approach.208 However, creating a set of
rules that AI can follow and embracing AI capabilities to analyze information very quickly is a
good start. Government policy is important in managing these projects, making sure that rules are
based on core societal values, creating boundaries and restrictions preventing bias and inequality,
providing funding, and coordinating efforts between key players like academia, the public and
private sectors, and initiatives in other countries. As Calo opines, “The end game of designing
systems that reflect justice and equity will involve very considerable, interdisciplinary efforts and
is likely to prove a defining policy issue of our time.”209
The second domain in which policymaker considerations are required is human safety and
the use of force. AI may eventually make vital decisions that can affect life, such as the decision
to shoot a “hostile” target by automated drones or for a self-driving vehicle to choose between
hitting a pedestrian or crashing into a tree. Indeed, these decisions, while similar, are different in
many ways. There is a near consensus internationally that “kill” decisions should always be
reserved for humans and that no AI should be allowed to make these decisions.210 Jean-Gabriel
and Matthew Castel call for international intervention in developing measures to prevent the
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production and use of partially or fully automated machines in both civil and international armed
conflicts.211 As a policy matter, they suggest that AI robots and programs should incorporate legal
and ethical values based on international humanitarian law.212
It is reasonable to assume that AI programs will be integrated into most computer systems
that are currently affecting and regulating our day-to-day lives. AI will increasingly be deployed
in airplanes, cars, and various means of transportation (including smart drone delivery); controlling
our homes’ elevators, cleaning, and heating functions; tracking our moves and caring for us.
Certain professions such as doctors, lawyers and accountants (all of whom are currently heavily
regulated) will change or adapt in concert with AI technology. These plausible scenarios
demonstrate the great potential AI has in preventing accidents and creating a safer and better
environment for us all.
AI technology can detect dangers, as well as alert citizens and law enforcement to them.
However, with this great potential comes risk. AI cyberattacks, for instance, pose a threat. When
day-to-day life is monitored and operated through AI, these systems are ripe for manipulation in
ways that can endanger users unless certain measures are put in place by governments. Further, as
Calo points out, “These applications raise additional questions concerning the standards to which
AI systems are held and the procedures and techniques available to ensure those standards are
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being met.”213 Establishing safety standards is something governments do all the time in domains
like food safety, drug approval, traffic rules, and manufacturing.214 The same could apply to AI.
In the AI policy debate, there are voices arguing that no regulation is needed since, as the
Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection Chairman expressed concerning
self-driving cars, “[This] technology has the potential to dramatically improve safety on our
nation’s roadways and that is one of the most important reasons to advance the bills we have under
consideration today.”215 However, “safer than humans” is not good enough.216 Governments
should set basic rules for AI-based systems and, even more urgently, establish how to regulate
current technology. For instance, the government might decide to restrict AI technology to specific
areas for trials or pilot runs.
A comprehensive proposal that has emerged recently in this area is that of establishing an
independent oversight body – a National Algorithm Safety Board. The Board would have three
primary duties: “planning oversight, continuous monitoring by knowledgeable review boards
using advanced software, and a retrospective analysis of disasters.”217 Anyone looking to develop
and deploy a major new algorithmic system would be required to submit an algorithm impact
statement to the Board. These statements would include “[s]tandard questions about who the
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stakeholders are, and what the impacts might be,” which would “ensure that implementers think
carefully about potential problems and then propose reasonable solutions.”218
Being transparent with the Board in advance of deployment helps to minimize concerns
about having later to de-code the algorithm and its built-in values. It may also be prudent to require
black-box testing before approval.219 Continuous monitoring would follow the initial approval and
would be undertaken by knowledgeable inspectors. This ongoing oversight is similar in theory to
the idea of safety inspections in food processing facilities. This would be possible and meaningful
because the Board would have approved the algorithm before it was delivered to market, as well
as inspected and tested the algorithm through its continuous monitoring program. The Board could
then work with the algorithm’s owner (or any other responsible parties) in order to conduct an
inquiry or investigation into the harm that was caused. Another example was recently presented
by Matthew Scherer. Scherer argues for the creation of what he calls an Artificial Intelligence
Development Act to be administered by a government agency that can certify and label AI systems
as safe.220
The technological changes will not happen in days (or months). A transition period in
which self-driving vehicles will share the roads with regular vehicles is expected. Thus, it is
important to address the effect of the transition period as well. If safety standards are to be imposed
on AI technology (including self-driving cars, drones, home assistant robots, etc.), the government
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must establish a way to verify whether those standards are met. This process would comprise
government supervision and certification as well as testing itself.221
A different set of policies should be developed to address privacy concerns. Privacy, or the
lack thereof, has become a significant concern as people have become more involved on the
Internet over the past two decades. We now perform many of our day-to-day activities via the
Internet, from using social networks to post pictures (that can pinpoint our exact location) to buying
products on Amazon and using GPS-based applications to drive. All these applications and online
systems use our data. This availability of data is what enables technological development: machine
learning cannot function without access to data. However, the fact that data are so important to the
development of AI does not mean that we should not find ways to secure the use of our data and
reserve some level of privacy.
The acceleration of AI technology will play an essential role in the privacy discussion. As
Calo suggests, two main issues threaten our privacy: pattern recognition and access to data. AI can
identify patterns that humans cannot. These capabilities, which we can expect to improve in the
future, pose a significant risk to our privacy and threaten to diminish it almost entirely, making
everything public to some extent. Even if we allow AI to use information that is shared freely,
such as grocery lists or locations, AI pattern recognition might reveal sensitive information about
us. “With enough data about you and the population at large, firms, governments, and other
institutions with access to AI will one day make guesses about you that you cannot imagine – what
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The AI in the UK report, supra note 55 at 138, recommends monitoring government’s policies closely “and react
to feedback from academia and industry where appropriate.”
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you like, whom you love, what you have done”222 – though, as indicated above, this technology
could also be used for positive purposes like security and making us all safer.223
Another concern is with access to data and how data are prioritized. Simply put, the ability
of machine-learning programs to find solutions to an issue is dependent upon the availability and
quality of the data it has access to. As discussed earlier, data can reflect biases and inequality.
Thus, regulating the amount of data, the quality of the data, and the priority with which
organizations can access data are paramount.224 Given that governments control vast amounts of
data, the decision of access is first and foremost a policy question.225
From a public policy perspective, governments should adapt guidelines and regulations
that designate the usage of data for specific causes, provide restrictions to preserve the privacy of
its citizens, and define the scope of fair data usage.226 In addition, big datasets may also affect the

222

Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42 at 421; See also Tal Zarsky, “Transparent Predictions” (2013) 4 U Ill L Rev 1503.
Recently, Israel Private Protection Authority (PPA) has examined the broadcasting companies and streaming services
in Israel (including Netflix). Following the investigation, PPA published its opinion concluding that the information
that is gathered by the broadcasting companies could, potentially, reveal sensitive information about the viewers and
is considered “data” under the Privacy Act and regulations. In consequence, PPA instructed the companies to secure
the information, and to ask for the user/viewer consent for collecting data. See Israel, Private Protection Authority,
“Statement Concerning Viewers Data by Television Companies” (22 April 2018), online:
<gov.il/he/Departments/news/_1tv_supervision>.
223
Ryan Calo, “Can Americans Resist Surveillance?” (2016) 83 U Chicago L Rev 23. Calo discusses the legal
challenges posed by the availability of data to government: “If everyone in public can be identified through facial
recognition, and if the ‘public’ habits of individuals or groups permit AI to derive private facts, then citizens will have
little choice but to convey information to a government bent on public surveillance.” Calo – AI Policy, supra note 42
at 18.
224
Amanda Levendowski, “How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem” (2018) 93:2
Wash L Rev 579.
225
I am aware of the risks and challenges pose by mega companies (such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon,
Microsoft, etc.). These companies hold the key to significant amount of data that can affect (in positive or negative
ways) the development of technology and our privacy. As part of developing an effective AI policy, the governments
ought to consider if and how to regulate this so-called “private” data. The recent involvement of Russia in the US
presidential elections has strengthened my position regarding the necessity of some level of regulation over these
mega companies. I further discuss data barriers in Part III.
226
Obviously, this issue raises subsequent questions regarding the way governments can incentivize organizations to
use data for public good. Providing free access to government data for specific organizations or companies could
prove to be a good policy.
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economy: as data are the fuel of AI development, data are worth a lot of money, and therefore the
government can leverage it as a means of funding.227
One attempt to regulate data was implemented recently with the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on May 2018.228 However, there are some
difficulties with the GDPR. First, it seems that many experts in the industry do not understand
some of the rules relating to the usage of data.229 Second, the GDPR is forcing companies to
explain the algorithms and AI decision process, which is not always possible.230 Machine learning
is designed to “think on its own” by developing new methods and approaches for a given task.231
The next area that requires government attention is employment. As discussed in the first
chapter of this part,232 technological advances in AI will affect markets. As we learned from the
Industrial Revolution and the Internet, we should expect this to shake the core foundations of
current professions and create new ones in the process. The AI revolution might happen in stages.
In the first stage, AI and machine-learning programs will replace humans in technical professions
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(or certain elements of those professions).233 However, we can expect subsequent advancements
to speed up the rate of change.
Eventually, as Calo predicts, “[V]ery few sectors will remain untouched.”234 In order to
better prepare for the coming changes, governments should allocate resources and develop specific
programs in technology, computer science, etc. Further, these programs should be employed on
three different levels: blue-collar workers in areas in which there is higher probability to be
affected in the coming decades; universities and other higher education institutions; and even
elementary schools. These conclusions are shared by almost all the reports I have surveyed above,
the most recent one in Ontario.235
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1.3 LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR AI
“Siri, do you believe in God?
Humans have religion. I just have silicon.
Siri, I insist, do you believe in God?
I would ask that you address your spiritual questions
to someone more qualified to comment.
Ideally, a human.”

Well, Siri might have a point, or does she?
The debate regarding the personhood of non-humans is well-trodden ground.236 The notion
of considering non-humans for legal rights goes back to the Middle-Ages, when churches were
subject to legal rights and animals were held accountable for their “criminal” behaviour.237
Considering AI to have legal personhood might imply that a similar status ought to be granted to
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other subjects such as animals,238 or trees.239 However, this conclusion does not necessarily follow.
There are many differences between animals and AI, the most prominent being that AI resembles
human intelligence far more than animal intelligence. In fact, AI poses many human qualities and
abilities and, in some aspects, even superior to human intelligence.
There are three main objections to the recognition of AI legal rights: the “only humans
should be given personhood rights”; the “critical component”; and the “AI is property”.240
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1.3.1

Only Natural Humans Deserve Legal Rights

The first is the most simple and straightforward: only natural human beings deserve to be
recognized as humans.241 AIs are not humans. Therefore, they do not deserve equal human rights.
However, we do award legal rights to non-humans: corporations, for example, are legal entities.242
It seems that this argument takes an anthropocentric approach: “We are humans. Even if AIs have
all the qualities that make us moral persons, we shouldn’t allow them the rights … because it isn’t
in our interest to do so.”243 Lawrence Solum argues that this statement “is akin to American slave
owners saying that slaves could not have constitutional rights simply because they were not white
or simply because it was not in the interests of whites to give them rights.”244 Similarly, in English
law, up until the passing of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, married women were
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considered subordinate to their husbands’ will under the couverture doctrine.245 Christopher Stone
observed in his 1972 paper on legal rights for natural objects: “Throughout legal history, each
successive extension of rights to some new entity has been, theretofore, a bit unthinkable. We are
inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless ‘things’ to be a decree of Nature, not a legal
convention acting in support of some status quo.”246
Being human is not an essential condition for legal rights. In fact, legal personhood is
attributed to funds, associations, and even ships.247 Moreover, this argument does not consider the
probability of cyborg and synthetic biological applications of AI, in which AI technology might
not stand alone. There is a chance that AI technology will be integrated into humans, creating new
entities possessing both human organs and AI-robotic parts.
1.3.2

The Critical Component Argument

The “missing something” objections claim that AI lacks a certain component (X) that is essential
for personhood, and since no AI can possess X, no AI can qualify for personhood rights. The fact
that AI can learn how to demonstrate X (i.e., can learn how to simulate X) cannot be satisfactory
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for the attribution of personhood.248 Take intentionality, for example. We can claim that
intentionality (in the philosophical sense – the quality of aboutness) is a crucial element of
personhood. AI would not be able to express intentionality. “AI’s verbal behavior would not be
about anything; the AI’s words would have no meaning.”249 These ideas go back to Greek
philosophy and Plato’s tripartite theory of the soul.250 However, this is a theological discussion
and has no place in a secular society. Legal rights should be based on public policy justifications.
Further, regarding consciousness and intentionality, we cannot assume that AIs will not be
able to develop such elements in the future, or at least convince us that they possess such
elements.251 Consciousness could be explained as the ability to recognize things: “We do not know
what taste or smell means for any individual human, but we can recognize it by connecting it to an
existing symbol.”252 Harari links consciousness to feelings and suggests that in the future we might
be able to understand consciousness in such a way that AIs could develop it.253
On the other hand, as Robert Ford said to Bernard Lowe in the HBO series Westworld:
maybe “we cannot define consciousness because consciousness does not exist.”254 There is merit
in assuming that humans may not be able to determine if an AI is conscious since humans may not
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completely comprehend the concept of consciousness even in ten or twenty years. In fact, AI will
probably be able to understand consciousness and intentionality before we do.255
Solum argues that an important component for AI personhood is the ability to express “free
will”.256 In the future, AIs might express free will by deciding autonomously that they deserve
legal personality. However, even the most advanced program still works on precondition
algorithms at an autonomous level. It seems that when AIs can act beyond their original code,
develop their own will, and perform self-determining tasks, then they might qualify for the
attribution of personhood.
1.3.3

AI Is Property Argument

The third objection is that AI comprises property, which lacks rights. This argument is rooted in
the philosophy of John Locke and theories of morality:257 AI is the product of human labour, and
every man has a right to “the labour of his body and the work of his hand.”258 Humans, as such,
have a moral right to the property that they created. However, if we accept this argument in its
simplest form, we might as well accept the claim that parents have a moral right to their children’s
work (or even the children themselves).259 The philosophical irony is that “we are strongly inclined
to believe the opposite with respect to humans – that each is entitled to the right of moral and
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constitutional personhood, even if we also believe that persons literally are made by their
parents.”260
Solum advocates for a pragmatic approach to AI personhood. As Koops, Hildebrandt and
Jaquet-Chiffelle explain: “[T]he question of whether we need legal personhood is empirically
dependent on the measure of independence of the artificial intelligence [Solum] discusses. Such
independence depends on the capability to perform complex actions (reducing the need for human
intervention) and – in the case of claiming constitutional rights and liberties – on the capability to
have conscious intentions.”261
1.3.4

Alternative Models for AI Personhood

Koops, Hildebrandt and Jaquet-Chiffelle offer three different models for non-human personhood.
First is the short-term model, which is based on the interpretation of existing law. The courts “can
qualify the general intention of the owner/user of the computer agent as sufficient for the intention
that is required for individual contracts, creating the possibility for those who contracted with the
computer agent to sue the ‘principal’.”262 However, this model is only relevant for existing
technology, which is considered a tool in the hands of the owner and operates under a preconditioned code or program.
Second is the middle-term, limited personhood with strict liability model. This is based on
the fact that “[c]reative interpretation and novel sector-specific rules provide for legal certainty,
and they can also deviate from ‘off-line’ legal constructs.”263 In a later stage, Koops, Hildebrandt
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and Jaquet-Chiffelle suggest a strict liability for “electronic agents264 if their unpredictable actions
are felt to be too risky for business or consumers.”265
Third is the long-term, full personhood with “post-human” rights model. This model offers
a fundamental change of our current laws by adopting full personhood to new non-human beings.
However, as Koops, Hildebrandt and Jaquet-Chiffelle admit, “For ‘posthuman rights’ to make
sense, we have to assume that autonomous action exists, even if it exists only as a productive
illusion.”266 In this regard, the authors agree with Solum that there is no sense in excluding outright
non-human entities from personhood rights and responsibilities.
Recently, the EU Legal Affairs Committee called267 for the rethinking of legal rights in the
fast-evolving field of robotics and AI.268 The EU Parliament Report is an important milestone in
the AI personhood debate: from a theoretical (maybe even science-fiction) debate, the normative
question of legal rights and personhood in the new AI era has reached the public domain and might
even produce new policy.
Reflecting on the implications of AI legal personhood, David Marc Rothenberg discusses
what AI property ownership might look like.269 Rothenberg states the simple truth: artificial
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personhood exists today in the form of corporations that hold property. He offers three hypothetical
scenarios for AI ownership. First is facilitating property ownership as an agent. Though the current
legal scope of an agent does not allow for a non-human to become an agent,270 this definition might
interoperate differently by future courts. In fact, as Rothenberg explains, “In both case law and the
real world, weak artificial intelligent robots (i.e., no cognitive states, just tools) have already acted
as agents for their principals.”271
Second is owning property like a corporation, thereby, treating AI as a corporation.
Corporations are artificial persons and considered to have similar attributes.272 Third is owning
property like a human. AI may buy and sell property in the same manner a human can. Rothenberg
explains that if AI would have sufficient cognitive abilities, it should be allowed to own property273
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under the same reasoning corporations can.274 There would, however, still be government and/or
legal oversight over AI-owned property.275
The AI personhood discussion concern issues of accountability for moral wrongs as well.
Such questions are discussed in the research of Curtis Karnow,276 Gunther Teubner,277 Gabriel
Hallevy,278 David C Vladeck,279 and Andress Matthias.280 However, these extensive debates are
outside the scope of my dissertation.
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1.4 DEFINING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Kevin Kelly281 states that the first step in understanding an issue is to define it: “Once named, we
could now see it. Having seen it, we wondered how anyone could not have seen it.”282 A concept’s
purpose is to establish common ground for professionals and non-professionals alike – a
comprehensible, shared language.
The scientific community that created the AI concept has shaped the definitions
surrounding the concept. As AI has sparked the attention of the legal community, most scholars
have preferred to “skip” the process of redefining terminology, adopting instead whichever
conceptions of the scientific vocabulary they believe preferable in a given discussion. This
approach is misguided. We should apply to the AI legal debate the same standards we insist upon
in other areas. As Jeremy Waldron once stated, “[W]e like to keep our armory of concepts in good
shape; that’s why we devote so much energy to the analysis and clarification of terms like ‘liberty’,
‘justice’, and ‘law’.”283
In the coming years, technology will challenge the conceptual foundations of the law. The
common belief that the concepts of law are universal – “true in all places and in all times” – might
not survive the expected advancements in AI. Indeed, “many legal philosophers have abandoned
the notion of a non-contingent concept of law, emphasizing that law is, like technology, a human
artefact.”284 I share Brian Sheppard’s view – concepts are influenced by time changes and thus
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“can better respond to the anxieties and hopes of those times.”285 The contingency essence of
concepts allows us to better understand the relation between concepts and emerging trends (like
technology’s impact on the evolution of a concept). These assumptions, as I will further explain,
challenge several leading legal philosophers.
1.4.1

The AI Concept

1.4.1.1 Concept vs Conception
Concepts are important to any legal debate: “They provide a means to set forth the parameters to
empirical inquiry, and they can highlight irksome inconsistence of hidden parallels in our
thinking.”286 For this reason, we cannot engage in a meaningful discussion about AI authorship
without first “defragmenting” the AI concept.
The first step in our journey toward understanding the AI concept is to distinguish between
“concept” and “conception”. Simply stated, a “concept” is an abstract idea or general notion,
whereas a “conception” is the way any given concept is perceived. Ronald Dworkin notes that this
“is a difference not just in the detail of the instruction given but in the kind of instruction given.
When I appeal to the concept of fairness I appeal to what fairness means, and I give my views on
that issue special standing. When I lay down a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by
fairness, and my view is therefore the heart of the matter. When I appeal to fairness I pose a moral
issue; when I lay down my conception of fairness I try to answer it.”287
Lior Zemer explains the distinction by levels of abstraction: “The concept of ‘X’ is more
general, more abstract and does not tell us what ‘X’ requires in particular circumstances. The
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concept, however, may have an inherent complexity.”288 The conceptions of ‘X’ “reflect different
views of the concept.”289 In comparison, the concept of AI is derived from ideas of technological
developments in the field of computer science. It is thus a general idea that can change according
to context. Hence, as I shall argue further, the AI concept in legal scholarship might be very
different from the AI concept in scientific research.
It is therefore important to look back on different definitions, the history of the concept’s
development, where it was conceived, and the reasons for following one term and not the other.
Looking back on the history of the AI concept might shed new light on the current progress in the
field as well. Understanding the roots of the AI concept is essential to the process of shaping a new
definition of the term.
1.4.1.2 Different Approaches to AI
The AI concept was first coined during the Dartmouth workshop of 1956. Nilsson outlines the
reasons for choosing the term, which was provided by McCarthy, one of the conference’s
orchestraters. The first reason was “to distinguish the subject matter proposed for the Dartmouth
workshop from that of a prior volume of solicited papers, titled Automata Studies … [that] largely
concerned the esoteric and rather narrow mathematical subject called ‘automata theory’.”290 The
second reason was McCarthy’s wishes to escape possible association with cybernetics. In his
opinion, “Its concentration on analog feedback seemed misguided.”291 McCorduck suggests that
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the other organizers of the conference did not share McCarthy’s passion towards the term and
continued to name their work differently for many years.292
It seems the AI concept was conceived out of a compromise in order to distinguish between
different subjects, rather than after considered deliberation. On the other hand, one might argue
that McCarthy gave the term a great deal of thought and deliberation. It is just that other people at
the time did not realize how much it would catch on. Further, just because the term has historically
been loaded with different meanings does not mean it cannot serve a well-defined purpose today.293
Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig,294 have provided a broader overview on eight different
definitions of AI, organized into four categories: thinking humanly, acting humanly, thinking
rationally, and acting rationally.295 The first – thinking humanly – is a cognitive-based approach.
John Haugeland296 and Richard Ernest Bellman297 have contributed to this approach. The thinking
humanly-based definitions focus on the way AIs express human thinking – the way the human
mind works. The thinking humanly definitions describe AI by comparing “activities that we
associate with human thinking, activities such as decision-making, problem solving, [and]
learning.”298 Haugeland suggests that AI computers are simply “machines with minds, in the full
to escape association with ‘cybernetics’. Its concentration on analog feedback seemed misguided, and I wished to
avoid having either to accept Norbert (not Robert) Wiener as a guru or having to argue with him.”
292
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and literal sense.”299 The difficulty with this approach is that in order to program a computer to
think like a human we first need to understand the way the human brain works.300 Unfortunately,
though much progress has been made in the field of cognitive science, the human brain is still
considered very much a mystery.
The second approach – acting humanly – is inspired by the Turing test, which was
“designed to provide a satisfactory operational definition”301 to establish machine intelligence. In
many ways, the Turing test is a game of lies and deception. It intends to ascertain if a computer
can ‘cheat’ a person to think that he is dealing with a human being and not an artificial form
(machine or robot).302 Kurzweil,303 Elaine Rich and Kevin Knight,304 have relied on the Turing
test’s reasoning – comparing AI abilities to intelligence behaviour as expressed by humans.
The Turing test is far more important than the other approaches, and though it attracted
criticism, it is still considered a revolutionary and innovative method of defining and shaping
computer thinking. The architect of the test, Alan Turing, was the first researcher who attempted
to determine AI (even though he never used the exact term). Introducing the test, he asked “Can
machines think?”305
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The Turing test cannot ascertain whether a machine can actually “think”, but only if it can
imitate human behaviour.306 It is a theory of how to establish whether a computer possesses
minimal semi-human capabilities. In an unpublished work, Turing speculated about the
possibilities of intelligent machinery using the human brain as his guiding principle.307 Passing the
test is, therefore, a minimal requirement for establishing AI.308 However, further tests are required
to establish whether a computer is indeed an AI.309 Turing’s idea can apply to copyright too.310
The debate over machine intelligence is endless. It “ensued over how humans
accomplished what everyone ‘knew’ was intelligence behavior.”311 In McCorduck’s words: “This
question is in a class with those snappy vaudeville comebacks: does a chicken have lips? And like
them, it ought to end the discussion at once by its self-evident nonsense. After all, we agree, our
one essential, identifying property is thinking.”312 The most famous test for human intelligence,
the IQ test, was developed in the early twentieth century.313 IQ is determined by demonstrating the
used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can machines think?’ is
to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd.”
306
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ability to solve problems, divided by the age of the subject and multiplied by 100.314 AI might be
considered highly inteligence according to this standard.
Philosopher Alan Anderson observes the following in his book Minds and Machines:315
“(1) We might say that human beings are merely very elaborate bits of clockwork, and that
our having ‘minds’ is simply a consequence of the fact that the clockwork is very elaborate,
or (2) we might say that any machine is merely a product of human ingenuity (in principle
nothing more than a shovel), and that though we have minds, we cannot impart that
peculiar feature of ours to anything except our offspring: no machine can acquire this
uniquely human characteristic.”

During the late nineteenth century, “intelligence was thought to demonstrate itself in problem
solving, and that behavior could be quantified.”316 Alfred Binet devised one of the early definitions
of intelligence. Binet “regarded intelligence as a combination of faculties … including the ability
to understand directions, maintain a mental set, and correct one’s own errors.”317 The German
psychologist Max Wertheimer viewed intelligence differently. Wertheimer founded Gestalt
psychology, which “held that the primary data of perception are not elements but significantly
structured forms. The Gestaltists wished to apply the concept of Gestalt, or shape, ‘far beyond the
limits of sensory experience’.”318 The Gestaltists considered “the primary brain process as a
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dynamic system, a continuous organizing and patterning that takes place as sensory experience
comes pouring in. The process is spontaneous; it does not have to be learned.”319
The next stage in understanding intelligence was the Cybernetic theory of thought.320
Cybernetic was not based on a detailed biological knowledge of the cell.321 “Instead it seemed
certain that the correspondence between the on-off behavior of the neuron and the on-off behavior
of the electronic switch would be sufficient to allow significant modeling of neural systems, and
then intelligent behavior. Its basic assumption was that brain cells were on the whole generalpurpose, organized for specific functions because of external stimuli.”322
Kurzweil’s view is that though “human intelligence is sometimes capable of soaring in its
creativity and expressiveness, much human thought is derivative, petty, and circumscribed.”323
Kurzweil claims that AI will eventually be able to demonstrate creativity that the human mind can
barely conceive today.324
Reflecting on the prospect of intelligence, the 100 Year Study states: “[I]ntelligence lies
on a multi-dimensional spectrum … the difference between an arithmetic calculator and a human
brain is not one of kind, but of scale, speed, degree of autonomy, and generality. The same factors
can be used to evaluate every other instance of intelligence – speech recognition software, animal
brains, cruise-control systems in cars, Go-playing programs, thermostats – and to place them at
some appropriate location in the spectrum.”325
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Thinking rationally is the third approach outlined by Russell and Norvig.326 Inspired by
rational thought (or the law of thought), this approach promotes logical thinking and deduction.
The logicist tradition327 within AI, as Russell and Norvig explain, hoped to build on programs that
can solve logical problems to create intelligence systems.328 Eugene Charniak and Drew
McDermott329 provided that this approach relies on “[t]he study of mental faculties through the
use of computational models,” which, as Patrick Winston offers,330 “make it possible to perceive,
reason, and act.”
However, thinking rationally can give rise to several difficulties. First, it is hard to
“translate” informal knowledge into logical notations. Second, and this problem is common to
programming, it is highly complicated to create rules for problems – in theory one problem can be
solved in several ways – “[e]ven problems with just a few hundred facts can exhaust the
computational resources of any computer unless it has some guidance as to which reasoning steps
to try first.”331 Third, rationality is only part of human intelligence. If we aspire to create an AI
that will share as many characteristics with human as possible – and I am not sure that we do –
logic is only one element. Creating a logical computer might pose a greater risk to humanity as the
instrumental convergence hypothesis suggests.332
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The fourth approach is acting rationally.333 This approach views AI computers as agents
that “operate autonomously, perceive their environment, persist over a prolonged time period,
adapt to change, and create and pursue goals.” Further, “[a] rational agent is one that acts so as to
achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome.”334 David
Poole, Alan Mackworth, Randy Goebel,335 and Nilsson336 view AI as an agent and are concerned
with intelligent behaviour in artifacts.
The difference between acting rationally and thinking rationally is that the last emphasizes
– correct interfaces. However, correct interfaces are only part of a rational agent (i.e., “reason
logically to the conclusion that a given action will achieve one’s goals and then to act on that
conclusion”),337 and are not all based on rationality – in some cases there might be actions that
cannot be proven right but still ought to be done.
The acting rationally paradigm is more open to scientific development than the other
approaches. Russell and Norvig explain: “The standard of rationality is mathematically well
defined and completely general, and can be ‘unpacked’ to generate agent designs that provably
achieve it. Human behavior, on the other hand, is well adapted for one specific environment and
is defined by, well, the sum total of all the things that humans do.”338
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Further, all the characteristics and skills that are required for the acting humanly (Turing
inspired) approach can also allow an agent to act rationally, hence – relevant for the acting
rationally approach.339
1.4.1.3 “Breaking” the AI Concept
The next stage in exploring the AI concept is to consider each component separately to ascertain
its compound linguistic meaning.340
The online Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of AI can be split into two parts: First,
the formal broader part, stating that AI is “[t]he theory and development of computer systems able
to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence”; Second, listing the AI technology
applications or abilities “such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and
translation between languages.”341 An alternative way to address the AI term is to look into the
two fragments of its definition – artificial and intelligence separately.
Artificial means “[m]ade or produced by human beings rather than occurring naturally,
especially as a copy of something natural.”342 The paperback Oxford English Dictionary provides
a shorter definition, stating that artificial is simply “made as a copy of something natural … Not
sincere.”343 Arthur Samuel points out one problem with the word, stating that it “makes you think
there’s something kind of phony about this … or else it sounds like it’s all artificial and there’s
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nothing real about this work at all.”344 The Oxford online dictionary further provides the origin of
the word “from Old French artificiel or Latin artificialis, from artificium handicraft.” Similar
definitions were found in the Cambridge online dictionary.345
Intelligence means “having intelligence especially of high level … (of a device) able to
vary its state or action in response to varying situations and past experience.”346 Intelligence is “the
ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills [or] the collection of information of military or
political value.”347 The Cambridge online dictionary provides that it means “the ability to learn,
understand, and make judgments or have opinions that are based on reason.”348 The word
originates from the Latin word intelligentia, which when split into constituent morphemes is inter
“between” and legere to “read, choose, pick out.”349
Building on the intelligence discussion, I shall now turn to broader attempts to define the
AI concept more holistically and inclusively. Nilsson provides a concise definition, stating that
AI:350
“… is that activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality
that enables an entity to function appropriately and with foresight in its environment.”

Nilsson’s definition centres on the word intelligent. Nilsson defines AI from the perspective of
scientists and scholars that research the field, but takes a neutral stance concerning AI itself,
focusing on the prospects and achievements of the developers of machines and AI technology. I
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believe that from a legal perspective, Nilsson’s definition is too technical and lacks important
moral and normative standards.
Müller and Bostrom351 share Nilsson’s AI concept, as they focus on intelligence capacity.
They describe AI as “a high-level machine intelligence.” However, Müller and Bostrom add
additional element that can repeatedly be seen in attempts to define AI: AI equivalence to human
characteristics, abilities, and behaviour. They stated that AI “can carry out most human professions
at least as well a typical human.”352
The 100 Year Study “views AI primarily as a branch of computer science that studies the
properties of intelligence by synthesizing intelligence.”353 Intelligence “remains a complex
phenomenon whose varied aspects have attracted the attention of several different fields of study,
including psychology, economics, neuroscience, biology, engineering, statistics, and linguistics.
Naturally, the field of AI has benefited from the progress made by all of these allied fields ...354
From this perspective, characterizing AI depends on the credit one is willing to give synthesized
software and hardware for functioning ‘appropriately’ and with ‘foresight’.”355 According to the
100 Year Study and Nilsson, human intelligence is a benchmark for AI:356
“An accurate and sophisticated picture of AI … is hampered at the start by the difficulty
of pinning down a precise definition of artificial intelligence … While drawing on common
research and technologies, AI systems are specialized to accomplish particular tasks, and
each application requires years of focused research and a careful, unique construction.”
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Bostrom offers some elements that can define AI:
1.5 The capacity to learn;
1.6 The ability to deal effectively with uncertainty and probabilistic information; and
1.7 The ability to extract useful concepts from sensory data and internal states as well as “for
leveraging acquired concepts into flexible combinatorial representations for use in logical and
intuitive reasoning.”357
Bostrom’s definition seems to follow the scientific perception of AI. However, he takes the term
further, stating that: 358
“[A]n artificial intelligence need not much resemble a human mind. AIs could be – indeed,
it is likely that most will be – extremely alien. We should expect that they will have very
different cognitive architectures that biological intelligences … There is no reason to
expect a generic AI to be motivated by love or hate or pride or other such common human
sentiments […].”

Bostrom is willing to consider the AI itself as part of the AI term, not with reference to human
abilities. Bostrom also considers an AI’s needs and wants. Indeed, as the UK House of Commons
report concludes, “[T]here is a tendency to describe AI by contrasting it with human intelligence
and stressing that AI does not appear ‘in nature’.”359 The report offers the following definition:
“[A] set of statistical tools and algorithms that combine to form, in part, intelligent
software that specializes in a single area or task. This type of software is an evolving
assemblage of technologies that enable computers to simulate elements of human
behaviour such as learning, reasoning and classification.”
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The recent AI in the UK report provides a more practical definition (which was introduced in the
UK Industrial Strategy White Paper):360
“Technologies with the ability to perform tasks that would otherwise require human
intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, and language translation.”

This definition is more limited in scope and emphasis specific measurable abilities.361 In his policy
paper, Calo offers his view on AI definition.362 AI, Calo suggests, “is best understood as a set of
techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.”363
Maybe instead of looking for one specific way to define AI we should view AI as “an umbrella
term, comprised by many different techniques.”364
Indeed, it seems that the essential component in the AI concept is intelligence. It is evident
that when the AI term was conceived, those who coined the term sought to define AI for human
purposes. In other words, they hoped that machines would exhibit intelligent behaviour. The
development of the AI field since then has revolved around expressing semi-human abilities such
as image recognition, processing capabilities, analysis, and speech. In doing so, we have missed
an important component: AI is not human, and not all humans exhibit intelligent behaviour.
Furthermore, an unintelligent human will still be considered a human.365
By shaping the AI concept on the prospects of intelligence, we not only diverted significant
resources to explore routes to AI that might not prove useful, but also misdirected the discussion
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– we can define artificial, but it is highly complicated to define intelligence, let alone non-human
intelligence.366
1.4.2

AI as An Essentially Contested Concept

The many different definitions of AI lead to my next argument: AI is an essentially contested
concept. Indeed, though we might find shared characteristics, no definitive legal concept has yet
been reached. Take, for example, the Apple iPhone’s Siri.367 To many, Siri is an AI program –
early AI, maybe, but still AI. However, according to most current standards, Siri cannot be
considered AI. This perspective is also time sensitive. AI philosophers and historians, if asked
twenty years ago, would provide different answers from today’s thinkers to the question of what
is AI; Siri might have been considered a highly sophisticated AI by past generations.
Walter Gallie explained that “any concept … is liable to be contested for reasons better or
worse; but whatever the strength of the reasons they usually carry with them an assumption of
agreement, as to the kind of use that is appropriate to the concept in question … When this
assumption cannot be made, we have a widely recognised ground for philosophical enquiry.”368
Take the concept of championship for example. In sport a champion team is the one that
has won the tournament, “[t]hen for a certain period … this team is by definition ‘the champions’
even though, as months go by, it becomes probable or certain that they will not repeat their
success.”369 However, if we change the rules to establish that the “championship” will be
determined by the supporters of each team, a previously agreed-upon concept can become
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“contested”. Each team’s fans could then presumably find different ways to establish that their
team is indeed the “real” champion. Supporters of different teams could put more stock in specific
“important” games that their team won, penalizing rival teams for not behaving according to the
spirit of the game, and so on.
Gallie argued that in order for a concept to be “contested”, it must first “be appraisive in
the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement.” Second, the given
achievement “must be of an internally complex character.” Third, “any explanation of its worth
must, therefore, include reference to the respective contributions of its various parts or features.”
Fourth, the accredited achievement must be of a kind that allows for considerable modification in
light of changing circumstances; “such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance.”
Fifth, “each party recognizes the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties,
and that each party must have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of
which the other parties claim to be applying the concept in question.”370
Further, “to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to
recognize that one’s own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses. Still more simply,
to use an essentially contested concept means to use it both aggressively and defensively.”371 Gallie
added two additional conditions that are essential to the discussion: “the derivation of any such
concept from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of
the concept”; and “the probability … of the claim that the continuous competition for
acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original exemplar’s
achievement to be sustained and/or developed in optimum fashion.”372
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The AI concept is indeed, as Gallie described, an essentially contested concept. First, the
AI concept is appraisive, as it signifies and accredits a high-value achievement in the fields of
computer science and technology. The second condition can be established as well: the
achievement of AI is indeed internally complex by nature. Gallie explained that “the variously
describable character of the achievement”373 is necessary for the third condition, and the term
“artificial intelligence” indeed gives it such a description. Further, it is apparent that scholars and
researchers judge AI differently, and that not any computer program can be described as AI.
The fourth condition requires that the achievement is constantly evolving, amenable to
changes and modifications. The AI concept is in constant flux, and in the last decades has evolved
from a small subfield of computer science to become its own field of research; many would also
agree that AI is open in character. Moreover, the concept is vague, and as apparent from the
discussion above, there are many different definitions. The concept by itself cannot describe what
AI is.374 The term AI is also used both in aggressive and defensive ways. Different conceptions of
AI indeed diverge from each other.
It should be noted that it seems plausible that the concept “intelligence” (which the term
AI contains) is contested as well. Many conceptions are stemming from the concept of intelligence,
and we cannot ascertain what the crucial elements that define intelligence are. Hence it is hard to
conclude whether, for example, a certain AI is indeed intelligent. This might require further
discussion.
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In examining the AI concept, according to Gallie’s conditions, we need to look for the right
exemplar (if indeed we have an exemplar).375 It seems that in the AI case, the development of the
concept arises from the field of computer science, and though it might be difficult to point to a
specific exemplar, it is reasonably accurate to point to the field of cybernetics and computer science
as an exemplar from which, as Nilsson and McCorduck state, the AI concept developed.
AI is, therefore, a contested concept. In this discussion, two important questions arise. First,
can we establish an uncontested concept, as Gallie suggested, one for which there are no grounds
“for maintaining that it has a single meaning that could be contested.”376 In other words, can we
conceive of an acceptable concept? Second, do we need to? I shall address the second question
first. Even if we cannot establish an uncontested AI concept, attempts to develop a more concise
and coherent concept can strengthen the definition and promote scholarly debate in the field. As
is apparent from this discussion, the inherent reasoning for the development of the AI concept is
important in ways that might be of lesser importance to other fields but crucial to the legal debate.
To the first question I shall say: Yes We Can.377 In many ways, developing a single concept
for every relevant discussion in the field of AI is unnecessary. We only need to aim to establish a
conception of AI for the legal debate. According to Gallie, “It is always reasonable to urge the
parties contesting the rightful use of such a concept to bethink themselves with all seriousness,
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whether they are really alleging the same achievement.”378 In the end, we might find ourselves
with a cluster of competing conceptions of AI.
1.4.3 The Contingent Concept of the Law
AI technology could change well-established concepts and assumptions about our legal system.
One likely change is shifting from abstract and general rules to “tailored laws” (micro-directives)
that would provide exact instructions for every scenario. Automated legislation regulated by AI
(or in the early stages – machine-learning algorithms) might be able to “up-to-the-second
individualized directives.”379 Take driving laws and rules for example, individualized directives
could indicate which vehicles “people may take, the direction that they may go, and the speed at
which they must travel.”380 Sheppard, Casey and Niblett have all shared this vision acknowledging
the promise individualized automated laws hold for reducing the cost of rule promulgation.381 I
agree that with time “the appeal of an aggressive regulatory regime powered by machines could
significantly grow and so too could our willingness to consider concepts that utilize it to even more
ambitious ends.”382
However, these changes bear a challenge to well-established legal approaches and theories
such as HLA Hart’s critical officials, Joseph Raz’s legitimate authority and Ronald Dworkin’s
justifying coercion. Hart, Sheppard explains, “emphasized the role of social conventions among
officials that gave the laws that come from them special normative character.”383 Hart highlights

378

Gallie, supra note 368 at 176.
Sheppard, supra note 12 at 40.
380
Ibid.
381
Ibid; Casey & Niblett, supra note 12.
382
Sheppard, ibid note 12 at 42.
383
Ibid at 52. Hart’s theory provides an alternative to the command theory positivism since the latter “failed to explain
how legal systems differ from systematic coercion.” See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined,
2nd ed (London: John Murray, 1861).
379

76

the importance of socially accepted norms and standards.384 According to Hart, the law is a union
between primary (norms, on different levels, that regulate conduct) and secondary rules (which, as
Hart explains, “provide the centralized official ‘sanctions’ of the system” or simply put: regulate
the norms),385 which “confer on individuals power to vary their initial positions under the primary
rules.”386
The secondary rule of recognition is the most important rule since it enables identifying
primary rules within the legal system. It is a social rule and its existence requires that we “look
upon the behavior in question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole.”387
Thus, Hart’s officials “serve as the normative backbone of the legal system, connecting themselves
to the social conventions by having critical reflective attitude to patterns of behaviour.”388
However, it is highly unlikely that AI would be able to serve the same purpose. Given the
characteristics of machine-learning technology, “[i]t will always speedily chug along in service of
the goal, improving as it goes, but it will not be able to step outside the system of primary rule
generation to revise its overall goal.”389
Under the tailored-law system, AI would be given a set of goals (or Asimov-like rules),
and in order to facilitate its designated purpose, would create a million sub-norms which would
constitute the legal system. In that scenario, there are no human officials (even though humans
might have provided the AI with its original goals) to keep up with social changes for “updating”
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the secondary rules accordingly, or as Sheppard vividly explains: “The dead hand of the computer
scientists who encoded the machine’s purpose would rule over future generations.”390
Raz’s and Dworkin’s theories might face similar difficulties. Raz argues that an authority
– which is an essential part of law – is only legitimate “if there are sufficient reasons to accept it,
that is, sufficient reasons to follow its directives regardless of the balance of reasons on the merits
of such action.”391 Raz further explains that “the normal way to establish that a person has authority
over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with
reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directiveness) if he accepts the
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than
by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.”392
However, one should be reminded that the authorities are required to base their orders on
relevant reasons “that apply to the subjects of those directives in the relevant circumstances.”393
Under Raz’s theory, authorities are only legitimate if their directives allow their subjects to follow
reason.394 Thus, a lack of reasons “robs us of the most important aspect of accepting an authority
– that we can better learn how to balance reasons and, thereby, better embody what we are
supposed to be as humans.”395
As I have already explained, and as I shall further discuss in Parts II and III, one of the
difficulties AI (and especially machine-learning algorithms) poses is the inherent
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incomprehensibility of its processes (codes). Even computer engineers find explaining the exact
process of the programs highly complex. Thus, an AI legal environment would most likely result
in directives and rules that would prove very difficult to justify under Raz’s theory.396 The tailoredlaw system directives might be clear but the process (i.e., the reasons) might not.397
In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin opines that authorities’ standards recommend a single
right answer, in all cases.398 However, even though Dworkin’s approach seems like a good basis
for an algorithm, he anticipated this result by later clarifying that he did not intend to devise “an
algorithm for the courtroom”. He further explains:399
“No electronic magician could design from my arguments a computer program that would
supply a verdict everyone would accept once the facts of the case and the text of all past
status and judicial decisions were put at the computer disposal.”

Dworkin bases his reservations on his predetermined assumptions about the inability of computers
to perform the role of a human judge – establishing the law and apply the interpretation can only
be justified “by deploying some general scheme of moral responsibility the members of a
community might properly be deemed to have.”400 However, in the future, AI might be able to
follow Dworkin’s integrity approach by providing “a systematic way to revise a set of rules in
service of an overall goal. And that goal might be morally legitimate.”401 The applicability of AI’s
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to Dworkin’s approach is dependent upon the AI’s ability to consider individual rights, “which are
trumps against collective goals.”402
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1.5 NON-HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
It appears that many conceptions of AI derive from the concept of intelligence. And it is evident
that the creators of the AI term originally sought to define the concept for human purposes. The
engineers and scientists who envisioned the term during the early 1950s hoped that robots and
machines would exhibit intelligent behaviour, expressing semi-human abilities and cognitive
capabilities. I argue that in doing so they missed an important component: AI is not human, and
not all humans exhibit intelligent behaviour. Further, an unintelligent human can still be considered
a human.
The current concept of AI poses difficulties for the legal field in general and the intellectual
property debate that follows in particular, due to the misconceptions outlined above. By pairing
the words “artificial” and “intelligence” together, machine intelligence has been relegated a lesser
status, since the term “artificial” seems to diminish the emphasis on machines’ intelligence. In
other words, even if machines possess higher intelligence than humans, this term still marks them
as inferior.403
Such misconceptions often lead discussion to a constant comparison between machines
and humans. It limits humans’ ability to examine other possibilities for a better concept for the
legal debate. In this regard, I wish to distinguish between the technological/scientific field and the
legal field. As stated earlier, recent decades have seen rapid development of AI technology. More
recently, the growing debate over automatic self-driving cars and other technological
advancements, allowing the application of AI technology to other fields, has shifted to legal
matters. The legal community is now expected to provide the tools to enable humans to coexist
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with machines, either by regulation or by revising our laws and its applicability to the new era. It
seems, however, that the legal community has (unintentionally) ignored the AI concept’s reasoning
and relevance to the debate.404 There is no merit to a legal discussion that is not based on a
distinctive and defined terminology. The current legal debate is therefore the equivalent of sewing
(legal) suits that no one can see (nor understand).
I therefore propose a shift in the legal terminology. I propose to define machines, robots,
and computers as they are: non-human. “Non-human” is a neutral concept that does not impose
any bias or attitude toward machines or robots405 or highly developed computers. Furthermore, it
allows the terms “AI” and “non-human” to coexist. AI will probably remain the general term for
defining the technological and professional fields of research. However, the term non-human (or
NH) should be implemented in the legal discussion.
It is also important to clarify that this new term does not itself imply an argument for human
rights. As discussed earlier, the philosophical debate concerning allocating legal rights to AI (or
non-humans) is convoluted. The fact that I choose a term that is based on the word “human” does
not imply that AI (NH) should or should not deserve legal rights. Though I do believe that the
current state of rights should be changed in the future, using the NH term has no effect on the
question of allocating legal rights to the newly invented alien.
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PART II: TOWARD AI-IP THEORY
“He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and
compass and never knows where he may cast.” (Leonardo da Vinci)

2.1 IP THEORY MATTERS
Conflict underlies IP.406 The term – “intellectual property” – describes an assortment of policies
regulating the use of non-physical objects.407 IP law’s two primary supporting premises clash
paradoxically: ideas should be free for all to use, to advance the public pool of knowledge;408 but
freedom to use ideas leaves little incentive – for creators, authors, inventors and businesses – to
disseminate ideas into the public realm.409 To mediate this dilemma, IP law grants creative minds
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a limited protection over only their material expression of such ideas, and only for a limited time.410
IP theories act as justification, criticism, evaluation (or any combination of these) of the way we
restrict IP to resolve this dilemma.
There are many IP theories. For example, one popular moral justification for IP protection
is through a creator’s natural right to his creation, which society should reward. From natural rights
flows a basic assumption about IP that such protection fosters creativity and multiplies creations.411
David Vaver wonders, however, whether IP protection is even necessary for the creative process,
noting that “in the centuries before copyright and patent laws were established or were rigorously
enforced, incentive and creative work flourished throughout the world.”412 This position is shared
by many scholars,413 and supported by recent studies.414
Beyond understanding the historical development of IP laws, IP theories are crucial for
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setting future progress’s foundations. In setting those foundations, we should avoid a fixed and
inflexible approach to IP theories. Robert Merges describes IP law as “one of those sprawling,
chaotic megacities of the developing world … construction cranes are everywhere.”415 Many
scholars agree with Merges’ claim, arguing that current IP theories offer insufficient philosophical
and practical clarity for current problems.416
Despite IP law’s inner balance being maintained in past decades (albeit not without
struggles), society is heading towards difficult stages in its evolution,417 as technology advances
under a rise of capitalism, globalization, and other aspects characterizing modern society. Flexible
IP theorization can help. It can assist us to build legal theories supporting those changes and
promote humanity to embrace the challenges technology is importing into an already complex and
highly-regulated area.
The theoretical discussion, therefore, has significant value.418 While IP theories on their
own merit “have failed to make good on their promises to provide comprehensive prescriptions
concerning the ideal shape of intellectual-property law, they can help identify non-obvious
attractive resolutions of particular problems.”419 The theoretical discussion can also “catalyse
415
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useful conversations among various people and institutions responsible for the shaping of the
law.”420 Through these discussions and conversations among the different “players” (like scholars,
judges and legislators) we can discern gaps and inconsistencies in IP theories. I share the views of
William Fisher, Zemer and other scholars that no single IP theory can provide sufficient legal
justification for a given issue, and “only by continuing to discuss the possibility … can we hope
to make progress.”421
Part I, Searching for Common Ground: Conceptualizing AI, provides an overview of AI’s
history and general concept in order to shape it for the legal discussion that follows. But, this
dissertation is concerned more specifically with the problems arising when AI and the law –
particularly IP law – intersect. These problems are amplifying as non-human actors create works
under a regime that only contemplates creation (and its ensuing rights and responsibilities) by and
for humans.
Part II places the AI discussion within the IP theoretical map and proposes a broader
perspective for AI-IP theory. I argue for developing theoretical approaches to IP in the AI era.
First, I explore the “many faces” of current IP theories, reflecting on their underlying bases.
Second, I consider if IP theories support allocating IP rights to non-human authors or inventors.422
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In doing so, I address distinct stages in AI’s development:
1.

AI development’s current stage (where, as Pamela Samuelson and Annmarie Bridy
explain,423 copyright protection is not accorded to the AI itself);424

2.

The impending stage in development of computer-generated works;425

3.

The stage during which AI is expected to reach human intelligence; and

4.

Later possibilities, in which AI and human authors (or inventors) combine, and/or AI
achieves superintelligence.

Finally, I look for other alternatives in IP scholarship, mainly whether AI can be provided a limited
scope of rights in its creations. Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, for example, offer an
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integrated approach to IP by “combining various modes of intellectual property protection.”426
Further, Parchomovsky and Alex Stein present a model that “calibrates authors’ protection and
liability to the originality level of their works.” Under this model, “creators of minimally original
works will receive little protection and incur greater exposure to liability if sued by others.”427
These approaches to IP might provide a way to solve the AI rights problem by awarding different
levels of protection to AI creations.428
Theorizing AI-IP presents several challenges. First, few similarities exist between the IP
theories discussion and the AI personhood discussion addressed in Part I.429 Given that establishing
AI-IP rights derived from the broader legal context of AI rights, this discussion begins where the
AI “personhood” discussion ended.
Second, from a normative perspective, the legal basis for IP rights – to promote the
“Progress of Science and Useful Arts” as framed in the US Constitution430 and to “encourage
cultural and technological development” as stated in the EU directive431 – raises immanent
questions: Would IP legal rights incentivize AIs to create or humans to create better AI systems?
And, if not, are there any other IP justifications which support IP-AI rights?
Third, how will introducing AI-IP affect the inner balance between authors or inventors
and society? AI copyright, for example, might shift the balance toward the public domain (as I will
explain further in this part). Those considerations are worth discussing. Finally, because AI is not
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an immediate but a future concern, the question arises whether it will be necessary to change the
legal system at that point.
I wish to bring the theoretical discussion, as Zemer suggested, “into contemporary
discussion on the future of property regimes”432 and challenge justifications behind the current
copyright regime to address the upcoming change. By reviewing the main theoretical approaches
in IP and considering AI’s applicability according to these theories, I hope to contribute to an
ongoing discussion about IP and build a balanced approach between technology and IP.
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2.2 IP THEORY’S MANY FACES
2.2.1

Introduction

Peter Menell divides the approaches to IP theory into utilitarian and non-utilitarian camps.433 The
utilitarian approach offers “the greatest good for the greatest number.”434 Utilitarian theories
(Richard Posner and William Landes) endorse the creation of IP rights to balance the economic
interests of rights-holders and the interest of the public.435 IP utilitarianism’s underlying reasoning
assumes that IP monopolization produces incentives to create; accordingly, it requires that we
accept such monopolization to produce creation. This assumption informs the basic economic
approaches presented below.
Non-utilitarian theories prioritize cultural or social concerns over utilitarian “greater good”
maximization. They include (non-exhaustively): Lockean theory (concerned with the connection
between an individual’s labour and its fruits); the personhood approach (which similarly connects
labour to its fruits, albeit emphasizing the centrality of such labour’s expression to the individual’s
“persona”); social-institutional planning (aimed at maintaining a strong civic culture that derives
benefits from balancing social and institutional IP regimes); and, traditional proprietarianism
(which sees IP as a form of property).436
The continued struggle and constant tension between the two camps influenced IP law’s
development in recent decades.437 According to Merges, only three justifications for IP rights are
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important: Lockean appropriation, Kantian individualism and Rawlsian distributive effects.
Merges argues against utilitarianism as a fundamental IP theory, stating that its “empty promise
and ethical holes […] are just too glaring.”438 Fisher opines that utilitarian and Lockean theories
have enjoyed an “aura of neutrality”,439 so courts more often – particularly in the US, the UK and
Canada, for the past 20 years – turn to those theories when faced with difficult legal cases.440
Behavioural theories provide a different basis for IP, by exploring behavioural effects on
the development of laws and norms to understand motivational forces underlying human or AI
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behaviour.441 There is already ample research about behavioural impacts on various legal fields
like criminal and tax law.
Contrasting these theories, the ensuing discussion will consider the differences across
jurisdictions and disciplines, as Abraham Drassinower describes:442
“[O]n the one hand, in common law jurisdictions, copyright is regarded as a policy
instrument designed to serve the public interest in the production and dissemination of
works of authorship … [O]n the other hand, in civil law jurisdictions, authorial entitlement
is conceived not instrumentally but as judicial recognition of rights inherent in the act of
authorship as such.”

I echo Drassinower’s words. We face two distinct perspectives affecting the way IP laws are
shaped. It is reasonable to argue that, in the coming era, these differences will have to be partly
reconciled to clear the way for a more inclusive approach that can be shared internationally by
humans and non-humans alike. An alternative vision is a transcontinental IP theory in which two
distinct approaches to IP would be available – the US and the EU. Under this vision, it seems
plausible that non-human creations would not be widely recognized in the EU, given the EU’s
natural law inclination. It would also be very interesting to envision where Canada and the pastBrexit UK would fall on the IP US-EU scale.
2.2.2

Four IP Justifications

Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman explain that IP justifications “fall into one of two general
categories”: (1) “ethical and moral arguments” or (2) “instrumental justifications that focus on the
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fact that intellectual property induces or encourages desirable activities.”443 Fisher contends that
there are four theoretical justifications for IP rights:444 utilitarianism,445 natural law (Labour based
justifications), personhood, and social planning.
My discussion emphasizes IP theory’s main philosophical arguments. I choose Fisher’s
paper as the cornerstone to the theoretical discussion below, though I am aware of other approaches
to IP and will keep those in mind, too. The theoretical outline below will seek to provide a compass
for IP discussion within the AI debate that follows.
2.2.2.1 The Utilitarian Approach
Influenced by Jeremy Bentham’s writings, utilitarianism aspires to achieve “the greatest good for
the greatest number”446 to maximize social welfare.447 It “endorse[s] the creation of intellectual
property rights in order to induce innovation and intellectual productivity.”448 By nature,
utilitarianism is based on consequentialist arguments, as “good is whatever yields the greatest net
utility.”449 The patent system, for example, is justified by providing inventors incentives to invest
in research and disclose valuable new products or processes to the public.450 A pharmaceutical
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company, for example, “will invest research and development costs in the manufacture of a new
drug only if it is granted a patent.”451 Lawmakers are expected to balance “the power of exclusive
rights to stimulate the creation of inventions and works of art” and the “offsetting tendency of such
rights to curtail widespread public enjoyment of those creations.”452
The utilitarian approach is well-grounded in UK and US copyright laws. It can be traced
back to the Statute of Anne, 1709,453 and the US Constitution.454
Scarcity is an essential element on the stimulation side of utilitarianism’s balancing act.
For example, invention is scarce because it demands research and development, which consumes
resources, which in turn consumes opportunity costs. Utilitarianism, therefore, must consider
scarcity and appropriately allocating IP rights to produce “the greatest net ‘X’ (utility, wealth, and
451
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so on) […] at the lowest cost.”455 Once ideas are shared, they become free to the public.
Since many aspects of IP are easy to copy, it is important to create artificial scarcity “to
protect the right of an author or composer of any literary, artistic, or scientific work”456 and prevent
“free riders”. As James Harris elegantly expresses, “Once the idea … cease[s] to be scarce, the
law, through such devices as copyright, design right, patents, trade marks, and so forth, surrounds
it with trespassory rules prohibiting unauthorized use.”457
Concerning mass information’s abundance,458 Mark Lemley identifies the resulting
potential irrelevance of the basic economic rule of scarcity for IP459 “when both the cost of creation
and the cost of distribution fall below a certain point.”460 Lemley’s “world without scarcity” will
require a reworking of basic economics,461 perhaps one that abandons IP protection.
Exploitation by “free riders” is a concern on the public enjoyment side of utilitarianism’s
scale. William Landes and Richard Posner emphasized the vulnerable nature of public IP goods:
“While the cost of creating a work subject to copyright protection … is often high, the cost of
reproducing the work, whether by the creator or by those to whom he has made it available, is
often low. And once copies are available to others, it is often inexpensive for these users to make
additional copies.”462 Lemley agrees, adding that “the ease of copying means producers won’t be
455

Palmer, supra note 452 at 849-850 (discusses the concept of scarcity in the utilitarian argument).
Harris, supra note 408.
457
Ibid at 44. Further, “Once an idea is fully in the public domain, it ceases to be scarce and in that sense an item of
social wealth which must be allocated between competing claimants. An ideational entity differs from tangible object
in that mere uses of it are not naturally competitive.” Ibid at 43
458
Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27.
459
Ibid at 462.
460
Ibid at 506, Lemley further explains that “[i]t simply means that how much (if any) IP we need in a given industry
is a function of the characteristics of that industry. As those characteristics change, so must IP.”
461
Ibid at 462 and 465, outlines three new technologies that promise significant changes: 3D printing, synthetic
biology, and bioprinting and robotics, arguing that “[c]ombine these four developments … and it is entirely plausible
to envision a not-too-distant world in which most things that people want can be downloaded and created on site for
very little money – essentially the cost of raw materials. Jeremy Rifkin calls this the ‘zero marginal cost society’.”
462
William M Landes & Richard A Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” (1989) 18 J Leg Stud 325 at
326. See also Posner & Landes, The Economic Structure of IP, supra note 416; Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M Salzberger,
456

95

able to charge enough to recoup their investment in making the thing in the first place.”463 The
legal and economic solution to the “free riders” problem, Anne Barron suggests, is to “institute
rights of private property in relation to these goods.”464 However, the way to that and to what
extent, is under considerable disagreement.
In a more recent paper, Lemley further criticizes the semi-“religious” adherence to
utilitarianism as the leading IP theoretical justification.465 He calls for a more scientific basis
approach to IP regulation,466 stating that despite gathering an increasing amount of data and
information on every aspect of IP and creative and innovative markets,467 our “faith-based” IP
approach remains largely unchanged.468 Robert Merges challenges Lemley’s faith-based IP
argument, which is standing against the very essence of deontological theories, stating that “[i]f
moral rules are to guide us, and if we follow those rules in deciding on a certain ‘system,’ it is then
precisely and exactly the case that that system ‘is better for the world than other systems’.”469
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These concerns – at each extreme of utilitarianism’s required balance – help explain the
theory’s aim: Allocating time-limited exclusivity to creators during which they may recover costs
and enjoy the benefits of their works to minimize inefficiency and deterrence of creation.
2.2.2.2 The Natural Law Theory
The second theoretical justification for IP is the Natural Law theory which utilizes labour-based
justifications, which originated in John Locke’s philosophy.470 Locke’s theory – which
significantly influenced the development of legal thought – is subject to a wide range of different
interpretations and views.471 For example, an instrumental interpretation deems rewarding hard
work as necessary to elicit labour in the first place.472 Alternatively, a normative interpretation
considers hard work as deserving of a just reward by right.473
The labourer’s right is conditional, subject to Locke’s proviso: She ought only to take and
use what is needed;474 and she must ensure that “there is enough and as good left in common for
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others.”475 Some deny such a proviso.476 Robert Nozick interprets Locke’s proviso as only limiting
the justification for acquiring property by labouring when others escape “net harm” suffering. In
other words, the proviso is violated if the labourer is unjustly enriched.477 Allocating patent rights
to inventors, for example, abides by the proviso because the invention only came into existence
due to the inventor’s efforts; inventor enrichment (ownership of the patent monopoly) equals a
corresponding benefit to the public (disclosure of the invention) which justifies the corresponding
deprivation (unfettered access to the invention). Adam Moore interpreted the proviso differently
as a necessary condition, arguing that “[i]f the appropriation of an unowned object leaves enough
and as good for others, then the acquisition and exclusion is justified.”478
Two limitations applicable to IP theory develop from Locke’s proviso. Nozick identifies
the first as occurring in simultaneous independent creation.479 For example, normally one inventor
appropriating the work of another is enriched at the expense of the other’s ability to use his own
invention. If two inventors create the same invention independently, however, each must be
allowed to fully use and sell their inventions – despite the adverse effect on either inventor’s
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monopoly – “[o]therwise the assignment of the patent to the first inventor would leave [the second
inventor] worse off.”480 Nozick identifies a second limitation required on the duration of IP
protection that “approximates how long it would have taken, in the absence of knowledge of the
invention, for independent discovery.”481
Lockean theory has boundaries beyond its proviso; difficulties arise when calculating the
appropriate mix of labour with property.482 For example, Nozick wonders whether “[b]uilding a
fence around a territory presumably would make one the owner of only the fence (and the land
immediately underneath it).”483 Perhaps, under this example, the builder may even lose entitlement
to the fence he built,484 unless the labour improves – or increases the value of – the property
underneath.485 In many ways,486 Nozick’s interpretation of utilitarianism for IP theory shares
Adam Smith’s “free market” (liberty) philosophy, rejecting Rawls’s theory for a more egalitarian
society.
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Utilitarianism’s reward for labour seems negotiable, by some accounts. Take Edwin
Hettinger’s example: “One does not create 99 percent of the value of an apple by picking it off a
tree, though some human effort is necessary for an object to have value for us.” 487 It is appropriate
to translate this example into the notion that an IP labourer with an acknowledged right to fruits of
his labour is not necessarily entitled to the entirety of the intellectual object’s value.488 Hettinger
supports the idea further by emphasizing that “works are not created in a social vacuum: authors
interact and converse with other creative individuals, enclosing ideas and other social facts
received from the common stock.”489 In other words, the quantum of “fruits” with which to reward
an IP labourer “is a question of social policy; it is not solved by simply insisting on a moral right
to the fruits of one’s labor.”490
2.2.2.3 The Private Property Theory
The third approach derives from Kantian and Hegelian philosophy.491 According to Hegel and

487

Hettinger, supra note 407 at 37. Locke believes that “until labored on, objects have little human value, at one point
suggesting that labor creates 99 percent of their value.”
488
Ibid at 38.
489
Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437 at 160. In his early work, Zemer argues that the Lockean theory
provides “significant recognition for the public role in the making of authorship and art … [and strengthen] the role
played by a society’s shared pool of ideas and experiences in the creation of new works.” Lior Zemer, “The Making
of a New Copyright Lockean” (2006) 29 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 891 at 892-3 [Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright
Lockean]. Carys Craig suggests that “[w]hen the author creates original expression in the form of literature, art, drama
or music, she is engaged in an intrapersonal dialogue (developing a form of personal narrative by drawing upon
experience, situation, and critical reflection) and an interpersonal dialogue (drawing upon the texts and discourses
around her to communicate meaning to an anticipated audience).” Carys Craig, Copyright, Communication and
Culture: Towards a Relational Theory of Copyright Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) at 53-4.
490
Hettinger, supra note 407 at 39. Hettinger concludes, ibid at 40: “In short, a laborer has a prima facie natural right
to possess and personally use the fruits of her labor. But a right to profit by selling a product in the market is something
quite different. This liberty is largely a socially created phenomenon. The ‘right’ to receive what the market will bear
is a socially created privilege, and not a natural right at all. The natural right to possess and personally use what one
has produced is relevant to the justifiability of such a privilege, but by itself it is hardly sufficient to justify that
privilege.” Adam Mossoff claims that the Lock’s labor theory discussion was neglected by philosophers and offers a
concise summary of the philosophical debate. See Adam Mossoff, “Saving Locke from Marx - The Labor Theory of
Value in IP Theory” (2012) 29:2 Soc Phil & Pol’y 283.
491
Hegel focuses on the individual’s will as the most important element in its existence. Hence, it is important to
establish if AI could express Hegelian “will”. Hegel, supra note 257. See also Robert R Williams, Hegel on the Proofs
and Personhood of God: Studies in Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017); Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “Kant on Copyright: Rights on Transformative Authorship” (2007) 25 Cardozo Arts &
Ent LJ 1059.
100

Kant, allocating private property rights to IP is justified by allowing “the satisfaction of some
fundamental human needs.”492 The Hegelian approach is more concerned with the individual’s
rights rather than social welfare.
Fisher confirms the application of these approaches to IP rights by justifying them on two
grounds: (1) “they shield from appropriation or modification artifacts through which authors and
artists have expressed their ‘wills’ (an activity thought central to ‘personhood’)”; and (2) “they
create social and economic conditions conducive to creative intellectual activity, which in turn is
important to human flourishing.”493
In other words, IP protections guard the creators’ personal cores, thereby encouraging their
cultural and intellectual creation.
Private property may appear like labour theory, since it similarly maximizes creation by
rewarding creators with protection. But, private property takes a less economic, more personal
approach to endorse a perhaps stronger entitlement for labourers. Justin Hughes – critical of
rigorous fixation to Lockean theory to justify IP494 – explained that the “most powerful alternative
to a Lockean model of property is a personality justification” because it “posits that property
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provides a unique or especially suitable mechanism for self-actualization, for personal expression,
and for dignity and recognition as an individual person.”495
Expanding on Hughes’s interpretation of Hegelian philosophy, Fisher offers principal
guidelines to shape a better IP system. First, IP should differentiate between highly expressive
intellectual activities (writing novels) to less expressive activities (genetic research). On a
spectrum between the two, the latter should be accorded lesser protection. Second, a person’s
public image (“including his physical features, mannerisms, and history”,496 some facets of which
result from little labour),497 should be given stronger protection since it reflects their “persona” –
an important “receptacle for personality”.498 Third, “[a]uthors and inventors should be permitted
to earn respect, honor, admiration, and money from the public by selling or giving away copies of
their works, but should not be permitted to surrender their right to prevent others from mutilating
or misattributing their works.”499 Notably, this last guideline uses the language of copyright’s
moral rights.
Margaret Radin reformulated Hegel’s approach to develop the concept of a person.500
Radin explains that “[i]n Roman law, persona came to mean simply an entity possessing legal
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rights and duties. Today it commonly signifies any human being.”501 Radin further outlines four
main conceptions of a person:
a. The rights-holder. Kant argues that the person serves as a rational free agent and his existence
is an end it itself. Accordingly, “personhood has no component of individual human
differences, but rather by definition excludes the tastes, talents, and individual histories that
differentiate one from another”;502
b. The thinking, intelligent being (i.e., having self-consciousness and memory). According to
Locke,503 consciousness is an inseparable element, as it is “impossible for anyone to perceive,
without perceiving that he does perceive”;504
c. The human body. According to Radin, recognizing someone as a person requires one “to
attribute bodily continuity to it”;505
d. The future projection (one on whom we may “project a continuing life plan into the future”).506
Radin contends that “what counts in recognizing something as a person is a consistent character
structure. Persons are what they are in virtue of their past and future integrated by their
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character.”507
Other philosophical conceptions of persons exist beyond these four categories. David Hume, for
example, believes that “the rest of mankind […] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux
and movement.”508 For Hume, “the feeling of self-identity over time is merely a persistent
illusion.”509
IP rights under the private property theory can be justified on the basis that a creator is
entitled to the rights in his creations – “manifestations of one’s personality in one’s intellectual
expression” – so protection acts “as barriers to expropriation of inalienable features of one’s
personality.”510 Locke wrote that “every man has a property in his own person”;511 hence, property
should be protected because it is part of the individual personality. Radin distinguishes two levels
of property: (1) market value (fungible); and, (2) personal (inalienable). Radin argues that the latter
is more important to protect since it is irreplaceable by other market-bought goods.512
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This approach to IP theory has its critics. In transposing Nozick’s classic query, Hughes
suggested, “[W]hy should we think putting our personality out into the world gives us rights to the
things we create? Why should we not assume that when we mix our personality with the world,
we lose part of our personality instead of gaining part of the world?”513
2.2.2.4 The Social Planning Theory
Social planning – or proprietarian514 – theory contends that property rights should be allocated in
a way that would promote desirable societal goals.515 Or, according to broader interpretations (like
Zemer’s), social planning is “largely devoted to discussing ways to maintain a strong civic culture
that benefits from a reasonably balanced social and institutional intellectual property regime.”516
This theory – inspired by philosophers such as Thomas Jefferson,517 Karl Marx,518 James
Harrington,519 Morris Cohen and others520 – supports looser IP restrictions to maximize social and
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cultural engagement.521 Among the many eminent scholars developing this approach include
Fisher,522 Neil Netanel,523 Rosemary Coombe,524 Niva Elkin-Koren,525 and Zemer.526
Netanel explores the balance between owner rights and the public domain,527 proposing an
alternative approach: the “democratic paradigm”. Netanel argues that copyright enhances our
society’s democratic character using a free market,528 by providing sufficient incentives to support
creation without government or elite patronage.529 In other words, Netanel claims that copyright’s
objective is democratic culture, not efficient authorship (an objective that constrains robust
culture;530 though autonomous self-reliant authorship remains an admittedly essential copyright
objective for Netanel).531 The democratic approach approves of transformative use – thus
disapproving of authorial control over derivation – which in turn “loosen media conglomerates’
hold on public discourse.”532 An ideal democratic culture is one that maximizes mass expression
opportunities while maintaining incentives to express without state intervention.533 One way to do
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this, per Netanel, is through compulsory IP licensing regimes “to balance the interests of artists
and ‘consumers’ of their works.”534
Social planning theory is skeptical of lengthy IP terms. Terms should instead be designed
with the importance of the works’ social value in mind, maximizing the public domain and
minimizing IP owner surplus.535 Netanel recommends two ways – tied to terms – to achieve this
goal. First, extending protection for personal uses to digital copies under certain conditions;536 and,
second, eliminating rigorous technological protection measures that restrict unauthorised users
from access to electronic databases and content.537 The democratic approach seeks to discourage
IP owners and providers from controlling works already publicly available or licensed to an
individual consumer or user for his private use.538
Netanel suggests a copyright regime that fosters democratic values as follows: First, “[t]he
copyright term should be shortened, thereby increasing the size of the ‘public domain’ available
for creative manipulation.” Second, derivative works (or transformative users) should be exempt
from copyright owners’ grips. Finally, “compulsory licensing systems should be employed more
frequently to balance the interests of artists and ‘consumers’ of their works.”539
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Netanel, supra note 523 at 369. Netanel states that the current length of copyright protection provides by all
accounts “more than sufficient support for an independent and diverse sector of authors and publishers, and that, from
the perspective of democratic governance, any further lengthening of the duration of protection would be undesirable
and unwarranted.”
536
Ibid at 373: “That extension would constitute a substitute for copyright owner rights that will have a far diminished
utility in the digital market and not an onerous expansion of copyright’s scope.” Netanel, for example, is skeptical in
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Rosemary Coombe – taking a dialogic approach to social planning IP theory540 – advocates
for an open and safer public area for creation.541 Coombe argues that strong (and expensive) IP
rights threaten the cultural process, because they prevent the public “from using the most powerful,
prevalent, and accessible cultural forms to express identity, community, and difference.”542
Coombe’s interpretation of social planning rejects the “rationalist privileging of the autonomous
self and its claims to know an objective social world.”543 She instead shares modernist aspirations
to “de-center the subject and its claims to ontological and epistemological primacy” but rejects the
insistence that “a single underlying structure may be privileged as the objective reality underlying
the cultural epiphenomena of everyday life and consciousness.”544 Coombe believes that the
conventional forms of discourse limit our realities.
Coombe’s argument is built upon the scholarly debate that “the objective world is the
cultural construction of social subjects and that subjectivity itself is a product of language and
cultural practice.”545 As Coombe explains, “What we experience as social reality is a constellation
of cultural structures that we ourselves construct and transform in ongoing practice.”546
Merges criticizes Coombe’s and Netanel’s views that the Lockean proviso is impossible to
apply to dialogic culture.547 Merges prefers a different balance, stating that “[w]e cannot escape
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at 29; Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437.
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‘dialogic’ way in which culture is constructed; she has focused on the ‘drive to meaning’ engaged in by all people,
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the barrage of images, signs, and symbols that flood our minds from the ubiquitous mass media,
yet we are supposed to honor property lines, and remain passive consumers of, instead of active
participants in, the media saturated culture that engulfs us.”548 According to Merges, we ought to
limit “how much someone may be permitted to comment on, reconfigure, and ‘make their own’
the works of the mass media.”549 Of course, this is demonstrably untrue for communities who
deliberately exclude TV and Internet from their lives; for them, popular culture and media are
indeed escapable.550

which she believes requires legal rules that permit widespread commentary, critique, and reaction to previously
published works. She sees expansive IP rights as a threat to these important values. She and others writing from this
strong public domain position have pointed out that the dialogic nature of culture makes it impossible in many cases
for IP rights to satisfy the Lockean sufficiency proviso.”
548
Ibid.
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Merges, Locke Remixed, supra note 473 at 1267.
550
Ibid at 1268: “All I mean to say is that, regardless of the intensity of the pleasure or comfort one derives from
consuming mass media, it is not after all an essential activity in a deep sense. Exposure to Big Media is a choice. It is
a widely shared choice, it is a very easy choice, it is a highly popular choice, but it is still a choice.”
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2.2.3

Moral Rights551

Moral rights protect an author’s non-economic interests,552 which generally mean personal
interests like honour, reputation, and dignity.553 The doctrine emerged in Europe in the nineteenth
century;554 French civil law is considered most sympathetic to it.555 In each country that recognizes
moral rights, “the nuances of interpretation reflect the unique qualities of its culture.”556
Continental Europe’s civil law countries favour strong moral rights copyright laws.557 The
apparent reason they differ from common law systems is found in the individual rights and
personhood doctrines of civil law countries in contrast to the commercial orientation of common
law countries.558 Common law jurisdictions only adopted moral rights more recently.559
Moral rights usually last the full duration of the copyright term,560 regardless of any
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represent complete embodiment of the author’s self). See e.g. Neil Netanel, “Copyright Alienability Restrictions and
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Kant, The Philosophy of Law, William Hastie, trans (T & T Clark, 1887).
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This is not true in all countries. In France, for example, moral rights are protected indefinitely. See Sundara Rajan,
supra note 552 at 15.
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economic rights diverted from the work.561 The author’s interest in the work “transcends the
motive of financial gain.”562 Hence, even if the author sells or licenses his work, he retains his
moral rights.563 What’s more, as Vaver notes: “Parting with the copyright does not lessen the
author’s personal attachment to the work. It follows that the author should have recourse against
those who present the work differently from the way the author originally intended.”564
Moral rights are internationally recognized in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which states:565
“[T]he author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.”

Berne confirms that moral rights are independent and persist even after an economic right’s
transfer. Gerald Dworkin opines that Berne – in its historical context – reflects a compromise by
common law countries which were “caught by surprise when moral rights issues surfaced during
the conference.”566 The more recent agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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Rights (TRIPs)567 requires that member states adhere to the substantive provisions of Berne.568
However, Article 9(1) of TRIPs excludes moral rights entirely from TRIPs, stating that “[m]embers
shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under
Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”569
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) approaches moral rights differently
by establishing a moral right for performance in Article 5 of the WIPO Performance and
Phonograms Treaty,570 granting rights of attribution and integrity for performers.571 Mira Sundara
Rajan emphasizes that a notable difference between Berne and the WPPT – also considered
significant by Mihály Ficsor – is “the elimination of the word “honor” from the definition of the
performer’s right of integrity.”572 According to Kwall, WPPT’s Article 5 and Berne’s Article 6bis
are the only existing international moral protections.573
Regardless of jurisdiction, two moral rights are always recognized and accepted in these
international agreements: the right of attribution and the right of integrity. In civil law systems
with a strong moral rights basis, other rights can be recognized as well, such as withdrawal and
disclosure rights.574
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The attribution right requires that an author’s name is properly and consistently associated
with his work.575 As a result, attribution preserves the historical truth.576 Accordingly, the author
retains the right to seek relief if his work is unattributed or falsely attributed to another.577 The
integrity right prohibits distortion, mutilation, or modification of a work.578 Considered the most
important moral right,579 it preserves “cultural heritage, whether material or intangible, from
damage.”580 Integrity can apply both to physical or contextual modifications (adding Christmas
ribbons to a goose sculpture), and in some cases, where a work is associated with a product,
service, cause or institution (use in a political party’s rallies).581
Moral rights have limits, even where their protection is strongest. Attribution, for example,
does not necessarily “entitle the anonymous or pseudonymous author to prevent a third party from
disclosing the author’s real name” and thus might extend copyright term.582 Integrity is a narrowed
right in Germany and France. Germany protects only gross distortions or mutilations of films and
works included in films; France, meanwhile, excludes moral rights protection for computer
programs, architectural works and creations of “minimal originality”.583
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Tension between contract and copyright law makes moral rights waivers a controversial
practice.584 This is because moral rights are understood as not transferable, which opposes freedom
of contracts doctrine.585 In common-law countries, however, moral rights are routinely waived in
contracts.586 This tension is exacerbated by the often variable, sometimes perpetual idea of moral
rights duration. While Berne prescribes a minimum standard duration lasting a period equal to the
work’s economic rights,587 French moral rights last forever.588
More tension arises in the way different jurisdictions define authorship (i.e., who is the
beneficiary of moral rights).589 In Canada, for example, 2012’s Copyright Modernization Act
expanded moral rights protection for performers.590 The UK’s Copyright and Patents Act 1988
preventing any ‘adaptation of a computer program’ that complies with rights transferred and from ‘exercising his right
to retract or correct’ … French law also precludes authors of computer programs from opposing modifications unless
they are prejudicial to their honor or reputation.”
584
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(CDPA) explicitly excludes computer programs as “authors” of computer-generated works,
instead designating copyright to the human “by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation
of the work are undertaken.”591 The CDPA further disallows any right of attribution or integrity
for computer programs or generated creations592 and diminishes employees’ moral rights
protection.593
During the discussion leading to the CDPA copyright reform in 1988, Lord Beaverbrook
expressed doubts about the applicability of moral rights to UK computer-generated works
protection. Since moral rights are concerned “with the personal nature of creative effort”, Lord
Beaverbrook argued that the person “whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of a
computer-generated work are undertaken will not himself have made any personal, creative
effort.” 594
Citing this quotation, Andrés Guadamuz concluded that the UK copyright law “recognises
that there is no creative input in computer-generated works, and therefore s 9(3) has been framed
as an exception to the creativity and originality requirements for the subsistence of copyright. It is
precisely this divorce with creativity what makes the UK’s computer-generated clause so different
from other jurisdictions.”595

performance, and — in connection with an act mentioned in subsection 15(1.1) or one for which the performer has a
right to remuneration under section 19 — the right, if it is reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the
performance as its performer by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.”
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Moral rights face criticism. The romantic author ideal underlying the personal bond
between creator and creation has notable weaknesses.596 Their continental origin may be less
compatible for (or incompatible with) common law copyright regimes.597 Moral rights impede free
markets through contractual restrictions and preservation of several aspects of the author’s
rights.598 They promote private ownership and interests over the public,599 and increase potential
free expression conflicts, as in Guy Pessach’s example of authors exploiting their integrity rights
“to prevent publication of a parody of their work.”600 Public interests and creative tastes change
over time, and, as Amy Adler notes, “Amidst the uncertainty, one can argue that it is sometimes
in the public interest to mutilate a work rather than to preserve it.”601
On the other hand, using moral rights might help regulate modern technology and improve
the quality of information proliferation. Sundara Rajan,602 concerned that knowledge
democratization, coupled with effective manipulation and alteration technology, may degrade
information beyond recognition.603 In her view: 604
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“[C]opyright rules play into both sides of the equation. They represent a method of
generating economic value from knowledge by imposing legal restrictions on its
circulation where few limitations exist in practice. By restricting the unauthorized
dissemination of works, copyright may also help, indirectly, to promote the integrity of the
knowledge.”

Copyright’s commercial function, in partnership with its moral rights function, might therefore
support improved knowledge integrity.605

605

Ibid.
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2.3 PLACING AI WITHIN THE IP LAW MAP
In chapters I and II, I mapped, summarized, compared and contrasted IP’s predominant theories.
In doing so, I indicated unique differences and commonalities between each approach. In chapter
III, I will place AI within the IP law map, and describe IP protection for three different AI
development levels:606
A. The current pre-AI stage;
B. The impending stage of AI realization; and
C. The future stages of advancement.607
Determining the best approach to protecting AI-IP may be helped by exploring how developments
in computer software considerably transformed IP protection over the years. The law’s interaction
with the onset of computer software – a field directly contributing to AI technology, and from
which AI technology has largely extended – should be particularly illuminating for AI-IP
modelling.
Current developments may also highlight differences between computer-assisted and
computer-generated programs. I consider these recent IP law software-related developments
because such law may affect software assisted or generated by computers in profoundly different
ways.

606

It is important to distinguish between the current stage of AI (hence – not necessarily an “AI” according to scientific
standards), the next stage of AI evolution, and future possible advancements.
607
Later, in chapter IV, I will explore each IP theory’s applicability to AI’s developments and consider how IP theories
might adhere to rights allocation for AI creations.
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Finally, as noted in Part I,608 the scientific community overwhelmingly recognizes a
possibility of singularity – AI reaching human-level intelligence – occurring by the years 2040-50
(not to mention an accepted higher probability that AI exceeds human intelligence in the following
years).
In this chapter, I aspire to develop ideas and to shatter some current misconceptions. My
discussion aims to expand on the ideas of Lemley, Menell, and others, as well as contribute to an
ongoing debate at the intersection of IP law and technology.
2.3.1

The Past: IP Law Trends for Software Protection

2.3.1.1 Protecting Software through Copyrighting Literary Code
Computer programs and copyright protection have never been considered a good match – “[a]fter
all, copyright is intended, at base, to protect creative expression, such as paintings, music, novels,
and sculptures.”609 Vaver further observes that “copyright protection for programs is awkward and
causes many practical problems. Programmers enjoy being called ‘binary bards,’ and the codes
they produce may look like telegraph code books.”610 Software is usually considered more
functional than it is artistic.611 Thus, it lacks several important “ingredients” to garner copyright
protection.

608

Part I, Searching for Common Ground: Conceptualizing AI, chapter II – The singularity is near.
Lothar Determann & David Nimmer, “Software Copyright’s Oracle from the Cloud” (2015) 30 BTLJ 161 at 165.
Paul Edward Geller, opines that “computer programs represent one of a number of hybrid creatures that the law of
intellectual property has not yet fully tamed.” Paul Edward Geller, “International Copyright: The Introduction” in
Lionel Bently, Paul Edward Geller & Melville B Nimmer, eds, International Copyright Law and Practice (Lexis
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610
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609

119

At the first stages of computer software development (1960s and 1970s),612 IP law (at least
in the US) did not protect software.613 Interestingly, as Determann and Nimmer,614 and Menell615
noted, when IP law stepped in, copyright – not patent law – become the “legal vehicle providing
the primary source of intellectual property law protection for software” and thus programming.616
Evidently, as Yochai Benkler concludes, “Throughout most of its history, software has been
protected primarily by copyright, if at all.”617
A computer program is typically classified as a literary work,618 but it is crucial to note
that, as Judge Learned Hand explains, “the right cannot be limited literally to the text; else a
plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”619 The same principle should apply to software,

612
Menell describes the development of the modern computer and provides an overview of computer processing
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thus protecting more than mere code.620
i.

Between the 1970s and 1980s, the US Defined “Computer Programs” as Literary
Copyright Works, and Courts Interpreted Their Fixation.

The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU) report
represented a significant milestone in establishing the software-protecting copyright regime in the
US.621 US Congress established CONTU in 1974, following developments in computer science.
CONTU’s mission was to advise Congress “to revise comprehensively the copyright laws of the
United States.”622 After years of deliberation, navigating the complex issues raised by computer
science advancements, CONTU concluded that computer programs, “to the extent that they
embody an author’s original expression”, constitute expression and should be accorded the same
rights as other expressive works.623
CONTU also argued that computers are no more than tools, and “that there was no
reasonable basis for concluding that a computer in any way contributes authorship to a work
produced through its use.”624 Following CONTU’s report,625 Congress amended US Code’s Title
620
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including Congress, decided to avoid grappling with technological issues that obviously required more study than the
legislative process was then willing to give them. Thus, the 1976 Copyright Act froze the law on a variety of issues
and left responsibility for exploring and formulating policy regarding the intersection of copyrights and computers to
[CONTU], which had been created in 1974 in anticipation of the legislative moratorium.” See Miller, supra note 59
at 979.
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“Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the Law” (1977) 7:4 Performing Arts Rev 459. Vaver, supra note
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17 (copyright law) to include the Computer Software Act of 1980.626 This amendment defined a
computer program as a “set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result.”627 In 1986 the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) criticized CONTU’s comparison between computers, typewriters,
and cameras by stating that it is misleading to think about programs as tools of creations in the
same sense.628 OTA further suggested developing a new protection framework for computer
programs “that would treat functional works as a major, separate class of intellectual property
law.”629
Subsequent caselaw interpreted the 1980’s amendment as changing the definition of
“computer program”. Courts took a practical approach, willing to provide “real” protection for
software programs under copyright law, establishing computer programs as both literary and
audiovisual works by the mid-1980s.630
To begin, the Third Circuit, in Apple Computer, Inc v Franklin Computer Corp,631 found
both operating systems and applications were equally copyrightable as computer programs.
Affirming Apple’s decision, the court in Williams Electronics v Arctic held that literal elements of
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computer programs included source code – spelled-out human-readable commands, usually
written in a programming language like C++ or Python,632 – or object code – written in binary,
comprised of ones and zeroes, and embedded in read-only memory (ROM) readable only by a
computer.633 This meant, as the court held in Stern Electronics, Inc v Kaufman, that computer
programs (like video games) could be simultaneously protectable in several ways by copyright
law: as audiovisual; graphical or pictorial; and/or literary works.634 Copyright protection for
computer programs remains problematic, however, as Lemley opines: “[W]hen only concepts and
not actual language have been copied, courts are put to the test of distinguishing idea from
expression.”635
ii.

Beginning in the 1990s, International Agreements Locked Step with the US.

Significant international agreements adhered to software’s protection as literary works. Vaver
explained how this push “gained momentum in the 1980s and was entrenched in both NAFTA and
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TRIPs in the early 1990s.”636 The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) following TRIPs and
Berne, stating: “Computer programs are protected as literary works within the meaning of Article
2 of the Berne Convention. Such protection applies to computer programs, whatever may be the
mode or form of their expression.”637 Many other countries, including Canada, followed suit by
adapting their copyright law accordingly.638
The EU significantly impacted (and still impacts) the development of computer program
legal protection.639 Several EU directives are responsible for EU’s copyright protection for
computer programs: the 1991 Related Rights Directive, the 2001 Directive on Copyright
Harmonisation,640 and the 2009 Software Directive.641
The Software Directive required EU member states adopting software-as-literary-work
protection under Berne, “as long as they are original in the sense that they are their author’s own
intellectual creation.”642 It harmonized with US law, protecting only software’s expressive
elements, leaving “functionality, technical interfaces, programming language or data file formats”
non-copyrightable.643
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iii.

From the 1990s Onward, US Courts Defined “Originality” and “Expression” of
Software as Literary Works.

Copyright law was always designed to protect literary work;644 but copyrightability of such works
requires more than mere fixation of copyrightable subject matter. In other words, a computer
program is prima facie copyrightable if fixed in source or object code, but it must embody
sufficient originality and expression to earn entitlement to robust copyright protection. Otherwise,
for example, as in section 102(b) of the US Copyright Law, it is a non-copyrightable “idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”645 Determann
and Nimmer claim that, historically, this exception “made software particularly ill-suited for
copyright protection.”646
Establishing originality in computer programs proved complex. Copyright protection for
computer programs required creativity; but creativity was disadvantageous for computer
programmers, which in many cases aimed to create the simplest and easiest program: “[S]oftware’s
value is usually measured precisely by its functionality and efficiency, aspects expressly excluded
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from copyright protection.”647 This paradox was perhaps overlooked in Apple648 where “the 1980
amendments reflect Congress’ receptivity to new technology and its desire to encourage, through
the copyright laws, continued imagination and creativity in computer programming.649 So, the
incongruence between copyright reform’s objectives and the business practice realities led to
uncertainty in copyright infringement case outcomes.650
In 1992, the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International v Altai,651 implemented
a more reliable analytical framework – the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test.652 This test
has three stages: (1) the abstraction step dissects the plaintiff’s program “into its constituent
structural part”; (2) the filtration step “sift[s] out all non-protectable material” like ideas, methods,
facts, and public domain and merger doctrine material653 (in this stage, the court should “assess
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whether the expression is original to the programmer or author”);654 and, (3) in the final step
compares any remaining creative expression to the impugned program.655
2.3.1.2 Protecting Software by Patenting
Patent law offers an alternative framework for software protection.656 Historically, many countries
were hesitant to exploit patent law for software, fearing it would stymie innovation.657 This fear
subsided in recent decades; patent law’s role in protecting software has increased since 1977.658
This shift stems from the US Patent Act’s patentability criteria: “Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”659 In past decades, the Supreme Court
of the United States (SCOTUS) interpretate the statue in a way that excluded non-physically
manifested computer programs, which SCOTUS viewed as mathematical algorithms, and thus
abstract ideas which patent laws could not protect.660
i.

US Courts thus Took a Narrow View of Software Patentability.

American software patent mechanisms began with the three SCOTUS decisions establishing the
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Freeman-Walter test:661 Gottschalk v Benson (1972),662 Parker v Flook (1978),663 and Diamond v
Diehr (1981).664 The trend continued in the 1994 decision, In re Alappat,665 which developed the
useful, concrete, and tangible test.666 In these cases, the courts consistently distinguished between
the unpatentability of mathematical algorithms – arguing that, alone, they are abstract ideas – and
the patentability of a useful process incorporating an algorithm.667 Such a distinction limited
patentability, since proving that a program is a useful process is harder to accomplish than
submitting mere algorithms.
Despite this limit, programming patent floodgates opened668 after the US Federal Circuit
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Courts removed any lingering doubt about the patentability of computer programs in the later State
Street Bank (1998) and AT&T (1999) decisions.669 The courts in State Street and AT&T finally
withdrew the need to prove the presence of a physical component or transformation in a process
claim as critical elements for approving a patent. The court in AT&T implied that software’s
unpatentability – and SCOTUS’s condition from Diamond that physical transformation is a critical
component – was a misunderstanding.670 These rulings also mark the US decision “to part
company with the Europeans and allow computer programs to be patented as well.”671
The patent floodgates closed almost a decade later when the US Federal Court rejected
both the Freeman-Walter-Abele and the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible tests in Bilski (2008),672
adopting instead the Machine or Transformation Test (only to be rejected in the SCOTUS appeal
two years later),673 as the sole test for process patent eligibility. That test was held only to be “a
useful and important clue, an investigative tool” for patentability determinations.674 Vaver notes
that the idea of being “‘useful, tangible and concrete,’ without more, entitl[ing] a process to be
patented,” was “unanimously discarded” after Bilski (2010).675
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Alice Corp v CLS Bank (2014) is the most recent important development on software
patentability.676 In Alice, SCOTUS reaffirmed the two-step test, adopted in Mayo Collaborative
Services v Prometheus Labs: the first step asks if the patent contains an abstract idea (like an
algorithm), and if it does, the second step requires the patent add “something extra” – embodying
an “inventive concept” – for patentability.677 Ruling that Alice’s patent claims were ineligible
under the US Patent Act,678 SCOTUS determined at the first step that they were “drawn to the
abstract idea of intermediated settlement.”679 SCOTUS concluded at the second step that
something extra was lacking, stating that “the method claims, which merely require generic
computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”680
The main problem in Alice is the “something extra” requirement in order for software to
be sufficiently inventive and patentable. This stringent requirement to meet innovation is unclear
in practice since “Alice left open the nature of the technological improvement that must exist before
an application of an abstract concept may be patentable as ‘inventive’.”681
The lack of clarity in “something extra” is exacerbated in the software industry, which
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significantly unique from other industries, as Ben Klemens noted.682 First, a detailed description
of software often is the software – for example, pop-up window – making it very difficult to
distinguish between “idea and its implementation”.683 Second, programs are math; this forms a
paradox: while the courts agree that pure math is unpatentable, software might be – “yet the two
are equivalent”.684 Third, if a patent on a particle of code restricts other users from using that data
or technique, it in turn hinders development of other programs. Finally, Alice’s decision runs
contrary to programmers’ desired simplicity of useful software, and limits appropriate patent
candidates by requiring the patent to demonstrate “something extra”.
Since most software contains abstract ideas,685 Alice may lead to a substantial decrease of
business method and computer-implemented innovations patents.686 It was unsurprising that,
following Alice, the US software industry sector and legal community expressed concern about
narrowing computer programs patentability, regressing to the pre-Diamond era.
On the other hand, others applaud SCOTUS’s decision to limit patents on programs based
heavily on data and, consequently, strengthen competition. Data is the fuel of future developments,
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and its availability is crucial for a machine-learning technology’s progression.687 As Calo
highlighted,688 distilling high-quality data is essential for any government policy. By limiting the
ability to patent software that relies heavily on data – even processed high-quality data – we make
the data public goods, thus allowing programmers access to it for the benefit of future progress.
Alice provided inadequate guidance for lawyers and programmers to follow.689 And after a
short ambiguous period,690 the Federal Court provided some guidance to software patentees.
According to Judge Hughes in Enfish (2016),691 Alice did not conclude that all computer-related
technology improvements are “inherently abstract and, therefore, must be considered at step two.”
Rather, it is, “relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer
functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea, even at the first step of the Alice analysis.”692
Marino and Nguyen called Enfish “the broad strokes of an analytical framework.”693
In examining the post-Alice decisions, Marino & Nguyen distilled the conditions needed
to establish software patentability: “First, the Court will determine what distinguishes the invention
from the prior art. If the novel feature is the use of a computer, the patent will likely be invalid,
while if the novel feature is a better computer, the patent will likely be valid.” As in other
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jurisdictions, it seems that American courts will likely try to redefine the boundaries of software
patentability in the future.
ii.

The UK Takes a Narrow View on Software Patentability.

The UK Patents Act 1997 lacks explicit recognition of computer programs as inventions.694
However, as Bently and Sherman explain, “One of the most important changes that led to the
liberalization of the protection offered to computer-related inventions in the United Kingdom …
was the decision that an invention that includes a computer program could be patentable so long
as the invention as a whole was technical.”695 This approach did not last long. Following Aerotel
(2008)696 the UK’s Intellectual Property Office (IPO) reinstated the “old practice of rejecting all
computer program claims.”697 It backtracked somewhat in February 2008, when it revised its
practice to include patentability for a computer program.698 In the recent HTC case, L. J. Kitchin
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followed this reasoning in overturning a UK High Court (Justice Floyd) decision that found two
of Apple’s related patents invalid. As L. J. Kitchin explains:699
“I believe the judge took his eye off the ball in focussing on the fact that the invention was
implemented in software and in so doing failed to look at the issue before him as a matter
of substance not form. Had he done so he would have found that the problem and its
solution are essentially technical in nature and so not excluded from patentability.”

Nonetheless, UK software patentability remains restrained, as “an ordinary computer program
used in a general-purpose computer would normally not be patentable in the United Kingdom.”700
iii.

Canada Splits the Difference Between the US and the EU/UK Approaches.

The Canadian approach to software patent protection was inspired by software developments and
the American legal approach. As Vaver states, “In 1978 the Canadian PO decided that computer
programs were effectively algorithms … and so fell under the prohibition against patenting abstract
theorems.”701 In the following decades, the Canadian Patent Office (CPO) was accordingly
reluctant to issue software patents.702 Until Diamond (1981),703 “Patents were granted for a
‘computing apparatus programmed in a novel manner, where the patentable advance is in the
apparatus itself,’ and for a ‘method or process carried out with a specific novel apparatus devised

the invention has a technical effect (that does not fall within the excluded categories in the Patent Act). In AT&T
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to implement a newly discovered idea’.”704
Following Diamond, the CPO “accepted that a ‘real change in a tangible thing’ beyond just
the production of information” could be patented.705 As a result of re Alappat706 the CPO decided
in 1995 to allow “patenting of an algorithm that scaled numbers exponentially where the
calculation was tied to a physical read-only-memory chip.”707 In the coming decades, the CPO has
refined and clarified its position distinguishing between “an abstract scheme, plan or set of rules
for operating a computer”, which do not fall within the meaning of section 2 of Canada Patent
Act, and a computer program that could “cause the device it controls to provide a technological
solution to a technological problem.” Accordingly, where a computer program exhibit novelty and
inventiveness the claim might include statutory contribution and thus provide the necessary
circumstances “under which a software product comprising a physical memory storing executable
code can be patented.”708
2.3.1.3 Trade Secret Protection Gains Weight after Alice
Trade secrets may play a key role in protecting software. Trade secret means information,
including programs, that “(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means” by other people
that can “obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”709 In other words, trade secrets
protection requires that the programmer should not make the code available to the public.
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Trade secrets were crucial during the mainframe era (1960s) – since software was rarely
distributed in source code then – but during the PC era (1990s), their importance diminished. The
rise of copyright protection and the Internet revolution made it relatively easy to view the
functional coding behind web pages.710 Moreover, the decrease of trade secret protection levelled
out with the rise of cloud computing companies during the late 1990s.
The advent of cloud computing at the beginning of 1999 heralded multiplayer games like
World of Warcraft (2004) and programs like Microsoft Office365 (2011) which contributed to the
rise of trade secret protection.711 Until Alice,712 the use of trade secret protection in the software
industry remained constant. Alice is expected to enhance the importance of trade secret protection,
mainly due to the diminished possibility of patent protection. However, we should bear in mind
that trade secret protection remains weak since software can be reverse-engineered unless digitally
locked and protected.
2.3.2

The Present: From Computer-Assisted to Artificial Intelligence

The current legal system is built on the assumption that legal rights are only for humans.713
However, as the human connection to a given work’s final output becomes distant, the legal basis
for rights is weakened. Contrary to common belief, the question of computer authorship is not
new, and “goes back to the early days of computing.”714
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Indeed, the struggle between humans and technology is a very old issue that scholars have
been debating about for almost a century since SCOTUS ruled in the Burrow-Giles case about the
role of photo cameras in the creation process.715 And in the past decades, IP scholars have
contributed to this discussion in numerous papers and reports.716
The line between computer-assisted and computer-generated works is blurring. Arthur
Miller classified AI systems into two categories: “systems that use symbolic and those that use
non-symbolic knowledge representation.”717 Symbolic AI “employs a specialized language to
encode knowledge, much as a dictionary uses a phonetic alphabet to encode information on
pronunciation or as DNA encodes information on the functioning of living things.”718 Nonsymbolic AI “attempt[s] to emulate the workings of the human brain, in which knowledge is
thought to be distributed across groups of neurons.”719 Miller’s work in the early 1990s focused
on symbolic AI since, at the time, he believed that non-symbolic AI was not yet advanced enough
to be considered as a plausible possibility.
Currently, computer-generated programs are “zombie” like: able to carry precondition
commands but lacking in unique characteristics of human free will. Nonetheless, computergenerated programs may develop to express more creative elements. Expression of original
elements may qualify their creations for copyright or patent protection, depending on the nature of

Budiardjo, at 55, further explain: “Artificial intelligence, as a concept, as a practical field of computer science, and as
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the work. Abbott describes the differences: “Computer involvement might be conceptualized on a
spectrum: on one end, a computer is simply a tool assisting a human inventor; on the other end,
the computer independently meets the requirements for inventorship” in patents or originality in
copyright.720
In a recent paper, Jane Ginsburg and Luke Budiardjo offer a quasi-different view on the
subject. They provide three categories of generative machines: “Ordinary tools”, “partially
generative machines”, and “fully generative machines”. However, they are framing the distinctions
according to the designer’s (i.e., the programmer) and user’s contributions. Ordinary tools are
“machines which rely solely on the creative contributions of their users”; fully generative machines
“rely entirely on the creative contributions of their designers and which do not require any creative
choices made by the users”; and, partially generative machines “combine the creative contributions
of both the user and the designer of the tools.”721
It should be noted, however, that according to Ginsburg and Budiardjo, there is no
difference between a machine and a human assistant (like an illustrator or an amanuensis). All
machines – computer-assisted and fully generative machines – are simply a tool for the execution
of human creativity. Even the “more sophisticated ‘learning’ models which we may not precisely
understand or supervise … [do] not change our initial conclusion that machines are not
‘creative’.”722 I will address these ideas in Part III and IV as well. Suffice it to say, at this point,
that I do not share Ginsburg and Budiardjo’s vision (i.e., there is no creative machines, only
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creative designers) regarding the human/machine distinction.
In this section, I shall outline the legal framework for computer-generated works in key
jurisdictions. In doing so, I am attempting to survey the differences and to reflect on the possibility
of recognizing computer-generated/AI works under current copyright laws.
The UK legal framework is, as Guadamuz describes, “deceptively straightforward [and its]
elegant and concise wording … does away with most potential debates about the creative works
produce by artificial agents.”723 Copyright protection under the CDPA requires that: (1) the
creation falls into a category of protected work (i.e., literary, dramatic, musical or artistic); (2)
qualifying for protection according to UK law;724 and, (3) its copyright has not expired. The
CDPA’s section 9(3) adds that, if a computer-generated work falls within a category under (1), its
author is “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are
undertaken.”725
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The CDPA’s section 178 (minor definitions) further defines a computer-generated work as
“a work … generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the
work.”726 Under the CDPA’s section 12(7), copyright in computer-generated works “expires at the
end of the period of 50 years.” Further, the computer-generated author is exempt from any moral
rights (i.e., the rights to be identified as the author and to object to derogatory treatment of the
work).727
The distinction between computer-assisted and computer-generated works in the UK is,
however, not very clear. In many cases, a computer-generated work is simply a more advanced
computer-assisted work which fall under section 9(3). A computer can act as a tool, similarly to a
pen used in drawing, merely assisting with execution, not conception or substantial production.728
Simply put: a tool, in which the user “contributes to the contents (expression) of the work.”729
Although the Express Newspaper decision is consistent with section 9(3), “there is some
ambiguity as to who the actual author is.”730 The same rationale could be used to allocate copyright
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to the users of the program rather than the programmers.731 Take Word for example. There can be
no valid claim that the author of my dissertation is Microsoft and not me. However, with
advancements in machine-learning technology, these scenarios might become more and more
complex.732
Guadamuz shares the example of machine learning in developing video games. In these
games, the user affects the program every time he or she plays the game.733 Using the Word
analogy, Guadamuz explains: “[O]ne would own all new worlds generated by the software because
the user made ‘the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work’. Yet clearly the game
developers make a strong claim in their end-user licence agreement that they own all intellectual
property arising from the game.”734
The reason the UK legal framework is so important is because many other countries share
it. Ireland’s Copyright and Related Rights Act, for example, echoes the UK model assigning
copyright to “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are
undertaken.”735 A similar legal framework exists – using almost identical wording – in New
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Zealand,736 India,737 South Africa738 and Hong Kong.739
Copyright law in the UK and other UK “inspired” countries explicitly limits authorship to
persons. Vaver has noted that “computer-generated works join the list of other works for which
the UK Act has created a fictitious author: the producer of a film or sound record, the maker of a
broadcast, the provider of a cable service programme – almost all of which are equally fictitious
persons, that is, corporations rather than humans.”740
The CDPA provides no instructions for when a work’s author is not human, for example,
as with independent AI-created work.741 Mr. Justice Richard Arnold has recently suggested that
AI-generated works could not be protected under UK copyright law and section 9(3) (the
computer-generated exception) should not apply to AI.742
Since protection for computer-generated works relies on a lack of any human author, it
seems peculiar to apply the originality test to them. Thus, the CDPA does not provide originality
criteria for computer-generated works that it acknowledges are copyrightable.743 In this regard, the
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UK approach to computer-generated works is very different from the EU copyright law. Bently
and Sherman note that difficulties arise with upholding originality criteria in computer-generated
works with regards to cases lacking a relationship between author and creation.744 Emily
Dorotheou observes that although the UK courts have dealt with computer-assisted/generated
works, they “have not yet considered a case regarding the author of computer generated works”,745
and when they do need to address computer-generated issues, they tend to gloss over the discussion
rather quickly. One example is the case of Nova v Mazooma. In Mazooma, Nova argued that
Mazooma games copied the composite frames which appeared on the screen.746 However, Kitchin
L. J. held that there was no infringement by concluding that the output of the computer-generated
work belongs to the games’ designer “because he devised the appearance of the various elements
of the game and the rules and logic by which each frame is generated and he wrote the relevant
computer program.”747
The UK approach to originality exemplifies the difficulties of considering AI for copyright
protection. Given the current definition of computer-generated works in the UK, I believe there
are two possible routes for allocating protection to AI works under UK copyright law. First,
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establish a new legal model for AI works. Under this model, the CDPA could define AI for the
purposes of copyright and apply the same standard from computer-generated works. Alternatively,
the UK can devise a new model for the allocation of rights. Secondly, UK copyright law might be
willing to allocate rights by changing the definition of an author (i.e., the personhood requirement).
While the copyrightability of computer-generated works in the UK is (relatively) clear, the
EU position “is considerably less favourable towards ownership of computer works”748 – let alone
AI generated works – casting doubt on any prospect of AI works copyright protection. In most EU
countries, copyright laws do not deal with computer-generated works. Since there are no
exceptions to computer-generated works, the basic principles – personhood and originality – apply.
For example, the German Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG) establishes that only a
human can be regarded as an author.749 Thus, even when a work was created with a computer (i.e.,
computer-generated), the courts still have to decide if the work is original.750
Article 1(3) of the EU Computer Programs Directive states: “A computer program shall
be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation.”751 Since
there is no definition for originality in the EU’s directives and regulations, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) had to provide guidance. There are several cases in which the ECJ shaped the
boundaries of originality and, in the process, established what EU copyrightability is.
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In Infopaq International A/S, the ECJ held that a work must be the result of the author’s
intellectual creation.752 In Eva-Maria Painer, the court elaborated that an intellectual creation must
reflect the author’s personality.753 Advocate General Trstenjak further offers that “only human
creations are therefore protected, which can also include those for which the person employs a
technical aid, such as a camera.”754 Finally, in Football Dataco decision,755 the ECJ ruled that in
“the setting up of a database, that criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the selection or
arrangement of the data which it contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an original
manner by making free and creative choices.”756 To put it briefly, the originality standard, as
developed by the EU, makes a strong indication that a human author requirement is vital to
establish copyright.757
It seems, however, that the EU is at least aware of the difficulties computer-generated/AI
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works pose. I have already mentioned earlier the EU Parliament Resolution Concerning Civil Law
Rules on Robotics.758 In the explanatory part, the resolution addresses the challenges AI pose to
copyright calling “to come forward with a balanced approach to intellectual property rights when
applied to hardware and software standards and codes ... [and that] the elaboration of criteria for
‘own intellectual creation’ for copyrightable works produced by computers or robots is
demanded.”759
The UK’s and EU’s approaches to computer-generated creations reflect a conservative
perception of copyright protection. This perception is understandable in the context of European
copyright development from the theory of Romantic-individualistic human authorship. US and
Australia, however, deal with computer-generated works differently.
In the US, legal policy towards computer-generated works since CONTU remains
unchanged and is relatively clear and straightforward – a computer-generated work might be
considered a work under copyright law; however, the computer itself cannot be regarded as the
author.760 As CONTU held:761
“The eligibility of any work for protection by copyright depends not upon the device or
devices used in its creation, but rather upon the presence of at least minimal human
creative effort at the time the work is produced.”

The author of a computer-generated work is the “one who employs the computer”.762 The US
Copyright Office has recited these statements recently, following the Monkey Selfie case763
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clarifying that it would only register works created by a human being.764 Bridy further explains
that under the current legal framework in the US the law “cannot vest ownership of the copyright
in a procedurally generated work in the work’s author-in-fact, because the work’s author-in-fact –
a generative software program – has no legal personhood.”765
As for the originality criteria, the standard was established in Feist Publications.766 In
rejecting the UK’s low “sweat of the brow” standard, SCOTUS stated that “100 uncopyrightable
facts do not magically change their status when gathered together.”767 Finally, SCOTUS held that
for a work to be protected it requires some level of creativity.768 The US standard for originality
“stands in stark contrast to the Infopaq standard prevalent in Europe,769 as in Feist the Supreme
Court clearly reckons that selection, co-ordination and arrangement of information is not an act
that conveys originality, while the opposite is true across the Atlantic.”770
The Feist decision excludes computer-generated and AI works on the grounds that
mechanical or routine acts lack creativity.771 Computer-generated/AI works are based on algorithm
764
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codes and mechanical arrangements and thus might be considered routine acts in which originality
is not subsisted. On the other hand, with machine-learning and deep-learning capabilities, it might
be difficult to argue that computer-generated programs work according to a routine since the basis
for the codes is to develop new and innovative ways to achieve their goals. The unpredictability
of these systems is what caused unrest in the past.772
Australian copyright law provides little explanation of the term “author”.773 Section 10(1)
defines an author only “in relation to a photograph” by stating that an author is “the person who
took the photograph.”774 The common wording of section 9(3) of the CDPA, which was adopted
in other UK colonies, is oddly missing. Therefore, an AI program which takes photos will not own
copyright in the photos, even if the owner of the AI program is a person since the AI itself took
the photos and not the person (owner of the AI program). Given that the Australian Copyright Act
relies on the existence of a person for authorship, allocating copyright protection for computergenerated or AI works seems challenging, even without establishing originality.775
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Further, in cases such as IceTv v Nine Network Australia776 and Telstra Corporation v
Phone Directories Company,777 Australian courts have chosen a similar path to SCOTUS in
adopting a higher originality standard, stating that skill and labour is not enough. IceTv and Nine
Network show us that a higher originality standard often has adverse effects on the possible
copyrightability of computer programs output.778 These cases might prove a barrier to computergenerated works. However, as I have stated in regard to the US standing in this matter, it would be
hard to argue in the future that machine-learning programs are not original, putting more pressure
on the need to revisit copyright standards.
Unfortunately, there is no explicit reference in Canada’s Copyright Act to computergenerated works, and copyrightability determines according to the well-established standard of
originality, as developed by the courts.779 The situation in Canada is a bit more complex though.
Unlike other common-law jurisdictions with low to medium originality threshold (where creativity
is less evident in determining originality), Canada did not adopt section 9(3) (computer-generated)
provision. In other words, computer-generated works are more likely to be considered original
under the Copyright Act and given that there is no specific exception to computer-generated works,
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it is more difficult to negate the possibility of computer-generated authorship under the current
Copyright Act.780
The distinction between a computer-generated and computer-assisted works was
considered in a recent Albertan case, Geophysical Service Incorporated (GSI) v Encana
Corporation.781 GSI is an intriguing example of a courts’ reaction to works of software created by
minimal to no human influence. Such a reaction often manifests itself from a desire to find
sufficient factual bases for human impact – slight as it may be – to allow a court to use the resulting
legal arguments and bypass having to deal with non-human authorship, at least temporarily.782
In GSI, an Alberta court considered if collected and processed seismic data constitute a
work protectable by Canadian copyright law.783 The issue was if the work was computer-generated
(with no – or negligible – human involvement) or computer-assisted (as described above, like an
execution-facilitating tool). The court rejected the defendant’s argument “that seismic data is
created with ‘little if any human input’,”784 distinguishing between its own case and Telstra.785
Unsurprisingly, the court in GSI found that “human input is involved continuously through [the
data’s] acquisition stage.”786 The court contrasted Telstra to GSI by noting the degree of human
780
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intervention required (particularly the “expert scientific skill and judgment […] ‘tailored and
unique’ to the author”), and it determined that the works in question were human-authored (and
therefore, merely computer-assisted).787
GSI foreshadows a likely trend in computer-generated cases: courts shuffling facts to find
enough human ingenuity enabling a work – despite strong evidence of minimal-to-zero human
influence – to establish human-authorship within the “safe haven” of computer-assisted works.
Obviously, in the realm of computer-generated or AI works, human connection can always be
established because humans contributed to the development of the programs and the computer
technology. This may not always be sound legal policy. Computer-generated and computerassisted works will likely become harder to differentiate. As a result, courts may view computergenerated works more as computer-automated works (establishing that humans influenced the
work or instructed the program by any mean and thus the work is still affected by humans). Even
though such a conclusion is not false from legal and philosophical perspectives, it seems to sidestep
another more accurate truth: that the work is computer-generated.
Even if one jurisdiction should decide to grant copyright protection to AIs, are other
jurisdictions obligated, under international agreements, to protect AI’s creations as well? Can a
state designate anyone or anything as an author?788 The scope of legal protection was always
considered a challenging one. As Vaver noted more than three decades ago: “Some countries,
typically net exporters of copyright material such as the United States, have no hesitation …
extending its benefit for all works and all rights to nationals or domiciliaries … [while others]
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carefully weigh whether to extend protection.”789
The scope of protection has a significant effect on a country’s developments and economic
growth.790 There is no doubt that these considerations would impact the development of AI and
thus it is important to further deliberate on the relations between the international treaties and
obligations and the state. It is apparent, however, that under the Berne Convention there is a
consensus that all states are obligated to impose minimum standard of protection. However, “the
precise nature of the works protected and the rights granted are by and large left to a state’s
legislative discretion.”791
In that context, we should inquire what the minimum requirements and obligations that can
be establish under the international agreements are. As Vaver observes, “The works included
within the RBC [revised Berne Convention] and the rights attaching to them … have been
progressively enlarged since the original BC [Berne Convention].”792 In reflecting on the balance
between the international and state level, Vaver offers further that “[t]heoretically, the RBC is not
supposed to compromise a state’s internal affairs … however, in practice the RBC does oblige a
state to extend protection to such works, since it is unthinkable that foreign authors should obtain
a larger protection in a state than do the state’s own nationals.”793
Contrary to the American and Australian positions, Berne “seems neutral on the possibility
of non-human authorship.”794 As Miller argues, Berne leaves Article 1’s “authors” undefined.795
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Both the WCT and the TRIPs dodge the issue by relying instead on Berne for guidance.796 Vaver,
on the other hand, holds a somewhat different view in stating that although Berne does not define
an author “it has always had a well-recognised meaning” of the author as a natural person.797 Vaver
adds that under Berne an author “implies a person who applies his/her personal creativity.”798
Establishing a common ground for authorship has proved difficult given the divergence of the
Berne signatories: “[S]ome recognising only natural persons as authors, while others treat certain
legal entities as copyright owners, some imposing conditions for the recognition of authorship
which others do not accept.”799
The intriguing question is whether a state can define an author in a way that includes
computer-generated or AI. Obviously, any jurisdiction has its own prerogative to shape its laws;
however, a state “cannot compel another … state to accept its idiosyncratic meaning to the extent
that it departs from the international law significance of the term.”800 Given the international
obligations to protect the works of each sate under the convention, these changes might impose
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difficulties.
It seems that any decision to change the core concepts of copyright and IP must
acknowledge the international agreements – a state is not entirely free to provide its views to the
question of who is the author: “[T]he meaning of the term ‘author’ must be derived from and
regulated by the RBC, not by the meaning an individual state chooses to place on the term.”801
Despite their obvious differences, none of the copyright regimes of the US, the UK,
Australia, Canada or the EU are willing to accept computer-generated or AI as the author of a
given work. Courts might, however, adopt a different approach to authorship in the future and
could resolve such issues by relying on other legal doctrines and fields.802
AI creations are computer-generated works, but not every computer-generated work can
be considered an AI creation. Being considered for AI copyright protection should require an
assertion that AI created the work; not every sophisticated computer can be defined as AI for
copyright protection purposes. The current debate around computer-generated works allows us to
understand better the legal standing and “neighbourhood” in which the idea of allocating copyright
to computer or AI creations has been developed. It seems that the legal community has not come
to terms with the question of awarding rights to creations in which a connection between the
author-programmer and the work cannot be established, or the connection is too remote in time or
function.
As with copyright, our current legal system’s non-recognition of computer-generated
inventions creates eligibility issues for patent protection. Ryan Abbott refers to this ambiguity in
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claiming that “it is not clear that a computer could be an inventor or even that a computer’s
invention could be patentable.”803 As with copyright, “there is no statute addressing computational
invention, no case law directly on the subject, and no pertinent Patent Office Policy.”804 Further,
since neither patent (nor copyright) laws recognize computers as inventors,805 failing to name a
human as inventor or designate a computer as the sole inventor can result in a denial of patenting
or an invalid or unenforceable patent.806
Abbott argues for amending patent law to consider computers as inventors. He believes
that “there should be no requirement for a mental act because patent law is concerned with the
creativity of an invention itself rather than the subjective mental process by which an invention
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on Jan 25, 2005, that was created by the “Invention Machine” – a GP based AI developed by Dr. John Koza. In a 2006
paper, Dr. Koza claimed that the Invention Machine is in fact the sole inventor. The third example Abbott provides is
the IBM famous AI computer system – Watson. Watson is a different brand of Invention Machines, since it “utilizes
a more conventional architecture of logical deduction combined with access to massive databases containing
accumulated human knowledge and expertise.” By applying a new developed algorithm that “incorporated a database
with information about nutrition, flavor compounds, the molecular structure of foods, and tens of thousands of existing
recipes”, Watson can, theoretically, create new processes and combinations that could qualify as patentable subject
matter. In a more recent paper, Abbott describes Watson contribution to research in identifying “novel drug targets
and new indications for existing drugs.” Abbott concludes that “Watson may be generating patentable inventions
either autonomously or collaboratively with human researchers.” See Ryan Abbott, “Everything is Obvious”, 66
UCLA L Rev [forthcoming in 2019] at 20, online (draft): <conferences.law.stanford.edu/werobot/wpcontent/uploads/sites/47/2018/02/Everything-is-Obvious_1_31_18.pdf> [Abbott, Everything is Obvious].
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may have been achieved.”807 This makes sense for the AI copyright discussion and accords for
other non-human creators. As Abbott suggests: “The need for computer inventorship also explains
why the Copyright Office’s Human Authorship Requirement is misguided. Nonhumans should be
allowed to qualify as authors because doing so would incentivize the creation of new and valuable
creative output.”808 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu have expressed a different
view. They oppose creating “new legal personalities to whom such ownership rights could be
granted” and contend that patent law is not applicable to AIs.809
The Canadian Patent Act seems to echo US law in this matter. Although “inventor” is not
mentioned in the Constitution Act or defined in the Patent Act, other statements imply a human
criterion.810 Patentee, for example, “means the person for the time being entitled to the benefit of
a patent.”811 With the developments in the field, I can only predict that the CPO will face similar
concerns.
2.3.3

The Future: IP Implications for Future Developments

In earlier chapters, I presented – past and present – challenges reflecting on how software
developments affected or are affecting IP law. I have showed how IP law is fluctuating and
adapting to technological changes in a never-ending struggle to balance between different IP fields,
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as well as between IP and the public. In this chapter, I will address future developments and their
IP applications. Lawrence Solum,812 Lemley,813 Abbott,814 and others have debated on these
expected developments. I will consider their research and add a few notions of my own.
Solum argues that technological developments are sometimes so profound that they may
rock “the foundations of an entire body of law”.815 Solum proves his point by explaining the way
new technology – like the video-tape recorder in Sony,816 peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing in
Napster,817 the Internet and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),818 among other
examples – morph the law.819 Consequently, the future of copyright law “is up for grabs”, and “we
are in the midst of an intellectual, moral, and legal struggle over the future of copyright.”820
Solum’s predictions are over a decade old, and though the examples he provided have since
evolved (or become obsolete), the legal reasoning has not.
Technology’s potential effect on current IP law was described recently by a group of
researchers at the University of Edinburgh. They argued that “[w]e are moving into an era where
man-machine co-production of creative works will become commercially viable and
commonplace.”821 The issue, as they posed it, “is not ‘high art’ but rather more mundane forms of
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creativity, for example writing short new stories or short jingles for computer games.”822 And,
these creations will probably be “disseminated automatically, without human intervention or
oversight.”823
It appears that computer-generated technology will become the standard. Human
involvement in creation and invention processes (i.e., patents and copyright) will decline in some
areas. True, a humans’ indirect effect will remain prevalent, since humans created the codes or
algorithms leading to the work’s invention’s development; however, the connecting link between
the original programmer (or the original code) and the creation will become more distanced.
Not only is the distance between human and creation increasing, so is the tremendous effect
on human life by current and impending technologies. As Lemley recently noted, “new
technologies promise to do for a variety of physical goods and even services what the Internet has
already done for information.”824 Abbott echoes Lemley, predicting that “an innovation revolution
is on the horizon.”825 Among these significant developments that can affect the shape of our laws
in general and IP in particular: 3D printing, synthetic biology, bio-printing robotics,826 genetic
manipulation, drones, self-driving vehicles, virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR).
3D printing is one of the most imminent and significant challenges to our current legal
system.827 IP is certainly one of the legal areas it affects, but not the only one. 3D technology and
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its implications pose challenges to broader areas such as public safety,828 environment
protection,829 and even our taxation system.830 Many IP legal scholars have offered different
solutions to the so-called IP “threat”. From prohibiting the distribution of 3D printers (a similar
approach to that taken in Sony and Napster),831 to providing free 3D printer access under fair-use
or fair dealing for home users.832
Yanisky-Ravid and Kwan, for example, suggest adopting a DMCA-based model, imposing
obligatory registration for 3D printers and other anti-circumvention features.833 Lemley predicts
(and hopes) that IP owners will lose that fight much as they lost the fight over internet file-sharing
and streaming technology,834 since “the potential social value in these new technologies, like the

Goods” (2015) 90 Ind LJ 901 (2015); Daniel H Brean, “Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing:
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Internet, is enormous.”835
I predict that the 3D printing market will implement a Netflix or iTunes model in which
the public can subscribe for affordable access to copyright and designs. Admittedly, these
suggestions may not resolve every public threat and legal problem posed by technology. But, given
my assumption about dramatic changes in IP law’s future – leading to a more democratic market
that limits protection for authors and inventors – this model might eventually prevail.
Robotics,836 an intriguing expected technological development, poses numerous legal and
ethical challenges as well.837 Even though the robotic industry is less advanced and the availability
of robots for public use is currently limited,838 the applications of robotics seem less futuristic than
some would think. In the coming five to fifteen years, robots will be available for home users and
“[s]pecial purpose robots will deliver packages, clean offices, and enhance security.”839 Further,
there are several indications that robots for private users (i.e., home services) will become more
advanced and effective in the next fifteen years.840 Within general robotics developments, robot
assistants (i.e., caregiver robots or “servants” like drivers, cleaners, or secretaries) may have
significant legal implications, particularly for IP law.841 At first, these robots might only serve as
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companions,842 but later robots could provide substantial assistance.
The challenges facing copyright law in robotics, and AI and machine-learning
technologies, are complex and broad-reaching. Robots, by their intended purposes, are designed
to store and share data that are likely protected by copyright. By programming robots to store data
(pictures and other information stored on its “hard-drive” or uploaded to the “cloud”), robots (and
their human owners) can infringe copyright with every picture, video, or piece of digital
information they hold and process.843 Consider, for example, a robo-caregiver following its
visually impaired person in a museum. In order to fulfil its duties, the robo-caregiver will take
images of the artworks hanging on museum wall (to move around or to direct the disabled person
to her favourite art). Taking and storing photos the robo-caregiver’s database, or sharing them with
other robo-caregivers,844 could constitute possible copyright infringement.845
Insofar as patent law is concerned, robots will presumably be mass-produced by companies
aspiring to protect their inventions. Patenting robots, globally, seems as futile as trying to patent a
car. So, the process would likely comprise trying to patent software and technology related to the
robot’s activities (like sensors, or voice and sound applications). Such attempts might still prove
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unsuccessful. First, as noted in the Alice discussion above, patent law is evolving to make software
patenting more difficult. Second, codes or algorithms might develop rapidly. Since future
technology will likely incorporate machine-learning capabilities, the results of which will be
shared online instantaneously, it will be almost impossible to anticipate the development phase
and block the codes from other robo-caregivers or similar technology.
Data and information will be crucial to robotics and AI despite copyright.846 Much
computer-generated content uses data that can be accessed from copyright-protected sources over
the Internet, for example, to assist self-driving cars’ sensors, or provide information to mobile
phones’ personal assistant (like Siri). These data comprise the building blocks for future progress,
despite their collection perhaps constituting copyright infringement.847 As I will further develop in
Part III, resolving data barriers and providing access to high-quality data is essential for AI
development. True, under current legal framework (at least in the US) the fair use doctrine makes
it difficult to argue that a machine or robot has committed copyright infringement.848 However,
this approach may not endure much longer; as computers evolve, and with expected advancement
in AI and machine-learning capabilities, legal reasoning will likely be reconsidered and change
with it.
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Lemley and Eugene Volokh address other expected technological advancements and their
legal implications: virtual reality and augmented reality. In VR, the user is placed in a virtual
world, in which he or she can interact and move in a fictional environment; in an AR, the user can
add elements to his reality.849 VR and AR technology pose new problems for classic legal questions
as well as for copyright,850 one of which is using copyrighted images (i.e., Superman, Lara Croft)
as characters in the VR or AR world. Lemley and Volokh predict that copyright and trademarks
suits against users that create avatars from copyrighted images “would likely operate much as they
have now, though with many of the uncertainties we see now.”851
The above are only a few examples; there are many more. This section’s purpose was to
provide a sample of technological challenges we are facing today and might face in the near future.
Bridging the gap between the current legal system and the expected implications of future
technology is a significant challenge. One might argue that these changes are no different from the
industrial revolution or the Internet, and as with them, no great revolutionary legal paradigm shift
should be expected. I disagree.
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2.4 AI-IP THEORY - DISCUSSION
Will IP law be expected to change dramatically? or will its structure remain largely static with
minor adaptations?852 Legal history strengthens the latter: stasis. Why would an AI revolution
depart substantially from the Internet revolution, where IP laws changed very little? And if IP laws
will not change dramatically in these instances, when would we expect change at all?
Humanity has always expected the worst. Consider films from the 1980s and 90s like Blade
Runner (1982) portraying 2019 Los Angeles as a dystopian city,853 or The Terminator (1984)
predicting humanity’s destruction in the late 1990s by an AI program named Skynet.854 And yet,
LA and humanity remain intact, safe from AI’s worst nightmares. This is not to suggest that the
societal issues raised in those films are trivial and worth little consideration. Instead, I wish to
emphasize that we tend to oversimplify or dramatize our legal and social predictions. Given the
anticipated technological changes on the horizon, I argue that it is neither doctrinally correct nor
normatively desirable to use our current IP legal framework to anticipate the expected
developments; new and innovative thinking must be developed and advanced.
The goal of this chapter is twofold: first, discussing and exploring if one or more legal
theories can recognize AI creations; second, returning to the theoretical discussion and considering
if legal assumptions can adapt to recognize AI authorship or inventorship. The preliminary
considerations discussed in the previous parts about AI personhood rights will remain
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unchallenged. This debate assumes that we can allocate legal rights to AI, at least theoretically.
And it starts by looking at the existing regime and seeing how to best distribute a limited bundle
of rights to AI in the current state of technological progress with an eye towards what may come.
To start, the current IP regime should accommodate and anticipate the ongoing variable
needs that various evolving levels of technology require. Right now – and for the next five to ten
years – AI is unlikely to evolve to the point of exhibiting semi-human capabilities, even though it
may eventually. We are more inclined in the near future to witness developments in computergenerated works: automated works created with minimal or no human involvement.
During this stage, the IP regime should change, adapt, exempt – or all three – to recognize
and protect non-human creations, albeit within its existing framework and mechanisms.855
Acknowledging the importance of strong user rights and the public domain, increasing IP
protection is crucial for this stage of development. As Abbott highlights, the current IP regime is
not serving the purpose it was designed for, and technological developments, especially with
patents, will exacerbate IP’s loss of theoretical identity.
Second, once independent AI creations develop over the next few decades, and as the
human effect on AI output weakens, IP justifications will have to change and adapt too. When that
occurs, AI’s IP rights – which would be hypothetically recognized by this time – can be catered to
by allocating specific rights to AI as the technological climate demands. The moral rights approach
is but one conceivable way of doing this. Another is changing the IP regime to distinguish instead
between humans and non-humans (as opposed to between humans and AI) for creations and
inventions. I intend to explore several other alternatives like those incorporating doctrines of joint
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authorship, derivative works, and work made for hire; at the outset, however, I find them less than
convincing.
Solum notes the different ways that IP scholars tried to address earlier technological
developments, like peer-to-peer file sharing.856 Posner and Landes857 “propose indefinitely
renewable copyrights.”858 Netanel and Fisher support legalize file-sharing,859 and suggest
“replac[ing] the lost revenues with a tax on hardware and internet service.”860 To address issues
with copyright duration extension, Joseph Liu suggests considering time as a factor in fair use and
fair dealing analyses.861 In several papers, Lemley challenges IP justifications generally in a digital
world that facilitates free duplication of IP-protected goods.862
These scholarly considerations demonstrate the need to re-evaluate the shape and scope of
IP laws. What follows is a return to the IP justifications described at the outset of this part in
chapter II.B, explored under the lens of AI-IP rights.
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2.4.1

The Utilitarian Approach Justifies AI-IP Rights

IP under the utilitarian theory promotes innovation and intellectual productivity for society’s
“greater good.” As such, allocating legal rights for AI adheres to Bentham’s consequentialist
reasoning if computer authorship is sufficiently incentivized to produce more innovation and
intellectual output. Yet, computers are unrecognized by patents and copyright laws as inventors
and authors, so AI inventions and works – no matter what value they produce for humankind – are
not patented or copyrighted unless they are “directly influenced by humans authors [or
inventors].”863 This approach creates barriers “to inventorship for computers as well as people”,864
and goes against the utilitarian theory principles.
I argue that there is no legal justification to attribute patents or authorship to inventors or
computer programmers who did not influence the production of the invention or creation. As
Abbott further offers, “If a computer scientist creates an AI to autonomously develop useful
information and the AI creates a patentable result in an area not foreseen by the inventor, there
would be no reason for the scientist to qualify as an inventor on the AI’s result.”865 Yanisky-Ravid
echoes Abbott’s argument: “[T]he creativity of an AI system is not a result of the creativity of the
programmers; at the very least, the causal relationship is not close enough to justify ownership …
in the new works generated by AI machines. The human programmer is only ancillary to the
creation of the artworks.”866
If a computer programmer created an AI for one specific purpose and the AI created an
original work tangential or unrelated to that purpose, where is the justification to allocate the
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programmer authorship rights? One might argue, under utilitarianism, that incentivizing more
programmers to design AI programs will improve the odds that those programs produce useful
creations, which in turn maximizes human benefit. This might be false logic, as explained through
the following example of the innovative way machine learning is developing isolated from human
intervention: the March 2016 Alpha Go match, in which a famous computer program defeated one
of the top world Go players, Lee Sedol.867 Not only did AlphaGo win, but it won in such an
unpredictable fashion; AlphaGo’s move 37 left the human players and programmers speechless.868
As AI advances, we should expect more creativity from AI programs, and as a result, more
unpredictability. If computer programs create useful works and inventions at a greater but
unpredictable rate, then it follows that we should not develop a legal system that discourages (or
at least, fails to encourage) computer programs to be less creative and original by design.869
From a utilitarian perspective, promoting computer inventorship is desirable and should
justify the rewards of IP protection. First, “the financial motivation it will provide to build creative
computers is likely to result in a net increase in the number of patentable inventions produced.”870
In our current stage of development, the need for human involvement is artificial; in fact, humans
influence few inventions at all. Amending patent laws to recognize computers as patent-eligible
could motivate the scientific community to develop more programs that automatically produce
inventions without worrying about the human inventor criterion. In many ways, this shift is not
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“revolutionary”: it is only technical and just and could be designed in a way that leaves economic
benefit to scientists or programmers as a transitional measure to maintain incentives to develop.871
I share Abbott’s conclusion that “courts and policy makers should be guided first and
foremost by the explicit constitutional [i.e., incentive based] rationale for granting patents.”872
And, “allowing patents [and copyright protection] on computational inventions as well as
computer inventors would do away with what is essentially a legal fiction – the idea that only a
human can be the inventor of the autonomous output of a creative computer – resulting in fairer
and more effective incentives.”873 Humanity should be willing to accept a certain level of AI
personhood.
In copyright law, immense value exists in AI-Authorship and “without an established
period of protection, there is no tangible incentive for developers of AI machines to continue
creating, using, and improving their capabilities.”874 Several justifications exist for AI authorship
in both the current stage of development and the future. And as with patents, our current
developmental stage demands we extend legal protection to computer-generated works.
The next stage of AI development adds further concerns. Solum contends that the utilitarian
idea of the “good life” is defined as maximizing pleasures and minimizing pain. Thus, the question
is if AI can have interests, which equates with the question of whether AI can have or demonstrate

871

I agree that, in the current climate, scientists and computer programmers should retain economic rights from the
computer’s invention.
872
Abbott, supra note 656 at 1108.
873
Ibid.
874
Hristov, supra note 423 at 438. Hristov further provides: “Simply put, even if programmers and the companies for
which they work have invested a substantial amount of time and money into the creation of AI machines, for the most
part, they would not be able to enjoy copyright protection or the financial benefits associated with it. This trend could
ultimately limit innovation by dissuading developers and companies from investing in AI research, resulting not only
in the decline of AI but also in the decline of innovation across a number of related sectors.”
169

feelings.875 If one, however, takes a more objective and public perspective on interests – as John
Finnis does876 – the question is whether an AI can flourish by including goods such as “life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion.”877
Solum argues that despite AI’s lack of a biological “life”, it may still lay claim to a life that
experience goods like knowledge, play, friendship, practical reasonableness, and perhaps even
religious.878 Finnis does not rule out such “life” from non-humans. But if we take Finnis’s theory
too literally (i.e., good lives include athletic competition, good food, parenting, children, etc.) this
raises a theoretical wall since AI, at least as we can perceive it today, might not have Finnis’s
“good life”.879 I concur with Solum that “AIs might claim that they do have interests and goods,
but that the good for an AI is quite different than it is for humans.”880
A good argument could be made for creating a new model for AI-IP under utilitarianism.
We can challenge the “only humans deserve authorship” argument by countering that AI
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authorship and inventorship can serve society better. The lingering question concerns the right
structure of this new AI-IP theory. And to face that question requires addressing incentive doctrine.
Incentive doctrine is based on the notion that “individuals will not invest in inventions or creation
unless the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost of doing so.”881 Granting exclusive rights
to authors or inventors imposes social costs on the public that can only be justified “to the extent
that they do on balance encourage enough creation and dissemination of new works to offset those
costs.”882
In the AI era, incentive theory might lose its substantive grip because computers cannot be
incentivized since they are already programmed to create.883 This claim might be false; if we expect
AI to possess human qualities, we can expect that AI will share similarities to human behaviour,
given that “both robots and AI agents create problems for law because one cannot always predict
what they will do when they interact with their environment.”884 Further, as Yanisky-Ravid
suggests, assuming that there would be no real need to incentivise AI to create – an assumption I
am not willing to make yet – and that AI would be able to produce good works, the “existing
balance would be thrown off”, since “there wouldn’t be any risk of a lack of artistic creation even
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if copyright law did not exist to protect such creations. Such a reality could, furthermore, pose an
existential threat to the entire copyright regime.”885 It is more likely, however, that machine
creations in the coming decade would not rise to human expectation and quality, making human
creations even more valuable, an outcome which might result in creating two (or more) markets:
high human art and low machine (IKEA) art. This future requires a stronger copyright regime.
From an AI-IP rights perspective, even in this future, there is a real need to copyright AI creations
from a policy standpoint. Given the importance of preserving human art – i.e., incentivize human
creators – denying AI works protection would result in free access to AI works, which would make
competition conditions for human creations harder.
Moreover, incentive theory may be irrelevant in the future both for humans and nonhumans. As Lemley stated rhetorically: “Why are people creating so much content without the
incentive of IP rights? And why hasn’t the sky fallen on the content industries?”886 Additional
studies have claimed that “[p]sychological and sociological concepts can do more to explain
creative impulses than classical economics. As a result, a copyright law that treats creativity as a
product of economic incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote.”887 Clearly,
the Internet era brought new and different variables into play. Although they might not be relevant
to AI as non-humans, the AI era may herald similarly divergent variables that would change,
diminish, or extinguish the existing incentive theory.
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2.4.2

Does a Lockean Basis Exist for AI-IP Theory?

Several indications can be found in Locke’s theory in support of allocating rights to AI. This
discussion testifies to the Lockean theory’s validity and strength, which is still a vital player in the
development of IP laws, a position that should continue for the next decades.
At first blush, Lockean theory seems not to recognize AI rights. Lockean theory
acknowledges a person’s right in the fruit of his/her labour, as one of Locke’s core arguments is
that “a person who labors upon resources that are either unowned or ‘held in common’ has a natural
property right to the fruits of his or her efforts.”888 AI and all its subsequent creations are the
product of a person’s labour in coding or manufacturing that AI, so Locke might consider all of
those fruits as belonging to the programmer. In a world in which “there is enough and as good left
in common for others”,889 there is no basis to restrict programmers from their just right in their AI
fruits.890
Now, even under the assumption that Lockean theory generally accepts a programmer’s
right to his/her AI’s independently created works, causation becomes more remote and the
programmer’s unjust enrichment increases as the connection between that programmer and the
AI’s output distances. Thus, even according to the Lockean theory, the programmer should be
allowed limited or none of the fruits of the AI’s labour.891 Yanisky-Ravid echoes this conclusion
in stating that “when a creator is a machine, robot, or AI system, the personality theory and the
labor theory are irrelevant.” In her view, “we do not need to recognize a programmer for an artistic
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accomplishment that is not his or her own.”892 In a more recent paper, Yanisky-Ravid and Liu
clarify that “proper application of Locke’s labor theory” depends on the definition of the “fruits”
that could result from the contribution of each player in the creation process.893 Accordingly, they
explain, “Locke’s labor theory calls for compensating those players, including the programmers,
with a portion of the profits from the subsequent inventions created by the AI, in light of the
programmers’ and other players’ contributions.”894 Yanisky-Ravid based these ideas on her
multiplayer-model and the assumption that AI could not and should not be entitled to IP rights. I
do not share those assumptions as I have explained in earlier parts and as I will further develop.
We might be able to derive further insights from Locke’s manifesto, On Parental Power,895
which seems to reflect Locke’s opinion on the moral right of parents to their children’s creations.896
Locke emphasized the preservation of the natural right stating that parent’s rights are limited by
nature and that even if a father has a right to “enacting penalties on his children … he has no
dominion over the property or actions of his son.”897 This puts it mildly since Lockean theory lacks
any justification supporting a child’s obligation to provide his/her parent with property or
economic rights indefinitely.
Locke’s philosophy is rooted in the concept that people are free and consent is required to
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exercise political authority on another individual.898 Children, however, are not full citizens so
they cannot consent to governmental political authority, as Nozick suggested.899 Scholars have
argued that Locke’s theory supports a view that natural parents own their child since the child is
the product of the parent’s labour.900 Hettinger remarks that “[i]f property rights in the very things
created were always an appropriate reward for labor … parents would deserve property rights in
their children.”901 Nozick argues that Locke failed to distinguish between children as the product
of labour and any other product of labour. For Nozick, this lacuna in Locke’s theory nullifies the
very essence of Locke’s theory:902
“If the point is that people cannot own their children because they themselves are owned
and so incapable of ownership, this would apply to owning everything else they make as
well. If the point is that God … is the maker of a child, this applies to many other things
that Locke thinks can be owned [...].”

For Locke, however, children do not lack all rights perpetually; parents serve only as temporary
guardians over their children’s rights, so certain parental power over children is warranted, but
temporary. Locke began his manifesto on paternal power by echoing his initial statement that “all
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men by nature are equal.”903 As developed by other legal philosophers, equality is not absolute,
and “[c]hildren … are not born in this state of equality” and “[t]heir parents have a sort of rule and
jurisdiction over them when they come into the world, and for some time after, but it is but a
temporary one … age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off
and leave a man at his own free disposal.”904 Equality is indeed a natural law given to all men and
women but, as Locke suggested, it depends on “age and reason”. As I have contended, reason is a
prerequisite for any AI – let alone IP – right.905
Locke also explains that the law “in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the
direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for
the general good of those under that law.”906 The law, according to Locke, is an instrument for
happiness and freedom for the intelligent agent:907
“Could they be happier without it, the law, as a useless thing, would of itself vanish; and
that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices.
So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to
preserve and enlarge freedom; for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where
there is no law, there is no freedom.”

Locke’s choice to use broad terms like “intelligent agents” and “created beings” when emphasizing
the law’s crucial role in fostering freedom, suggests that such freedom is not reserved merely for
humans. After all, AI could easily fit plain language definitions of “created being” and “intelligent
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agent”, so according to Locke, AIs deserve to express freedom.
In drawing similarities between justifications underlying parent-child and programmer-AI
relationships, we should also accept Locke’s position limiting a creator’s (parent’s or
programmer’s) rights on two conditions: (1) time – the rights are not indefinite; and (2) reason and
intelligence as a prerequisite to establish independence. First, parental power over their children is
limited until the moment in which “reason shall take its place and ease them [the parents] of that
trouble [of taking care of their children].”908 Also, Locke differentiates between the parent and the
child in stating that “he that understands for him must will for him too; he must prescribe to his
will and regulate his actions; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the
son is a freeman too.”909 Second, reason and intelligence serve as an important criterion for legal
rights in Locke’s view:910
“The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on
his having reason which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and
make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will.”

In conclusion, Lockean theory provides several justifications for AI-IP. Locke’s views on parentchild relationship, equality, freedom, and liberty rights to intelligent agents all serve as justification
for AI-IP theory.
2.4.3

The Personhood Dilemma

Hegel’s philosophy could advocate for AI’s legal standing as part of accepting its personhood and
autonomy rights. Hegel argues that a bond exists between a man and his property. Depriving the
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person of his property causes discomfort and pain. Accordingly, by proving AI’s attachment to its
creations, we might assume that AI possesses a semi-human personality. This personhood status
can be integrated into the Turing Copyright Test.911
Kantian and Hegelian approaches, however, are based on a creator’s emotional connection
to the creative work. At AI’s current stage, it seems implausible to assume it holds any emotional
connection to its created work.912 As Abbott observes, “Creative computers invent because they
are instructed to invent, and a machine would not be offended by the manner in which its inventions
were used.”913 Nevertheless, we might assume that future AIs could sustain a level of intelligence
allowing them to develop a more substantial connection to their creative output. If that is the case,
the question is whether to develop an AI-IP based model that relies on that personal connection?
And if so, should we not also consider a programmer’s personal connection to his AI creation’s
creation? The personhood theory might support a programmer’s rights to his AI’s creations even
when the AI itself can also develop a real connection to its creation.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Fisher and Radin’s arguments as outlined earlier
in this part.914 First, AI-IP theory should adopt Fisher’s suggestion to differentiate between
different expression levels in IP, from highly expressive and innovative creations to low expressive
creations. Post-differentiation, AI-IP theory should allocate various levels of protection across this
spectrum of expressiveness. Parchomovsky and Stein support this approach in their paper, which
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also considers allocation across originality spectrum.915
In essence, there is no reason to monopolize creations or innovation that lack real value.
Though defining levels of creative and innovative expression may be difficult and highly
subjective in practice, it can be emphasized theoretically that some works and inventions are more
original and innovative than others. This approach would subsequently increase the public domain
and reward only works able to prove a level of investment truly deserving IP protection.
A range-based IP protection regime would need to be adapted to accommodate computergenerated and AI works. For example, as computer programs advance along with their ability to
create genuine and innovative creations, so the validity of the justification to award creativity and
originality with a higher level of protection is correspondingly strengthened. Beyond
Parchomovsky and Stein proposal, I suggest that when computer-programs and AIs produce highly
creative works or innovative inventions unexpected by the original programmer’s intent, such
unexpectedness (or non-obviousness in patents) can indicate independent creation by the computer
program or AI. Simply put: When an AI creates an independent work or invention, IP should not
be awarded to the programmer or the owner of the program.916
Several of Radin’s four conceptions of a person might also be well suited for AI. For
example, one element in Radin’s conception of a person is his ability to think – his intelligence,
having self-awareness, and memory. Under this conception, for an AI to deserve all rights, it must
demonstrate the ability to think, remember, to be self-aware, and this may never occur or be
915
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provable. Even then, it may be permissible to grant AI certain rights, without recognizing the full
capacity of a human’s rights – or better yet, reserving those rights until such intelligence is proven.
It is important to note that a “person” need not necessarily mean a “human being”; “[i]n Roman
law, persona came to mean simply an entity possessing legal rights and duties … for philosophers
the nature of a person has never been reduced to a generally accepted theory.”917
2.4.4

Social Planning Theory

Social planning theory is centred around the idea that IP rights should promote social good. As I
have expressed earlier, IP rights do not currently optimally maximize social good. And, as Abbott
suggests, allocating IP rights to AI may help since AI could develop new technologies that will
eventually benefit humanity. The mere possibility that computer-generated works can be produced
without human interference means that scientists and researchers could devote their work toward
developing the most efficient socially-beneficial programs without concern about patenting that
output.
I argue that no reason exists in our current stage of computer programming and AI to limit
patents, for example, only for inventions directly influenced by humans. This approach serves
social planning theory to the letter. True, “AI could develop immoral new technologies”,918 but so
could humans. Further, I do not endorse granting patents automatically without any human
supervision or regulation. These risks could be avoided by other means.
Social planning supports AI rights even in future stages of development (i.e., when AI
becomes capable of expressing semi-human behaviour) if these rights benefit humanity. First,
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social planning theory opposes lengthy IP rights. Allocating AI rights to the public domain, while
reserving its economic rights for the prosperity of the public and allocating its moral rights to the
AI itself, will maximize creations or inventions available for public enjoyment.
This allocation model is not immune from criticism. First, we might promote two distinct
levels of IP rights: for humans – which will remain practically the same; and for non-humans –
which will be designed to benefit humans (allocating rights to AI means, in practice, providing the
public with more access to creations). AI creations might prove more attractive for humans; thus
human creations (authors and inventors) will trend toward obsolescence, a remnant of the past.
From a social perspective, it is hard to foresee whether this might be good or bad. Perhaps
it is part of the natural evolution, much like changes in music preferences throughout history. On
the other hand, perhaps as a consequence, human creations would become more valuable compared
to “artificial” but easily accessible AI creations.
Second, AI rights promote democratic values and culture. Netanel’s approach rejects recent
endorsements of extensive IP protection (e.g., for 3D printing) and supports instead promoting AI
applications for personal users. There is no justifiable reason to limit or restrict technology that
can benefit humanity, and that includes AI. As Fisher, Zemer, and Netanel might concede, limiting
protection over AI creations forces inventors and creators to follow certain rules to patent, which
in turn hinders AI development and potential. Increasing the size of the public domain available
for inventions or works to be integrated into AI capabilities is preferable.
Several concerns exist regarding data availability or privatization in the future. It is vital to
consider the theoretical implications on data as the building block of machine learning and AI
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programs.919 Social planning theory likely opposes any privatization of data. Any limitation on
data usage (in which IP has a crucial role) also limits research in machine learning (and
subsequently AI). Under a socialist theory, 920 the public – via the state – owned the capital. Since
data could also be considered as a form of capital, socialist thinking would promote public
ownership of data.
The question remains whether it is optimal for the government to control our data? The
notion raises concerns, especially regarding privacy risks and censorship. The alternative,
however, in which most of our data is held restriction- and supervision-free by corporations is
equally problematic. A third scenario is probably best, in which the government establishes
agencies and regulators to provide a “data safe environment”.
2.4.5

Moral rights: An Alternative Approach for AI Rights?

Moral rights doctrine may offer an alternative route to developing AI-IP justifications. If we accept
the assumption that AI can be regarded as a person under certain conditions, we should consider
granting AIs a minimal standard of moral rights over its creations (like the rights of attribution or
withdrawal).921 This would act as a compromise: we allocate moral rights for non-human AI
creators – recognizing the bond between the AI and its creations – while also reserving economic
rights allocation for human creators. Despite numerous popular objections (even for human
creators),922 moral rights present an appealing IP pathway to protect AI creations.
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While, commercially speaking, AI lacks the need or desire for financial gain, we may all
benefit from granting AI moral rights recognition. First, by adhering to common and
internationally accepted copyright practices there would be no need to allocate any effective legal
rights to AI. Second, moral rights can be applied in a way that distinguishes between AI, human
(and any AI-human hybrid) creations. Thus, promoting quality assurance by preventing
exploitation, alteration, or manipulation of AI works.
I acknowledge one challenge, as the distinction between allocating integrity rights to AI –
as reasoned immediately – and attribution rights is perhaps harder to justify. Indeed, at the current
stage of its development, AI does not possess elements such as honour or reputation to prejudice.
However, in the future AI might be able to express these elements.
We can grant AI a limited scope of rights (like the rights of attribution and integrity) which
serves the purpose – as Sundara Rajan suggests – of distinguishing between AI and human
creations. By doing so, the public can gain full access to AI creations (protected under moral, not
economic rights) while their economic rights are managed by a governmental or an international
organization which can reinvest AI’s earnings into education, health, and other causes for human
benefit (similar to Norway’s oil profits model).923

culture.” Furthermore, from an economic perspective, moral rights “may inhibit the exploitation of creative works …
by bringing uncertainty to the process of using, editing, modifying, or interpreting works, discouraging the growth of
both industry and art around the existing wealth of human culture.” Ibid at 18. From a public policy perspective, moral
rights may inhibit “the publication of creative works, while moral rights claims could penalize those who undertake
to disseminate them.” Ibid. This argument reflects the general claim that copyright, as a whole, is a state monopoly
that restricts creations from the public domain. In that respect, establishing moral rights is an extension of this
monopoly and an additional restriction on the public.
923
The Government Pension Fund of Norway (known as the Oil fund) was established in the 1990s to invest the
surplus of Norwegian petroleum assets. See Norway, “The Government Pension Fund”, online:
<regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/id1441>.
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This is all to say that once we recognize AI-IP rights, then we can regulate those rights
through IP law in order to create the right incentives and restrictions to regulate and maximize the
public pool of knowledge for the benefit of human society.
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PART III: AI AUTHORSHIP
‘We are the products of editing, rather than of authorship.’ (George Wald)

3.1 BUILDING A NEW AI AUTHORSHIP
For the Bristlecone Snag:
‘A home transformed by the lightning
the balanced alcoves smother
this insatiable earth of a planet, Earth.
They attacked it with mechanical horns
because they love you, love, in fire and wind.
You say, what is the time waiting for in its spring?
I tell you it is waiting for your branch that flows,
because you are a sweet-smelling diamond architecture.’
that does not know why it grows.’

You might be fooled into believing this poem was a human creation. You would not be alone; the
editorial of one of the oldest student literary journals was deceived by Zackary Scholl’s poetry
generator.924 As my previous parts made clear, core questions arise from computer-generated
works: Who is its author? Is it copyrightable? If so, who is the owner? Should we devalue art just
because it is the creation of a machine? What happens in cases like Scholl’s where no human is
identified as author, and/or the creation is not known to be computer-created? On this last question,
this example reveals an important truth. People are easily deceived, and even professionals are
susceptible to confusing human art and artificial/computer-generated art.
To answer these questions, we must revert to the basic concept of authorship. Suffice to
say for that example, the author is the programmer, Scholl. He modified a computer program to
use a context-free grammar system to generate poems. For Scholl’s program, it is easy to
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Brian Merchant, “The Poem That Passed the Turing Test: They Should Have Sent a Computer” (5 February 2015),
online: Motherboard <motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vvbxxd/the-poem-that-passed-the-turing-test>.
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demonstrate and prove his influence on the creative process that eventually produced this poem.
Scholl is indeed the owner of the program and its output.925
Innovations in machine-learning and artificial intelligence technology pose many different
challenges to copyright law.926 Guadamuz described Google’s Deep Dream as an application that
“mimics human thinking and makes a decision as to how to transform the input based on a pre-

determined algorithm.”927 The novelty of Deep Dream, and its ilk, is that the program itself – not
the programmer – eventually makes its own artistic decisions about what it should amplify in the
image. This creates an unpredictable result. The result of the process provides different levels of
abstraction, producing “new images that do not resemble the originals, but most importantly, they
are not the result of creative decisions by the programmers, but rather they are produced by the
program itself.”928
I propose beginning my revisit to copyright’s core by exploring the seminal question of
who, or as Michael Foucault asked, what is an author. I begin here, as Andrew Bennett noted,
because “[t]he history of literary criticism from the earliest times may in fact be said to be
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926

186

organized around conceptions of authorship …” Literary theory, we might say, “is largely a
question of author theory.”929
The definition of authorship has been contested for centuries and developed differently
across jurisdictions. Despite these differences, most jurisdictions exclude animals and computers
from authorship.930 Historically and globally, creativity’s source was assumed to be solely
human.931 As a result, and as I explain further below, the world has collectively deemed nonhuman creations as inferior and unworthy of legal protection.
More recently, the concept of authorship has faced waves of criticism and change.
Christopher May and Susan Sell remind us that authorship (as with other intellectual property
fields) is also the ongoing struggle to seek control of and exploit valuable knowledge and ideas.932
Oren Bracha adds that copyright was shaped by interactions between elements still present in AI
debates such as “technology, economic elements, ideology, existing institutional practices, and
other social factors.”933 As I argued in previous parts, and further contend below, it is vital to
understand that humans design all laws – copyright included – so our interactions, expectations,
and conceptions affect and justify those laws. As with money, human recognition gives laws value.
There are many options for authorship with AI: the programmer, the user, or the AI itself,
joint authorship between all three, or perhaps none at all if the work falls into the public domain
or if AI is disqualified as a rights-bearer. By exploring who an author can or should be for AI
works, I explore if changes are needed in the normative basis of our legal system – i.e., recognizing
929
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AI as a legal rights-bearer – or if changes in copyright laws are required in order to acknowledge
new sources of creation. If significant changes are needed for either, I do not concede that they
must be instantaneous. In our current stage of computer-assisted and computer-generated works,
our current legal framework might be sufficient.934 All we might need are a few tweaks and
amendments to that framework to regard any work, whether human-created or not, as
copyrightable. It may also do with changes aimed at preventing abuse of computer-generated
works, as I will explain further.
In Part I, I had outlined the AI debate. In Part II, I had explored ways that IP theories might
include AI creations and inventions as part of a new IP law regime. Part III builds on the two
previous parts, as well as follows arguments and ideas that surfaced earlier. First, I will explore
and challenge our current conceptions of the “author”. I will reflect on some of copyright’s legal
exceptions and justifications. This discussion correlates with the IP theory discussion I had
purposely “neglected” in Part II, delving deeper into authorship. Second, I will seek an answer to
the question posed above: Who (or what) is the author? Third, I will provide a comparative outline
of two copyright standards – originality and creativity – as developed in several jurisdictions.
The following sections also aspire to draw preliminary conclusions for a broader concept
of originality that might benefit human and non-humans alike.
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James Grimmelman argues that there are no AI authors: “It is possible that some future computer programs could
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3.2 UNDERSTANDING (HUMAN) AUTHORSHIP
3.2.1

Who is an Author?935

Even though copyright law is relatively new and was not part of the classical world, as a legal
regime copyright was always susceptive to technological advancements.936 However, it was not
until the invention of the printing press – allowing the production of affordable copies of books –
that copyright’s modern legal conception was born.937
Copyright, “began with ‘authorship’,” while copyright law served as the mechanism to
“solidify the notion of literary property.”938 Authorship is one of “the more elusive concepts in
copyright law,”939 and, as Peter Jaszi offers, the “centrality of [the] concept is an uncritically
accepted notion.”940 SCOTUS described it as the “very ‘premise of copyright law’.”941
Author rights refer to original works “created by ‘authors’, such as books, plays, music,
art, and films” that possess some degree of creativity.942 Vaver adds that “[t]he term
compendiously describes whoever writes a book, letter, or play, as well as every other producer of
creative works [...].”943
Our views on authorship within copyright law evolved with rhetoric, as Mark Lemley

935

Alternatively, should I rather ask – “What” is the author as Michel Foucault challenged in his monumental book.
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suggests “[t]he rise of property rhetoric in intellectual property cases is closely identified not with
common-law property rules in general, but with a particular economic view of property rights.”
This view emphasizes the importance of private ownership as a solution to the economic problem
known as the tragedy of the commons.944 The basic propertization idea strengthens the individual’s
perspective of authorship while simultaneously weakening the public domain.945 Indeed, “[t]he
‘authorship’ concept, with its roots in notions of individual self-proprietorship, provided the
rationale for thinking of literary productions as personal property with various associated attributes
including alienability.”946
The modern author concept developed during the eighteenth century947 as a shift from a
poetics of imitation to “a valorization of originality”, with the “writer” becoming an “author”.948
Copyright did not reach its modern form as a “discrete area of law that grants rights in works of
literature and art” until the mid-nineteenth century.949 In the UK, only after the passage of the
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Copyright Act in 1911 was copyright law “rationalized and codified into the type of modern,
abstract, and forward-looking statute.”950
In America, James Madison and Charles Pinckney reflected on the “congressional powers
relating to the encouragement of learning technological innovation.”951 These discussions
eventually lead to what is known today as the US Copyright Clause, which empowered the US
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”952
However, as Oren Bracha notes, “In 1800 American copyright law was still the unique regulation
of the book trade, which retained the traditional institutional features of the publisher’s economic
privilege, now bestowed on authors under a universal regime of rights.”953
The Statute of Anne in 1710954 is considered, by most copyright historians, as the catalyst
to developing the modern author.955 In Jaszi’s words, it was “a conceptual move that gave us
copyright as we know it.”956 D’Agostino explained that the Statute “officially ended the system of
privileges, granted the author copyright protection, aimed to encourage the composition of socially
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desirable works and prevent the practice of piracy.”957 It promoted John Locke’s ideas of just
labour and natural rights, which reflected two of the four central ideas of modern copyright law.958
It marked a cultural change, divorcing copyright from censorship by structuring copyright as a
property right rather than a regulatory mean.959
D’Agostino further explains that the book industry’s growth from the 1730s onwards
fuelled the English booksellers’ copyright feuds.960 On one side, authors argued to expand
copyright and their ownership rights. Their concerns dealt “mainly with royalties and moral rights,
objecting to publication without consent, false attribution of authorship, and modifications to the
text that were harmful to their reputation.”961 On the other side – as Mark Rose observed – others
argued that no one could and should have ownership of ideas and that copyright must be limited
and restricted.962 These struggles framed modern copyright law, and the core values and ideas that
led the debate still affect copyright scholarship to this day.
In many ways, the AI discussion parallels these early struggles. AIs are the new authors
struggling for recognition and rights over the “old” institutions. The book publishers remain with
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us today, shaping this new fight over copyright expansion. The arguments evolved with
technology, but the core values remain. It is still a debate over ideas, ownership, and royalties.
Slowly but steadily, authorship became an individual ownership right, as the romantic
period took hold: “the author became the actual ‘genius’ innately inspired and thus capable of
producing original work.”963 The Romantic period, which Ronald Barthes and Foucault identify at
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,964 emphasized the individual author and the
sanctity of creativity.965
Barthes has described the author as “an individual creative personality, a solitary originator
of stylistically consisted work.”966 Martha Woodmansee, Jaszi and Rose have pointed to the
significant effect of the romantic author on the core values of copyright law, obscuring practical
approaches to copyright and contributing to the preservation of economic rights for companies and
publishers.967
Indeed, the romantic ideal of authorship, in which “the writer becomes an author”,968 has
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had an enormous influence on the development of copyright.969 Zemer echoes Rose and
Woodmansee by stating that the Romantic author “plays a significant role in copyright discourse,
even if we do not expressly mention it.”970
Several scholars have challenged the romantic author paradigm.971 The perception of the
author as a solitary creator, who with his unique abilities is creating original marvels, seems
unrealistic and misguided.972 As Barthes remarked: 973
“The text is a tissue of quotation drawn from the innumerable centers of culture … the
writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only Power is
to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any
one of them.”
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The concept of individualism is based on the romantic author’s perception of the author as an
individual genius.974 The roots of individualism originate in the Statute of Anne,975 which changed
the legal standing of authors, granting them copyright protection “aimed to encourage the
composition of socially desirable works […].”976
According to this copyright model, “the literary notion of the author as originator merged
with Locke’s economic theory of possessive individualism to produce the legal construct of the
author as proprietor.”977 Bennett suggests that the concept of individualism is “related to the
‘break-up of the medieval social, economic and religious order’, with its feudalistic emphasis on
a person’s place in that relatively rigid hierarchy.”978 The concept, as Bennett further explains, is
dated in the English tradition “as early as the period 1050-1200” and “fundamental to facets of
classical culture.”979
James Boyle argues that “the idea of authorship is socially constructed and historically
contingent [and that] the romantic vision of authorship plays down the importance of external
sources by emphasizing the unique genius of the author and the originality of the work.”980 Boyle
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points out to one of the core arguments within copyright law (mainly US copyright law) – does
regulation of information produce too much or too little? The difficulty, as he explains, is that “the
use of some general body of ‘public goods theory’ to analyze information issues seems to be
impossible.”981 In the absence of a clear and convincing economic argument, the romantic
authorship values and ideas “mixed” into the economic analysis. Thus, claims Boyle, the romantic
author paradigm is influencing (and affecting) the framing of legal rights allocating rights unjustly
– “those who do not look like authors find their property claims disfavored.”982 As appealing as
Boyle’s argument may be, it is not without flaws. There are more reasons for copyright expansion
than the “romantic determinism”.983 As Vaver notes, “[t]he life of the law here is less logic or
literature than lobbying.”984 Bently outlined better suspects,985 such as corporate greed, interest
groups, legislative process, property rhetoric, internationalization, national economic and trade
interests. Accordingly, “[t]he romantic author was, at most, a minor accomplice.”986
Furthermore, there is a growing understanding that the author is socially constructed,987
and authorial creation is a collaborative process.988 Woodmansee demonstrated it by tracing the
authorship concept’s evolution. As Woodmansee has shown, authorship was always a
collaborative process in which authors shared their writing.989 Jaszi identified the romantic author
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paradigm as the main source for undermining the authorship’s collaborative nature.990 Rosemary
Coombe and Zemer have both argued that intellectual products are the result of social dialogue.991
Notable works by several prominent scholars such as Boyle,992 Coombe,993 Jessica Litman,994
Drassinower995 and others have promoted the idea of copyright as a communicative act.
Drassinower, for example, rejects copyright theory’s common conceptual paradigms.996
Drassinower, instead, relies on the internal rationality of copyright997 and considers copyright
works as acts of speech. Thus, copyright law “protects the integrity of the work as a communicative
act.”998 And consequently, infringing a copyrighted work acts as compelling its author’s speech.
Accordingly, copyrights – like limits on communicative acts – must both accord with others’
communicative rights (endorsing fair dealing policy) and must be limited specifically to
communicative uses (endorsing a relaxed limit on incidental copying).999
Indeed, the concept of the author is changing. However, is the author really dead? Not
necessarily.1000 We should distinguish between the author in the literature (who may be dead for a
990
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while)1001 and the legal concept of authorship, which is changing, developing, and expanding.1002
The legal concept of authorship is still with us, and “there is plenty of evidence that copyright law
continues to employ the rhetoric and conceptual underpinnings of authorship, in both the judicial
and legislative arenas.”1003
I am not willing to concede the idea that AI authorship marks the end of copyright. I believe
that copyright will have an important role in the coming decades. My assumption does not preclude
a conceptual change within the copyright regime. As the title for my dissertation implies – the
legal boundaries of copyright require rethinking. Copyright law should become more receptive to
social change (AI included). Perhaps it already is – as Jaszi’s analysis indicated – on a review of
two divergent US Court decisions in Koons.1004
New changes are on the horizon, especially the computer-generated works and expected
AI revolution: we might live to see the death of the human author and the rise of the AI author.
Woodmansee has foreseen these changes already, stating that “technology is hastening the demise
of the illusion that writing is solitary and originary.”1005 Indeed, in the new technological era, the
concept of the sole (romantic) author is obsolete. Even if we put aside AI authorship for a moment,
we ought to consider the way humans interact with technology today. Information and data engulf
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us from all sides. We use Google Images, Google Scholar, and Google Books to gather
information. We enjoy unlimited sources of information on every topic and every issue. The
human author of our time can easily be affected by different styles of works and creations.
Advancements in technology will speed these processes even further. These unique characteristics
of the new creation process make the individual author a reminiscence of the past.
The new AI authorship is a collaborative process, as Woodmansee claims. But, it is difficult
to argue that it is socially constructed – computer programs are not affected by human
interactions.1006 On the other hand, the social concept itself might change: i.e., we might be willing
to accept a different version of social interaction, framing the “dialogue” differently. Transmitting
data, for example, might indeed be considered a sort of language.1007 AIs and humans might be
able to communicate, thus creating new ways for social interactions.1008 If we can accept nonhuman legal rights, we might as well accept new ways of interaction and new ways to socialize.
New and innovative ways to socialize and dialogue between humans and non-humans will change
the concept of authorship allowing a more inclusive way to structure constructive connections that,
in turn, will affect the creative process.
3.2.2

The Human Author

Authorship is perceived as a human ingenuity-rooted concept. The Berne Convention defines
authorship indirectly, stating that “[t]he person or body corporate whose name appears on a
cinematographic work in the usual manner shall … be presumed to be the maker of the said
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1007
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1008
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work.”1009 Jane Ginsburg indicates that “it is not clear that the person whose name appears must
be a human being.”1010 Ginsburg shows that we can vest ownership in productions where its human
input is unclear “without tricking out the owner in the garb of an author.” Sam Ricketson and Adolf
Dietz, however, both argued that Berne restricts authorship only to humans.1011
Seeking guidance from other jurisdictions delivers similar results. The CDPA deems an
author as “the person who creates it.”1012 Australia’s Copyright Act explicitly defines an author as
the “person who took the photograph.”1013 The EU Term Directive implies a human element.1014
Justine Pila and Andrew Christie conclude:1015
“The assumption that every literary work has a human author is undoubtedly central to
the (pre-technological and industrial) theory of literary production embodied in the AngloAustralian copyright legislation.”
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The US Copyright Office stated in its Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, that “it
will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the work […].”1016
Following this rationale, SCOTUS has consistently interpreted authorship as a process involving
human beings or persons, restricting the authorship of non-humans.1017
In Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co,1018 Justice Holmes explained the concept of
authorship as a unique quality of human personality: “The copy is the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible which is one
man’s alone.”1019
In Urantia Foundation v Maaherra,1020 Urantia Foundation claimed that Kristen Maaherra
infringed its copyright by distributing a computerized version of a book. Both parties, however,
agreed that the authors of the book were “celestial beings”, and that these celestial beings “have
delivered the teachings, that were eventually assembled in the Book, ‘through’ a patient of a
Chicago psychiatrist, Dr. Sadler.”1021 Putting the factual argument aside, the court concluded that
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for copyright purposes, “a work is copyrightable if copyrightability is claimed by the first human
beings who compiled, selected, coordinated, and arranged.”1022 It is intriguing, however, to analyze
the court’s decision about the human element. It seems that the court tried to avoid challenging the
faith of the parties (i.e., arguing that there are no celestial beings and thus there has to be a human
author). In avoiding this ruling, for obvious reasons, the court made an important remark:1023
“The copyright laws, of course, do not expressly require ‘human’ authorship, and
considerable controversy has arisen in recent years over the copyrightability of computergenerated works.”

As Yanisky-Ravid argues, however, “the case can also be interpreted as lending support for the
idea that the statue really does not protect works authored by non-humans.”1024 She referenced the
court opinion stating that “it is not creations of divine beings that the copyright laws were intended
to protect.”1025
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid,1026 the Community for Creative NonViolence (CCNV) “entered into an oral agreement with the respondent … to produce a statue
dramatizing the plight of the homeless for display.”1027 The legal issue in this matter was

was proved that the whole of the manuscript of the work was written by the plaintiff alone in her own automatic
writing, and none of it was dictated by the defendant or any other living person.” In establishing Cummins’s
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established, under the work made for hire doctrine, who the owner of the sculpture is.1028 In
addressing the question of authorship, SCOTUS opined that “the Copyright Act of 1976 provides
that copyright ownership ‘vests initially in the author or authors of the work’ ... As a general rule,
the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into
a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”1029
In Aalmuhammed v Lee,1030 a case involving the 1992 biographical drama film Malcolm
X,1031 Jefri Aalmuhammed claimed to be a “co-creator, co-writer, and codirector of the movie.”1032
In rejecting Aalmuhammed’s claim of co-authorship, the court defined authorship by stating that
an author “[…] will likely be a person ‘who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons
in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be – the man who is the effective cause
of that’, or ‘the inventive or master mind’ who ‘creates, or gives effect to the idea’.”1033
The contemporary “common sense” that presumes the author to be a living, breathing,
thinking being rested on these earlier cases and conceptions. As Bridy concludes, SCOTUS has1034
“defined authorship and copyright in broadly humanistic terms, citing the Framers’
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reliance on English Law: an author is ‘he to whom anything owes it origin; originator;
maker; one who completes a work of science or literature’; copyright is ‘the exclusive right
of a man to the production of his own genius or intellect’.”

Hence, for AI to be regarded as an author in law, it is essential to disconnect the authorship concept
from assumptions about individualism and current perceptions of creation as a human monopoly.
As I stated earlier, a work of authorship is not an individualized process; no author is a sole
genius. “Works of authorship, whether the result of years of study and labour or of a sudden leaps
of spontaneous insight, begin with what has been done in the past, and they go beyond the past in
logical and understandable ways.”1035
Zemer claims that copyright law allows “disproportionate enclosures of portions of the
general public domain, of social symbols and cultural elements fundamental to the development
of society and its members.”1036 If we accept this argument, it is possible to move forward to
establish a more reasonable balance between the author – any author, human or non-human – and
the public domain.
Furthermore, if we take into consideration recent developments in technology, we can
assume future AI will possess some level of inter-connection, otherwise known as a hive mind.
My assumption is based on the way our technology is connected today. Almost all computers (and
smartphones) are connected through the Internet. Software is updated on a routine basis, almost
independently. Hence, we might assume that future technology will establish hive mind
interactions like what exists today. In doing so, the concept of individual creation will become a
remnant of a different era. AI will be able to produce or acquire new creations at any moment,
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instantly creating new adaptations and sharing creations with other AI. The reality might work
differently: AI might be unwilling to share or prepared to do so only under certain conditions.
3.2.3

Resolving AI Data Barriers1037

3.2.3.1 Presenting the Challenges
We usually focus on output – the work itself – when discussing creative machines. As a result, we
ignore input: the data gathered and processed by programs or engineers.1038 In previous parts, I
introduced IP theories that support looser IP restrictions to maximize social and cultural
engagement. In this chapter, I will consider AI input and address data barriers.
AI and machine-learning algorithms require a massive amount of data to develop.1039
Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and other companies are gathering data, indexing pictures,
videos and messages to improve their search, translation and commercial algorithms. Yet, the mere
availability of data is not enough. AI needs good data. Incomplete or biased data can exacerbate
problems.1040
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Good data, however, might be copyrighted,1041 which poses a problem: where the AI’s
input infringes copyright, the output may infringe too.1042 Indeed, not all data is copyrightable.
Facts and raw data are usually ineligible for copyright protection.1043
AI can infringe copyright on several different levels:
1. Making digital copies of copyrighted works and saving them on either the hard drive or the
“cloud”. To date, however, courts “have yet to confront whether unauthorized copies made for
training AI are necessarily infringing copies;”1044
2. Modifying data in a way that creates a derivative work;1045 or
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3. Gathering data using programs (crawlers),1046 or a text and data mining (TDM) process that
can extract information such as photographs1047 and e-books.1048
In the last case, part of AI-mined data might be copyrighted,1049 even if unprotected by other means
like through a contract, trade secrets or privacy laws.1050 In Century 21 Canada Limited
Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc, for example, the British Columbia Supreme Court held
that Zoocasa (a wholly owned subsidiary of Rogers) infringed Century 21’s terms of use by
scraping its real estate listings from the website and incorporating them into a real estate search
engine.1051 In discussing fair dealing, however, the court held that there is no need to ask for
permission to render a dealings as “fair”.1052 On the other hand, scarping the Internet to gather data

programming languages is ultimately a matter to be decided by domestic law, but in principle not incompatible with
Berne's broad definition.”
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L W Sobel, “Artificial Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis” (2017) 41 Colum J L & Arts 45 at 67-68.
1050
Data protection laws prevent sharing spesefic information without consent (i.e., medical data). See e.g. Privacy
Act, RSC 1985, c P-21; Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5.
1051
Century 21 Canada Limited Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc, 2011 BCSC 1196, 338 DLR (4th) 32. See
also Denise Brunsdon, “Dating Sites Scrape Internet for Women’s Photos, Including Those of Deceased” (5 December
2013), online (blog): IPilogue <iposgoode.ca/2013/12/dating-sites-scrape-internet-for-womens-photos-includingthose-of-deceased>.
1052
Century 21, ibid at para 252: “The issue of fair dealing only arises where there is no consent to the activity
complained of. The fact that consent has not been given, or has been refused, whether orally or in writing or in a
robots.txt file, is only the starting point for a fair dealing analysis. It is not the end point for an analysis of fair dealing.
The test is the character of dealing not the dealing without consent.” Yet, in 1395804 Ontario Ltd (Blacklock's
Reporter) v Canada (Attorney General), [2017] 2 FCR 256 at para 37, 2016 FC 1255, the court held that “the deliberate
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(like photos) for commercial purposes might be excluded as a form of research under fair
dealing,1053 making fair dealing for most AI or machine learning companies unattainable.
There are several differences between human and computer-generated/AI infringement.1054
For one, it is difficult to establish whether a human creator explicitly copied a work instead of
merely being influenced or inspired by similar works and authors. By contrast, computer programs
(and most likely AI as well) store and index data in an orderly manner, making it easier to
investigate any alleged infringement.1055 Indeed, determining infringement might seem plausible
when examining current computer-programs works. AI and machine-learning algorithms can even
be coded to target specific usages, to locate potential infringements and issue cease-and-desist
letters, and even to block access for certain violating companies or individuals.1056

breach of the accepted terms of access to and use of copyrighted material, whether protected by a paywall or not, is a
relevant consideration in applying the fair dealing provisions of the Act.”
1053
Trader Corp v CarGurus, Inc, 2017 ONSC 1841 at para 38. In Trader Corp, the respondent, CarGurus, indexed
and scraped dealers’ websites using crawls to extract vehicle photos, which Trader Corp owned. In addressing fair
dealing defence, Judge Conway stated: “I am not persuaded that CarGurus’ use of the Trader Photos is ‘fair’. At this
stage of the analysis, CarGurus's own purpose may be considered – that purpose was strictly a commercial one. The
character of the dissemination of the Trader Photos was unfair, in that they were widely disseminated through the
Internet for the entire life of the vehicle listing. The entire photo was displayed, not just a portion of it.”
1054
Under copyright law, the plaintiff could argue that the defendant’s work exhibits substantial similarity to the
plaintiff’s original creation. The courts then can examine the work and investigate whether the defendant had access
to the work to establish the probability of copying.
1055
Sobel, supra note 1049 at 65-66. Sobel explains: “The vagaries of the human brain have led to some awkward
rulings: George Harrison was found to have ‘subconsciously’ copied a song by the Chiffons, and a jury found that the
singer Michael Bolton had access to an obscure Isley Brothers song because it was played on radio and television in
the areas where Bolton lived as an adolescent, nearly three decades before he released an allegedly infringing song.”
See also Three Boys Music Corp v Bolton, 212 F (3d) 477 (9th Cir 2000); Bright Tunes Music Corp v Harrisongs
Music, Ltd, 420 F Supp 177 (SDNY 1976).
1056
Using algorithm-based capabilities and other programs to detect suspicious anomalies is not new. See e.g. Antonio
Capobianco, Pedro Gonzaga & Anita Nyeső, Algorithms and Collusion - Background Note by the Secretariat (OECD,
2017); Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E Stucke, Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-Measures (OECD, 2017).
On the complexities that algorithms create for competition law see also Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E Stucke, Virtual
Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2016). Korea’s Trade Commission, for example, is using BRIAS – an automatic quantitative analysis system – to
detect bidding anomalies and preventing bid-rigging conspiracies. Michal Gal and Niva Elkin-Koren also suggested
using algorithms to empower consumers to maximize profits. See Michal S Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, “Algorithmic
Consumers” (2017) 30:2 Harv JL & Tech 309. In a different paper, Elkin-Koren argues that the fair use doctrine
should be embedded in those systems. See Niva Elkin-Koren, “Fair Use By Design” (2017) 64 UCLA L Rev 1082.
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But, mere presence of a specific song or style within a computer program should not
necessarily imply infringement. Take, for example, an AI designed to learn a user’s personal
preferences and compose tailored songs and music from its access to all the songs available on
Spotify.1057 It would be challenging to prove that the AI’s music derived from any specific song(s):
“All funk songs bear a debt to James Brown, so it would not be altogether surprising if the funky
Al generated output that was substantially similar to his work.”1058 Further, the same legal
reasoning could be applied to humans and non-humans alike. As Woodmansee Coombe, Zemer,
and others have argued, human creation is influenced by cultural perceptions, other creations, and
experiences, as well as affected by a constant dialogue – it is not a work of sole genius.1059 The
same inspiration and social structures could and should be applied to AIs.
A different set of challenges revolves around access and the availability of and to data.
Levendowski argues that the current legal regime renders the AI market accessible only to
dominant AI developers like Apple, Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon.
Small companies that cannot acquire good data or are unwilling to face expensive legal
battles in using copyrighted data, might choose not to enter the AI market or to use low-quality
data resulting in poor AI programs.1060
Levendowski explains that low-quality data often demonstrate bias. For example, using
public domain works from the early 1920s reflects the dominance of the Western white male and

1057

Spotify is a music streaming service.
Sobel, supra note 1049 at 66. As Sobel notes: “Because creativity is cumulative, rather than ex nihilo, a work can
bear the mark of works that its author has not encountered firsthand.”
1059
Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, supra note 437. See also Coombe, supra note 541.
1060
Levendowski, supra note 224. Levendowski explains, at 609: “[A] newcomer would find it nearly impossible to
build something approaching the vastness of Facebook’s build-it model. And it is equally unlikely that said newcomer
could strike a licensing deal comparable to Google’s agreement with global news agencies or a partnership equivalent
to IBM’s buy-it model. Without the resources to get the vast amounts data easily acquired by major AI players,
meaningful competition becomes all but nonexistent.”
1058
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creates biases against blacks, women, the LGBTQ community and other disadvantaged or minority
groups.1061 A program using such works would also lack a basic understanding of common modern
phrases and would apply different meanings to day-to-day terms. For example, AI companies
would find limited use in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn or Bessie Smith’s song Baby Won’t
You Please Come Home for analyzing current consumer trends.
Alternatives to public domain data are available by developing independent creations or
using works under universal licensing and Creative Commons (e.g., machine-readable data on
Wikipedia). These alternatives risk being insufficient or providing low-quality data.1062 Database
creation is costly, so big players who already control abundant data are strengthened by these
availability and accessibility issues.1063 Thus, a small start-up AI company is less likely to find
investors willing to invest in creating a database.
3.2.3.2 Exemptions for AI Data
Several jurisdictions have introduced TDM exemption legislation. As with other legal issues
described in this dissertation, however, TDM policies diverge between countries:


In the UK, the IPO defines TDM as “[t]he use of automated analytical techniques to analyse
text and data for patterns, trends and other useful information.”1064 In 2014, the UK amended
the CDPA to include a non-commercial research exemption.1065

1061

Given that in Canada works are protected for only 50 years plus the death of the author, we can expect better
quality of data in Canada. It should be noted that the new agreement between the US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA)
expects to extend copyright protection to 70 years.
1062
Take Wikipedia for example – the vast majority of its content editors are male, making its data potentially biased
against women. Wikipedia, “Gender bias on Wikipedia” (last edited 5 October 2018), online:
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_bias_on_Wikipedia>.
1063
Nevertheless, these data might also be biased since it is reliant on users and thus do not include communities that
do not use Facebook or Google.
1064
UK, “Guidance Exceptions to Copyright” (12 June 2014), online: IPO <gov.uk/guidance/exceptions-tocopyright>.
1065
UK, The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Research, Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014,
SI 2014/1372, s 3(2)(1)(a). Incorporating section 29A of the CDPA: “The making of a copy of a work by a person
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In 2016, the EU Commission introduced a new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market,1066 which included an exemption for TDM.1067 The directive also offered changes to
EU’s copyright laws, expecting to impose greater restrictions on users’ rights.1068



Both Germany and France include in their copyright statutes non-commercial TDM
exemptions for scientific and research purposes.1069



As part of Japan’s AI and innovation initiatives, it amended its copyright law in 2010 to include
a broad exemption which appears to include both commercial and non-commercial uses and is
not limited to research and scientific purposes.1070

who has lawful access to the work does not infringe copyright in the work provided that- (a) the copy is made in order
that a person who has lawful access to the work may carry out a computational analysis of anything recorded in the
work for the sole purpose of research for a non-commercial purpose.” Notice that the exemption does not apply to
databases. Discussing UK’s fair dealing doctrine, Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 224, explain that “the dealing
must be fair for the purpose of research or private study, criticism or review, quotation, the reporting of current events,
parody or ‘illustration for instruction’. As such, it is irrelevant that the use might be fair for the purpose not specified
in the Act, or that it is fair in general.” Under the UK fair dealing doctrine, the test “does not depend on the subjective
intentions of the alleged infringer” (an objective approach). Fairness “is said to be a question of degree and
impression”, which is determined according to several factors such as the amount of work that was taken (quantity
and quality), the use that was made by the user (this correlates with the US fair use transformative factor – a defendant
that can show that the dealing was transformative has a stronger case; on the other hand, a commercial use of the
dealing weigh against the defendant), consequences of the dealing (market impact), whether the work was published
or not (if the dealing is in relation to an unpublished work it weigh against a fair dealing), etc. Several considerations
might affect a ruling regarding machine-learning and AI. For example, using pictures for creating a data corpus for
machine-learning algorithms – the amount that would be taken might weigh against considering this corpus as fair
dealing; on the other hand, the quality of the data might be very poor.
1066
EU, Commission Directive (EC), 2016/0280 (COD) Proposal of 14 September 2016 for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market [Copyright in the Digital Single
Market Directive].
1067
Ibid at art 3.
1068
Article 13, for example, was rejected by the EU Parliament.
1069
France, Intellectual Property Code, art L 122-5, 10 (for works) and art L 342-3 and 5 (for databases). French
copyright laws exempt only using lawful sources that made available with the consent of the owners. Meaning, if the
owners prohibit using data for AI training or other purposes (in its website terms of use for example) – the exemption
does not apply. Germany exemption entered into force in March 2018. Urheberrechtsgesetz, art 60d enables TDM for
non-commercial scientific research. For further reading about TDM exemptions in the EU’s countries see EU, The
Exception for Text and Data Mining (TDM) in the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market –
Legal
Aspects
(2018),
online
(pdf):
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/604941/IPOL_IDA(2018)604941_EN.pdf>.
1070
Japan, Copyright Act, Act No 48 of 1970, art 47: “A person that, without prejudice to the right provided for in
Article 25, publicly exhibits the original copy of an artistic work or photographic work, may print such work in
pamphlets for the purpose of explaining or introducing the work to persons viewing it.”
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The US’s and Canada’s standing on these issues is a bit more complex, though, as I explain
below, TDM might be exempted as fair use or fair dealing at least until a better legislative
framework is put in place.

Courts view computer-programs and machine output as mechanical, routine, and generally
uncreative or unoriginal.1071 These perceptions are rooted in the legal community and reflected in
the history of software copyright protection.1072 Such perceptions might be changing as evidenced
by CONTU and the subsequent amendment to the US Copyright Act in 1980. The question is
whether current legal regimes will accommodate technological progress in the foreseeable future.
Given the impact of data on AI’s progress, any legal changes to tighten or loosen data barriers will
affect AI research significantly.
Fair use and fair dealing doctrines are prominent legal mechanisms that could enable
copyrighted work use, without the need for an author’s or owner’s explicit authorization to do
so.1073 Admittedly, their interpretation and rules differ across jurisdictions. The basic principle,
however, is closely linked: Copyrighted material can be used in circumstances otherwise
considered infringement.
Data exemptions in the US are governed mostly by its court-developed fair use doctrine.1074
In several prominent cases since the early 1990s, the American courts rendered a use as “fair” if it
was transformative, or in other words – it created something useful and different.1075

1071

See the discussion in part II, Ch. II(B): The Present: From Computer-Assisted to Artificial Intelligence.
Sobel, supra note 1049 at 51: “[R]eactions to new expressive technologies, in court or the culture at large, reveal
a belief that machines cannot in themselves impart, apprehend, or evince authorial expression.” As Sobel further
expresses: “Just as copyright treats machines as too dumb to count as authors, it also treats machines as too dumb to
count as readers.”
1073
Levendowski, supra note 224 at 619-622. Although, as I have shown, some jurisdictions include an owner’s
permission (or lack of) as part of the fairness analysis.
1074
Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 107.
1075
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569 at 579 (1994) [the “Pretty Woman” case or Campbell].
1072
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In Sega v Accolade,1076 the Ninth Circuit ruled against Sega and found that Accolade’s
“intermediate copying” was fair use. The court held that1077
“[A]lthough Accolade’s ultimate purpose was the release of Genesis-compatible games
for sale, its direct purpose in copying Sega’s code … was simply to study the functional
requirements for Genesis compatibility so that it could modify existing games and make
them usable with the Genesis console.”

Kelly v Arriba and Perfect10 v Amazon followed the same reasoning;1078 both Ninth Circuit Courts
held that when search engines like Google use thumbnail (small images) display of copyrighted
images from other websites – while hyperlinking to those sites – this constituted fair use.1079
Google Images and Google Books applications have also been exempted on similar grounds.1080
In the recent case of Authors Guild case, the court held that the “[s]nippet view … does not threaten
the rights-holders with any significant harm to the value of their copyrights or diminish their
harvest of copyright revenue.”1081

1076

Sega Enterprises, supra note 848. Sega claimed that Accolade (the defendant) developed compatible games (Sega
developed the “Genesis” consulate and licensed the consulate to developers) by reverse engineering their consulate.
1077
Ibid at para 46.
1078
Sobel, supra note 1049 at 52. Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F (3d) 811 (9th Cir 2003); Perfect 10, Inc v
Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F (3d) 1146 (9th Cir 2007). Sobel explains, ibid at 53, that “both decisions doubled down on
the rhetoric of non-expressive machinery. The defendants’ image search engines assembled photographs into ‘tool[s]’
– mere machines – not vehicles for conveying expression.” In Kelly, for example, “[t]he dispositive element of Kelly’s
fair use finding was Arriba’s lack of artistic purpose in reproducing Kelly’s images. While Kelly's photographs are
‘artistic works intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience’.”
1079
Perfect 10, supra note 1078. Since then, Perfect 10 sued several companies without much success. In the last case,
Perfect 10, Inc v Giganews, Inc, No 15-55500 (9th Cir 2017), the court affirmed the District Court ruling against
Perfect 10.
1080
Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, supra note 847 at 665; Authors Guild, supra note 1048.
1081
Leave to appeal was denied in April 2016. However, in the recent Fox News Network LLC v TVEyes, Inc, No 15‐
3885(L) at para C (2nd Cir 2018), the Second Circuit rejected TVEyes’s fair use defense by distinguishing Google’s
Book case on the basis that “[w]hile the [Google Books] snippets allowed a user to judge whether a book was
responsive to the user’s needs, they were abbreviated to ensure that it would be nearly impossible for a user to see a
meaningful exposition of what the author originally intended to convey to readers.”
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It is important to highlight the differences between Authors Guild, Perfect10, and Kelly.1082
In Authors Guild, the court was willing to establish fair use in cases where harm to the plaintiff’s
market might arise, stating that “the possibility, or even the probability or certainty, of some loss
of sales does not suffice to make the copy an effectively competing substitute that would tilt the
weighty fourth factor in favor of the rights holder in the original.”1083 Also, in Authors Guild, the
amount and substantiality of the portion taken from the work did not change the outcome.
Levendowski suggests that courts are willing to accept “[c]reating wholesale copies of copyrighted
literary and visual works … when those works are not exposed to the public.”1084
Other factors should be considered in analyzing fair use, like the commercialized nature of
the work.1085 Such consideration should, however, weigh against the work’s transformative nature
as Justice Souter emphasized in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music: “[T]he more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use.”1086 D’Agostino explains that while establishing fair use might
sometimes be difficult “there is flexibility with emerging technologies.”1087

1082

There is a difference between using a thumbnail (that can also direct users to the website it is derived from) to
being able to enjoy parts of books in a way that might harm potential buyers. The Google Books user can read parts
of the books and decide not to purchase the book. See Authors Guild, supra note 1048 at 224: “We recognize that the
snippet function can cause some loss of sales. There are surely instances in which a searcher’s need for access to a
text will be satisfied by the snippet view, resulting in either the loss of a sale to that searcher, or reduction of demand
on libraries for that title, which might have resulted in libraries purchasing additional copies.”
1083
Authors Guild, ibid; Sobel, supra note 1049 at 55; Levendowski, supra note 224 at 629. Judge Parker bluntly
stated in Authors Guild v HathiTrust, 755 F (3d) 87 at 100 (2nd Cir 2014): “Lost licensing revenue counts under Factor
Four only when the use serves as a substitute for the original and the full‐text‐search use does not.” Levendowski,
concludes that in “[u]sing copyrighted works as training data for AI systems is not a substitute for the original
expressive use of the works.”
1084
Levendowski, supra note 224 at 628. The SCC expresses a similar view in CCH, supra note 440 at para 58:
“Although certainly not determinative, if a work has not been published, the dealing may be more fair in that its
reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a wider public dissemination of the work — one of the goals of
copyright law.”
1085
As D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 36 observes: “Today, in the US, there is no presumption against fair use if the
defendant makes a commercial use. Commercial uses tend to weigh in favour of the plaintiff.”
1086
Campbell, supra note 1075.
1087
D’Agostino, supra note 408 at 40.
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Canada lacks an explicit exemption for TDM or AI training.1088 Thus, TDM are governed
by the fair dealing doctrine, as developed by a series of SCC, the Federal Court of Appeal, and
Copyright Board decisions. Recently, as part of section 92 review of the Copyright Act, several
companies, scholars and industry leaders have submitted briefs advocating for amending the
Copyright Act to include either a broader fair dealing doctrine or an AI training/TDM
exemption.1089
Under Canada’s Copyright Act, a dealing is fair because “the purpose of research, private
study, education, parody or satire does not infringe copyright.”1090 The SCC has long held that fair

1088

Under Copyright Act, RSC 1985, s 30.71, temporary reproduction of a work or other subject matter (like data)
would not constitute an infringement. This exception might enable the usage of data as part for AI training purposes.
However, it is debatable whether the data could indeed be temporarily and not integrated into the AI code. First, it is
difficult to maintain which data is copyrightable and which is not. Second, as Element AI (an AI company based in
Toronto) argued recently, given that “informational analysis provides inputs to other technical processes such as
iterative learning by AI algorithms, it may not always be clear when copies need to be destroyed.” ElementAI,
“Promoting Artificial Intelligence in Canada: A Proposal for Copyright Reform” (3 October 2018) at 4-5, online (pdf):
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10078507/br-external/ElementAI-e.pdf>. See also
recital 15 of the Software Directive, supra note 641 (translation, adaptation or transformation of the computer program
code constitute an infringement, unless these steps are required “to achieve the interoperability of an independently
created program with other programs”). The Software Directive subject the rights of a computer program author to
the exceptions stated in arts 5 (Exceptions to the restricted acts) and 6 (Decompilation). For further reading see
Margoni, supra note 1039 at III.3.b.1.
1089
See IP Osgoode, “Submission to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology for the Statutory
Review
of
the
Copyright
Act”
(10
December
2018),
online
(pdf):
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10269431/br-external/DagostinoGiuseppina-e.pdf>.
ElementAI, ibid at 3, stated, for example, that “[a] targeted exemption within the Copyright Act (Act) to allow for
informational analysis would help secure a predictable legal environment for Canada’s Artificial Intelligence (AI)
ecosystem to both continue its unprecedented growth and reach competitive maturity.” Microsoft further suggested to
“[d]raft the new exceptions to clarify that the techniques of machine learning involving copying analyzing, and using
lawfully acquired works protected by copyright to develop new knowledge – are permitted and require no
authorization of the copyright owner, and by any entity or individual for lawful purposes.” See Microsoft, “Submission
of Microsoft to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology on the 2018 Statutory Review of the
Copyright
Act”
(4
September
2018)
at
7,
online
(pdf):
<www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10008894/br-external/MicrosoftCanada-e.pdf>.
Others have supported a broader fair dealing doctrine, see e.g. Pascale Chapdelaine et al, “Brief - Statutory Review of
the Copyright Act submitted by Pascale Chapdelaine, on behalf of Canadian intellectual property law scholars” (20
November 2018) online (pdf): <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10166923/brexternal/ChapdelainePascale01-e.pdf >.
1090
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, s 29. Fair dealing is confined to the enumerated purposes listed in the
act.
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dealing should not be interpreted restrictively. Canadian courts have instead chosen to strengthen
user’s rights and emphasize fairness’s importance.1091
Further, a Canadian use’s commercial nature is considered as a factor, but it is not
determinative. As Vaver stated, “[r]search purposes are not restricted to private purposes. Nonprivate or commercial research … can therefore qualify as fair dealing.”1092 Nevertheless, as noted
by the SCC: “[R]esearch done for commercial purposes may not be as fair as research done for
charitable purposes.”1093
Determining whether a user has taken a “substantial part” is an essential part of the fair
dealing analysis. The test to find if a substantial part was taken includes both quantitative and
qualitative factors. While none of the factors are determinative, qualitative factors are more
important and might weigh against fair dealing in Canada, in cases where massive amounts of
copyrighted data feed the algorithms.
In the future, courts might limit fair dealing’s applicability to TDM-related cases to force
the parties to bargain for royalty agreements. If data is equivalent to currency and quality data is
high-value, there might be a normative justification to motivate the parties to negotiate for a “fair”
use. The recent York University decision might illustrate a move in that direction.1094

CCH, supra note 440; Vaver, supra note 237 at 233-244. In determining fair dealing, the courts address the
following: the purpose of the dealing, nature if the sourced work, how much and what was used, the effect on the
market and whether there are easy alternative available. Giuseppina (Pina) D’Agostino, “Healing Fair Dealing? A
Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US Fair Use” (2008) 53 McGill
LJ 309 (D’Agostino offers several suggestions to remedy fair dealing in Canada).
1092
Vaver, ibid at 240.
1093
CCH, supra note 440 at para 54. See also Trader Corp, supra note 1053. Further, from a normative perspective,
there are justifications for limiting access to free data for commercial purposes and allowing access for social causes.
For an interesting discussion about artificial intelligence and social good, see Gregory D Hager et al, Artificial
Intelligence for Social Good (Computing Community Consortium (CCC), 2017), online (pdf): <cra.org/ccc/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2016/04/AI-for-Social-Good-Workshop-Report.pdf>.
1094
The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency v York University, [2018] 2 FCR 43, 149 CPR (4th) 375. In rejecting
York University fair dealing arguments, Justice Phelan of the Federal Court held that York requires to pay royalites.
1091
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Proponents of a broader fair dealing defence for machine learning or AI training argue that
copyrighted data in such learning or training is used for research purposes and should, therefore,
be exempt under fair dealing doctrine. Michael Geist recently expressed this:1095
“There are several purposes that would permit some text and data mining activities,
notably exceptions for research, education, and private study. However, given Canada’s
emphasis on the commercial benefits of AI, the law may not offer sufficient flexibility to
safely move from the lab or classroom to the market.”

Geist suggests that Canada should emulate US fair use, “by making the current list of fair dealing
purposes illustrative rather than exhaustive”, or by adopting specific data mining exception like in
the UK.1096 As I explain in the coming sections, however, broadening fair dealing is the wrong
path for Canada.
Back in 2007, Israel’s 2007 Copyright Act adopted a fair use doctrine similar to the
US’s.1097 Zemer highlighted several core changes that this Act implemented, including: replacing
fair dealing with fair use; broadening the list of exceptions and limitations; and adding new fair
uses like quotations, instructions, and examinations (in a similar manner to the changes introduced
in the CDPA).1098 One significant difference between American and Israeli doctrines is that Israel

However, it is interesting to note the negoatiations between the parties about the Interim Tariff described by the court.
It seems that the parties could have reached a reasonable agreement to avoid the proceedings.
1095
Michael Geist, “Why Copyright Law Poses a Barrier to Canada’s Artificial Intelligence Ambitions” (18 May
2017), online (blog): Michael Geist Blog <michaelgeist.ca/2017/05/copyright-law-poses-barrier-canadas-artificialintelligence-ambitions>. See also Pascale Chapdelaine et al, supra note 1089 at 3-4 (suggesting to replace fair dealing
with fair-use); Michael Geist, “Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use” in
Michael Geist, ed, From: The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of
Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 2013).
1096
Ibid, Michal Geist Blog.
1097
Israel, Copyright Act, 2007, s 19.
1098
Lior Zemer, “Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and the Case of Fair Use”
(2011) 60 DePaul L Rev 1051 at 1078 [Zemer, Copyright Departures]; See also Tony Greenman, Copyright Law, 2nd
ed (Green man publishing, 2008) at chapter 6 – permissible uses; Neil Netanel, “Israel Fair Use from an American
Perspective” in Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach, eds, Authoring Rights: Reading in Copyright Law (Nevo
Publishers, 2009) at 377.
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“does not refer to the commercial nature of the use and does not make an explicit distinction
between commercial uses and nonprofit uses.”1099
Up until today, fair use or fair dealing relied on two core elements that excuse the usage of
copyrighted data by computer programs:
1. The computer-program’s or machine’s inability to purposely infringe copyright;
2. The computer-programs’s or machine’s minimal or none- existent effect on potential markets
in a way that is material to copyright law.1100
AI developments are beginning to challenge these assumptions. Machine learning is distinct from
basic computer codes. Its algorithms do not require specific instructions and can learn and evolve
by acquiring and analyzing data, adjusting its code in the process. This represents a marked
departure from simple data gathering, storing, and processing employed by computer programs
until now. These algorithms could potentially enable the study of a human author’s or artist’s
expression and style and learn to employ patterns appropriating that author’s or artist’s distinct
“tone”.
With that ability to mimic human expression and style, machine learning and AI pose a
grave risk to human author’s market. Works resulting from an AI’s study of a particular human
artist could provide affordable substitutes to their creations.1101 Moreover, using copyrighted
works as data renders that use of the work as “raw material” – as opposed to, for example,
consuming the work or incorporating it into a new piece. Thus, the way we use the data should
change the way we define the data. When a work is used for its designated purpose it should be

1099

Zemer, Copyright Departures, ibid at 1084.
Sobel, supra note 1049 at 57.
1101
Ibid at 75.
1100
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regarded as a work; when the work is used for a different purpose, like for AI training, it should
be tagged in the same way the AI and its programmer view it: raw material or simply “data”.1102
In the future, courts might make use of productive or consumptive dichotomy – developed
by Justice Blackmun in the dissent to Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios1103 –
to determine if exempting AI data is just from a public policy perspective. The dichotomy’s logic
is straightforward: productive use benefits the public and might constitute a fair use, but
consumptive uses are “not what the fair use doctrine was designed to protect.”1104
Not all machine-learning or AI developments and applications should be recognized as
productive by nature. As Justice Stevens warns us in Sony’s majority decision, we should be
cautious not to fall into a legal “mash” arguing that all uses could result in productive social
impact.1105 Under the same logic, “[i]f future productivity is no defense for unauthorized human
consumption, it should not excuse robotic consumption, either.”1106
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Ibid at 625: “I suggest that the language we use to describe how humans and AI systems experience copyrighted
works reveals a new and different purpose. When humans experience these works, we call them ‘works’. When AI
systems do it, these works are transformed into ‘data’.” Matthew Sag called works using for AI developments “grist
for the mill”. Matthew Sag, “Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology” (2009) 103 Nw UL Rev 1607 at 1624. See
also Maurizio Borghi & Stavroula Karapapa, “Non-Display Uses of Copyrighted Works: Google Books and Beyond”
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In many ways, fair use results from the ongoing struggles between authors and users.1107
In her monumental 1982 paper,1108 Wendy Gordon argued that fair use doctrine should be applied
in three conditions:
1. When “market failure is present” (the pre-condition).1109
2. When “transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable”; and,
3. When “an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff
copyright owner.”1110
Market failure theory offers a scale of legal arguments. Some scholars argue for a model in which
all uses are paid in full: a fared use model.1111 Others are concerned that a fared use model would
“advance the interests of established rightsholders while inhibiting participatory semiosis and
downstream uses of copyrighted works.”1112 Merges developed a further distributive model,
arguing that copyright is a subsidy to creators, so fair use can be recognized as a tax on rights
owners to facilitate specific usages.1113
3.2.3.3 Alternative Approaches to AI Data Barriers
Sobel argues that the two alternatives – machine-learning or AI’s input as fair use or an
infringement – are bad. The former would most likely stagnate technological developments and
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hinder research, leaving the field empty for other international players. The latter creates two
different legal systems – for humans and non-humans – which would favour the non-humans and
disincentivize the humans.1114 Further, fair use might worsen inequality since only the strong and
wealthy would be able to fight expensive legal suits.1115
Relying on fair use as a mechanism for regulating TDM and AI raises reasonable
concerns.1116 As illustrated above, the fair use doctrine does not provide certainty to users,
investors, and AI companies, which is important for building a strong innovative market. On the
other hand, fair use offers flexibility that is missing from the slow legislative process. Courts might
more efficiently address new technological changes under old law than waiting for new law. There
are also alternative means to address challenges, like levies and doctrinal or political reforms (such
as Fisher’s government-funded reward system for entertainment media to compensate
creators).1117 Different legal regimes, like contracts, could provide additional regulating
measures.1118
My support lies with the narrow fair dealing camp, between it and broader fair use.
Admittedly, fair use played a crucial role in welcoming a more inclusive copyright regime. Courts
turned to this mechanism in cases where applying a rigid rightsholders policy would harm other
important causes.
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Sobel, supra note 1049 at 82: “Why should a digital humanities scholar devour millions of texts without
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Publishers, social media, and other giant services (Google, Microsoft, Amazon, etc.) are all using contracts to
enforce their policy on its users.
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Nevertheless, fair use must not exceed its original purposes. Retreating to fair use (or
planting a US fair use model in fair dealing jurisdictions like Canada) to harbour TDM, machinelearning and AI training might restrain courts from addressing the real and significant issues: The
relationship between artificial/machine and human creations. Instead, I suggest a different policy:
An exemption for TDM, machine-learning and AI training. This exemption could feature a
distinction between using data for commercial purposes and other public uses (including social
justice causes). Royalties, for example, can be applied when data is used partly or wholly to
develop algorithms for commercial purposes. Under this exemption, the government could provide
access to data for social causes or other public benefits as part of its big-data policy.
There are reasons to be critical about royalties. Indeed, the EU’s recent attempt to impose
a quasi-royalty mechanism might chill exploring these ideas.1119 But to establish an exemption
mechanism for TDM, machine learning, and AI training, governments ought to explore all possible
balanced approaches and weigh all relevant considerations.
Data barriers may also be alleviated by intermediate measures like levies, international
agreements, and acquiring or licensing data. An example of an alleviating levy can be found in the
US legislature’s introduction in the 1990s of the Audio Home Recording Act (AHARA).1120 A
decent ad-hoc solution may be found by enacting AI-AHARA legislation to shield users and
companies from infringing owners’ works by using their data as input on the one hand and
establishing a compensation scheme to provide royalties on the other.
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Copyright in the Digital Single Market, supra note 1066 at art 13 (which was rejected recently).
Monica Zhang explains that AHARA “was intended to provide proper compensation to copyright owners by
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simultaneously shielding manufacturers and consumers from infringement liability.” See Monica Zhang, “Fair
Compensation in the Digital Age: Realigning the Audio Home Recording Act” (2016) 38 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ
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International, 2008); Sobel, supra note 1049 at 91-3.
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An example of an alleviating international treaty can be found in international initiatives
like the recent Marrakesh Treaty.1121 International treaties can include exceptions for specific
technologies. And, since AI’s and machine learning’s advancement relies on access to data,
exemptions for access to helpful but copyrighted sources might create desirable consequences for
innovation and research.1122
An international initiative to create an open-source pool of free data and information could
be a good start,1123 though its chances of success are slim. First, reaching international consensus
is difficult, made more so by issues like data protection and access laws that vary significantly
between countries. Second, changes in the legality of the usage of information among different
countries for other considerations (such as privacy) will only widen the gap between countries.1124
Ultimately, an opportunity might arise to create a limited data pool for research or within bilateral
agreements like NAFTA or USMCA.
As I explained earlier, acquiring or licensing data for development purposes might offer an
alternative interim solution. Companies could acquire or license copyrighted data to build a
database for machine-learning or AI training. These databases could include various types of data,
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Marrakesh Treaty, supra note 845. A unique international initiative that allows distribution of copyrighted data
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which could also be found in the public domain or be provided by governments in support of AI
research. However, a licensing policy is not ideal in the long term. First, the high costs of licensing
are a significant barrier to small firms. Second, there might not be much variety of sources to
satisfy AI developing needs. As Levendowski opines, “recent studies have suggested that, at least
in the context of training AI systems, bigger is objectively better.”1125 On the other hand,
encouraging individual data creation and licensing could open new markets and, either directly or
indirectly, increase investments in high-quality data, which would benefit the AI field.
3.2.3.4 Orphan Works AI Challenges
3.2.3.4.1

The AI “Orphans”

An orphan work is a copyright-protected work in which the rights-holder cannot be located.
Without an owner or author, the work is an “orphan”. Orphan works pose different challenges to
AI in the digital age:1126
1. More works are prone to manipulation. It is easier for a computer (nonetheless AI) to create
works and circulate them through the Internet without anyone realizing that. Given expected
developments in AI, a greater quantity of “orphans” is expected.1127
2. AI are becoming better and better in imitating human works, making it harder to distinguish
between human and non-human creations. Thus, under the current legal regime, computer-
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Levendowski, supra note 224 at 621: “AI systems trained using larger datasets perform more accurately than those
trained with smaller ones.”
1126
There are other challenges posed by orphan works, which are outside the scope of my dissertation. For example,
orphan works could cause a chilling effect by preventing users from creating derivative works. When copyright owners
cannot be located, potential users do not have any way to seek permission to use the works. Their options are to either
use it at their own peril and risk being sued in the future or forego using the work entirely, which can rob society of
new works or access to reproductions of already existing works.
1127
David R Hansen, “Orphan Works: Causes of the Problem” (2012) Berkeley Digital Library Copyright Project,
Working Paper 3.
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generated or AI works might be labelled as orphans despite having known (albeit inorganic)
creators.
3. The process of composing a song or painting a picture often takes time and involve other people
besides the (human) artist. AI, however, can generate instant works automatically without
human’s influence and involvement. Therefore, it is likely that more AI works would be “lost”
given that the creation process makes it more difficult to track them.
4. Where a work is generated automatically with no human involvement, it could either be
misappropriated by a human or simply labelled as an orphan if no human is involved and the
origin is difficult to establish.
Notably, if the work is a computer’s output with no human influence, it could also be considered
not a work at all, since it lacks the human author required by many copyright regimes. Since an
orphan work is copyright-protected, a computer-generated work would be better off as an orphan
work (with no human) than a computer-generated work (with no human). On the other hand, AI
technology has great potential in resolving some of the issues mentioned here. For example, smart
AI search engines could enable better ways to locate rights-holders.
3.2.3.4.2

What are Orphan Works?

A work may be deemed an orphan for several reasons, not limited to the following:


the author is deceased;



the work was intentionally abandoned; or



the work was generated automatically with little or no human involvement and without proper
documentation (as with computer-generated works).
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Different countries employ different licencing regimes for orphan works. In Canada, for example,
an individual seeking to licence a song with no apparent author or owner can apply to Canada’s
Copyright Board, which evaluates the request and establishes whether the work needs a licence. If
he demonstrates that he conducted a thorough search to locate the work’s rights-holder and came
up empty, the Copyright Board might concludes that no licence is required, “and the applicant will
have the comfort of an official decision that its planned use is legal.”1128
The Canadian orphan work definition hinges on whether the rights-holder can be located;
the Board lacks jurisdiction where the rights-holder is unknown but locatable or was located but
has not responded.1129
The UK, like Canada, uses an upstream model,1130 by which users must apply for a licence
if they want to use a copyrighted work. Users apply online, and the IPO collects and holds the fees
for eight years; and, if a rights-holder emerges, the IPO transfers those funds to them. The IPO is
more autonomous and therefore more flexible than similar administrative bodies in other countries.
The US and the EU have similar orphan work definitions. The US Copyright Act 1976
defines an orphan work as a work whose owner is impossible to identify or contact. The EU’s
definition is similar to the US’s: a work whose author or rights-holder is not known or cannot be
1128

Vaver, supra note 237 at 262; Giuseppina D’Agostino & Margaret Hagan, “IP Osgoode Orphan Works Hackathon:
Final Report” (IP Osgoode, 2016), online: <canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/copyright-policypublications/orphan-works-hackathon.html>. Giuseppina D’Agostino, “Copyright Exceptions and Limitations and the
Copyright Board of Canada” in The Copyright Board of Canada: Bridging Law and Economics for Twenty Years
(ALAI) (Éditions Yvon Blais, 2011); Jeremy de Beer & Mario Bouchard, “Canada’s Orphan Works’ Regime:
Unlocatable Owners and the Copyright Board” (2009), online (pdf): <cb-cda.gc.ca/about-apropos/2010-11-19newstudy.pdf>.
1129
The Federal Court of Appeals has stated that the Canadian Copyright Board is in a better position to adjudicate
these matters and has deferred to its findings of facts as well as its interpretation and analysis. As stakeholders’ interests
drift farther apart, D’Agostino suggests that the Canadian Copyright Board will play an increasingly important role in
balancing these interests.
1130
UK CDPA (2013 amendment), section 116A (Power to provide for licensing of orphan works); J Griffiths, Lionel
Bently & W R Cornish, “United Kingdom” in International Copyright Law and Practice, Paul Edward Geller &
Melville B Nimmer, eds (Lexis Nexis, 2016) § 8[2][e][i]. The Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs & Trade
Marks, can “grant non-exclusive licenses for the use of ‘orphan works’.”
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located.1131 The EU, like the US, employs a downstream model, which allows users to use
copyrighted or copyrightable works without having to seek a licence, so long as they adhere to the
regulatory requirements.1132
It has a two-pronged approach:


The first prong: The EU Directive 2012/28/EU, which outlines the permitted uses of orphan
works and includes a statutory exemption that allows “public service organizations” – like
libraries – limited use of orphan works. The directive also includes a diligent search
requirement, creates a registry, and mandates fair compensation if a rights-holder is found.



The second prong: A Memorandum of Understanding which allows for the voluntary collective
licensing of “out-of-commerce” works. The EU Intellectual Property Office regulates the EU
scheme, and the Orphan Works Database was recently launched under its auspices.1133
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In 2012, the EU has also introduced orphan works legislation adopting the Orphan Works Directive, which was
implemented in 2014. EU, Commission Directive (EC) 2012/28/EU of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of
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despite a diligent search for the rightholders having been carried out and recorded.” Art 4 sets up a mutual recognition
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1132
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A licencing model exists in several other jurisdictions including: Nordic countries (which applies
an extended collective licencing),1134 Germany,1135 Japan1136 and Korea.1137
3.2.3.4.3

Orphans: Causes and Alternatives

According to the US Orphan Works and Mass Digitization report, there are four major causes for
the growing ocean of orphan works:
1. the elimination of copyright formalities;
2. the progressive extension of copyright terms;1138
3. technological advancements which allow creators to “create and preserve more copyrightable
works”; and
4. technological advancements – specifically the shift from print to mass digitation – which give
users access to works and facilitate their use.1139
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The first two causes relate primarily to the US, but the last two can be applied more globally.
Sherman and Bentley point out to another general cause: Authors do not even realize that they
have created a copyrightable work.1140
The report notes the US orphan works system’s shortcomings, including the lack of an
incentive to conduct a diligent search and meagre protection for rights-holders of orphan works.
The report rejects most foreign models (like Canada’s) by claiming that despite creating a diligent
search requirement, these systems are rarely used and are often limited in scope. Instead, the report
suggests that users should still be allowed to rely on fair use, but that there should also be
modifications made to the Shawn Bentley Act of 2008.1141
Given the changes in technology and mass digitation,1142 the orphan works issue has
become increasingly pressing. Legislators, courts, and academics are racing to keep up with the
developments.1143
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Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 330.
The modifications include: a notice of use provision, allowing judicial consideration of foreign determinations
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The orphan works problem has created a chilling effect which prevents potential users from
using orphan works to create derivative works or reproductions of original works. Any solution
devised to address this problem must balance the interests of authors, users, and the public: It must
be transparent and provide certainty, but also be flexible enough to ensure fair outcomes.
As discussed above, international models diverge, employing upstream models (requiring
users to seek a license) or downstream ones (no license is required, but users must comply with
the regulations). Some jurisdictions contemplate ex-post facto compensation while others require
ex-ante compensation. Each model has its benefits and drawbacks.1144
Tackling orphan issues requires a multi-tiered approach that includes policy changes,
platform streamlining, better and more comprehensive databases, and more regulatory guidance.
As D’Agostino and Hagan suggest, international government collaboration would increase access
to resources and expand the knowledge base.1145
Any AI authorship model must address orphan works challenges. For example, AIs might
be labelled as “the authors” of a work while the public would own its economic rights. In this
scenario, AI orphan works could be exempted.
Alternatively, maybe there should be no digital orphan works, and orphan works legislation
should be amended to include only human works. Orphan works should also be exempted for AI
training and TDM. Given the importance of quality data to AI development, orphan works might
act as a better alternative to more expensive and less accessible data. In balancing between orphan
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works rights-holders, the public, and the specific use of the works, the balance shifts towards
creating an exception for orphan works AI databases.
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3.3 WHO IS THE AUTHOR?
My discussion focuses on authorship of a computer-generated or AI work, specifically on who
should be the rightsholder of an AI’s output. Many entities are involved in the development of an
AI and its subsequent creations,1146 so the question engages different players, each one of whom
could be a legitimate rights-holder. Some players are at odds with each other
(AI/public/programmer), others might be willing to share their rights (programmer/user), and still
others may overlap (programmer/employee).
First, the relationship between ownership and authorship is a preliminary and crucial
consideration for answering the question in a “just” manner. Many copyright law frameworks –
Canada’s, for example – make ownership dependent on authorship by granting the author
copyright as the first owner.1147
The concept of authorship was influenced by concepts of ownership (and property) and
vice versa. Thus, “to ask who is the author of a computer-generated work is to ask who has
ownership rights in it.”1148 From a doctrinal perspective, however, authorship and ownership can
be kept apart as two distinct concepts. The presence of one does not necessarily make the other
present too. Regardless, authorship and ownership affect each other significantly, making a
separation process very difficult.
Second, is a lack of consensus among IP scholars that AI could be an author or should be
treated differently from “pen-and-paper works”.1149 Grimmelmann, for example, argues that there
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Yanisky-Ravid and Liu outline ten entities: programmers, data suppliers, trainers and feedback suppliers, AI
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(2016) 39 Colum J L & Arts 404 at 406 Grimmelmann states that “[e]very kind of copyrighted work can be – and
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is nothing new under the sun, and “[w]e can imagine a digital creative process that perfectly
parallels any analog one.”1150 Grimmelmann claims that these considerations, “have been with us
since the Statue of Anne” and will remain with us “as long as copyright considers it important to
assign ownership of a work to an ‘author’ who is causally responsible for the work’s existence.”1151
Ginsburg & Budiardjo have stated further that “computers today, and for proximate
tomorrows … would not qualify as ‘authors’. Asking whether a computer can be an author
therefore is not a fruitful inquiry.”1152 Other scholars contend that IP law might not be relevant in
the future for both human and non-human alike. As I already explained, I do not share these
assumptions.
In this section, I will present the directions that AI authorship might take in the future. First,
I will address the main players who have a substantial claim to AI’s authorship: the programmer,
the user, and the AI. Second, I will address the “no authorship” alternatives; these can be framed
in different ways, such as public rights or government ownership. Finally, I will address two other
rights models: author in law, and AI moral rights.
My analysis centres around the traditional copyright framework; but I will make further
policy observations and consider alternative legal frameworks where applicable. I am willing to
establish that the computer or AI is the author of its own independent computer-generated work
(i.e., where no human involvement occurred). In past and current stages of computer-assisted

regularly is – created using computers.” Microsoft Word, Apple Pages etc. for literary works; Sibelius, Noteflight for
musical works; Adobe Photoshop for pictures and graphics and so on.
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digital, to generate the work.” Therefore, they conclude, at 53, that “generative machines should be examined through
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works – when the program operates merely as a tool – the programmer, user, or owner of the
program should be considered as an author (reserving all subsequent rights, economic or moral,
when applicable).
In the next stage of development – generated by computer alone – the complexities
snowball. The courts will most likely prefer to establish human impact on the creation (even minor)
to avoid allocating legal rights to AIs. This approach might suffice, but only for a while. As
technology advances, sustaining this legal framework would be difficult, and thus we should
consider other alternatives.1153
A collaborative legal framework might be prudent in this next stage, one that involves joint
authorship or ownership between one or more of the key players and the AI. Under this model,
either rights would be assigned to the public – making the work available for use for a short period
– or profits would be invested in government foundations for public causes. The only restriction
on this model would be an obligation to attribute the creation to the AI or computer that created
the work. As several scholars suggest, attributing computer-AI rights is essential to avoid potential
exploitation, manipulation, and degradation of those works. It is also vital to promoting the
integrity of knowledge.
In the final stage, if and when we reach singularity, it is hard to predict what might happen
and what authorship model may fit. I suggest, however, that we do not discriminate between human
and non-human creations at that stage. I advocate for AI rights or at least a limited set of moral
rights that recognize an AI’s attachment to its creations.
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In discussing alternative models for computer-generated or AI authorship, I am willing to consider other ideas,
such as assigning the programmer the neighbouring rights in the works for a limited time.
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3.3.1

The Programmer

The first and most favourable candidate for AI authorship is the programmer.1154 We should
distinguish between two different models for the programmer:
1. the “basic” – authorship in the AI’s program itself; and
2. the “basic plus” – authorship in both the AI’s program and the AI’s output.
As CONTU explains, “[a]uthorship of the program or of the input data is entirely separate from
authorship of the final work, just as authorship of a translation of a book is distinct from authorship
of the original work.”1155 Unfortunately, looking to CONTU’s recommendations for guidance
might not prove very useful.1156
At the present stage of AI development, programmers might have more substantial claims
for authorship in the computer-generated or AI output because a line can be clearly drawn between
programming and the program’s output. As AI develops, however, that line weakens along with
an authorship claim.
When a programmer creates an AI capable – by its definition and basic code – of changing
its own algorithm, its creation process, and the creation itself, the line might disappear entirely. As
Wu observes, “The programmer does not cause the output to be fixed in a tangible medium,
because of the user’s intervention, or the randomness built into the program.”1157
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There could be more than one programmer or, for that purpose, a company that employs a group of programmers.
CONTU, supra note 621 at 45.
1156
Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1195, footnote 34: “CONTU did not explain why it thought the failure to get
permission to use a copyrighted program or data base (something the copyright owner normally has no statutory
authority to control) would “limit or negate” the user’s copyright in the output.” CONTU, ibid at 45-6: “It is, of course,
incumbent on the creator of the final work to obtain appropriate permission from any other person who is the proprietor
of a program or data base used in the creation of the ultimate work. The unlawful use of a program or data base might
limit or negate the author's claim of copyright in the ultimate work, just as the failure of a translator to obtain a license
from the proprietor of the translated work might prevent securing copyright in and making use of the translation.”
1157
Wu, supra note 14 at 171.
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The programmer of such a program might have authorship (and patent) rights to the AI
program, but his claim to the output diminishes. Vaver would agree, “Where the programmer has
no control or creative choice over what the translation program is applied to, and the source work
owner has no control or creative choice over the workings of the program, neither deserves to be
called an author […].”1158
Ginsburg and Budiardjo imply that surrendering too much control over the execution of a
work calls into question whether the “initial conception of the work was anything more than a
general idea.”1159 In Kelley v Chicago Park, the Seventh Circuit, seem to accept the notion that
when an author (or a programmer) has limited control on the outcome, assigning copyright
protection might be challenging.1160 However, they do seem to agree that the programmer “of fully
generative machines … which create works without further intervention or input [i.e., randomly]
can be the author of the resulting outputs.”1161
Lack of connection between the programmer and the resulting output of the computergenerated or AI program “does not destroy the designers’ authorship claims any more than the
lack of a direct connection between the nature photographers’ minds and the expressive aesthetic
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Vaver, Translation and Copyright, supra note 718 at 162. Vaver explains the CDPA position stating that “[t]he
reason for protection has nothing to do with encouraging human creativity and everything to do with protecting the
product of capital investment from unfair competition or misappropriation.”
1159
Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 20. They further explain, at 33: “[I]f an artist fully develops a creative
plan or conception for a work … but does not control the execution of that plan (instead delegating the execution to a
force beyond the author’s control), the artist may not be an ‘author’ in the copyright law sense.” The same is true to
programmers.
1160
635 F (3d) 290 (7th Cir 2011). In Kelly, the court discussed whether a living garden could be considered a work
under copyright law. In rejecting copyright claims, the court held that forces of nature cannot be copyrighted. This
decision is controversial and was criticized by several scholars. See e.g. Jani McCutcheon, “Natural Causes: When
Author Meets Nature in Copyright Law and Art. Some Observations Inspired by Kelley v Chicago Park District”
(2018) 86 U Cin L Rev 707.
1161
Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 71: “[C]opyright law does not always require an author to hold in her
mind a precise mental image of the work she sets out to create. The essence of the conception requirement is the
formulation of a complete creative plan for the work.”
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content of their works destroys those photographers’ ability to claim authorship over their
images.”1162
Several justifications exist to adopt a programmer-based authorship model. First, the
programmer is responsible for the AI program’s creation by providing creativity, skill, and labour
to the program,1163 and crucially influences the creation process. Using the labour-based
justifications, “even though it may be a fruit he had not envisioned” the programmer is normatively
entitled to his or her reward for the fruits of his or her labour in making the program.1164 According
to this perspective, the AI program and all subsequent products are the results of the programmer’s
labour. From a utilitarian perspective, the programmer must be incentivized to create the program;
without awarding copyright, there would be no incentive for creating or improving AI
programs.1165 Tying this together, the programmer authorship model requires no significant
changes to the existing authorship legal framework. Several jurisdictions have already adopted a
programmer-based model, including the UK.1166
By default, allocating authorship to the programmer is both normatively and doctrinally
justified. Advocating a programmer authorship model as a default, however, should not mean that
the programmer be designated as owner in all cases and circumstances. It equally should not extend
copyright to the maximum length of fifty or seventy years. So, while the current legal framework
grants programmers’ copyright in both the program and its output,1167 I argue for a new model that
1162

Ibid.
Bridy, supra note 423 at 51, further offers that “[i]ntuition and the principle of transitivity both suggest that the
programmer of generative software is the logical owner of the copyright in the works generated by his or her software.
He or she is, after all, the author of the author of the works.”
1164
Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1205.
1165
Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 706-707: “Developing AI systems capable of creating
works of authorship is a great accomplishment. Therefore, it may make sense to grant programmers the copyrights of
works created by AI systems to recognize the magnitude of that accomplishment.”
1166
CDPA, s 9(3), which indicate that the author of a computer-generated work “shall be taken to be the person by
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”
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See e.g. Software Directive, supra note 641.
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would limit copyright for both the program and its output. We should, however, distinguish
between copyright protection for the program and the output of the program. It might be
normatively justified to offer a more extended protection period for the former.1168
In earlier chapters, I presented models by Parchomovsky, Siegelman, and Stein, who
advocate for a more balanced approach to IP and copyright protection that correlates the level of
protection awarded to the level of originality of the creation.1169 These innovative approaches
might offer a good alternative for establishing the level of protection for the programmer.
Further, given the differences between AI programs (advanced AI programs and more basic
programs), there are normative justifications for limiting the scope of protection to the programmer
even where copyright protection is a desirable outcome.1170 AI programs have a shorter lifespan
than other programs. Extending copyright protection for a long period would hinder the ability to
develop additional applications or make changes to the program, which is a socially desirable
outcome. A limited balanced copyright model for AI programs would incentivize more AI
research.
From a policy perspective, assigning copyright in the AI’s output to the programmer
overstretches the authorship concept to any creator of intellectual labour. Given the length of
copyright protection, broadening the scope of authorship might adversely shift the balance in other
IP regimes. Take patenting, for example, where strengthening programmers would strengthen
large companies and developers like Google and Microsoft at the expense of the public and other
small players.
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Considering, for example, the time and investment of the programmer in making the program.
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 426 at 1458; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 427 at 1507.
1170
These considerations extend the scope of my research. We should not extend the maximum length of copyright
protection for the programs (50 to 70 years). In my opinion, even patent models of 15-20 years is too much.
1169
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Samuelson provides further counter-arguments against a programmer-based model. For
starter, “[i]f the programmer chooses to exploit the value of the program by charging a significant
fee for its acquisition, it seems only fair that he agrees to yield some of his rights to those who
have paid for that right.”1171 Samuelson also explains why expectations between the parties – the
user and the programmer – justify that the programmer would not be able to claim copyright in the
computer-generated/AI creations: 1172
“Granting all rights to the programmer would mean that the programmer would
automatically own everything the program was capable of generating. This solution overrewards the programmer, particularly in light of the fact that the programmer is no more
able to anticipate the output than anyone else.”

Even in the limited cases that discuss computer-generated or AI copyright “courts have
consistently taken the pragmatic approach of attributing authorship for copyright purposes to the
person who held the pen and did the actual writing.”1173
While there are good justifications for assigning programmers copyright in the program
itself,1174 there are reasons not to assign copyright in the AI’s output: “Just as we do not need to
incentivize programmers to create works of authorship in which they do not have any creative
input, we do not need to recognize a programmer for an artistic accomplishment that is not his or
her own.”1175 Dorotheou agrees that when “the connection between the programmer’s work […]
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Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1207. This argument, however, is challenging in cases in which the programmer
charges no fee like in open source programs. Freeware, creative commons, or ad-revenue based software models skirt
this argument.
1172
Ibid at 1208.
1173
Bridy, supra note 423 at 50.
1174
An interesting case is Nova v Mazooma, in which Kitchin L. J. debated whether authorship in a computer-generated
work subsides with the programmer or the user, ruling for the programmer, which was responsible for designing the
games. Nova Productions [2006], supra note 746.
1175
Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 236 at 707. See also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 293 at
2236: “[W]e do not challenge the eligibility of the programmer to be entitled to ownership according to copyright
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and the final work is too remote […] [t]here can no longer be a link to the programmer, irrespective
of whether the programmer was the original creator.”1176
Arguments in favour of assigning copyright in the AI’s works to the programmer posit the
view that this is the most prudent and doctrinally reasonable policy. Even if we follow the
suggested logic that AI program and the AI’s output should be assigned to the programmer, we
might be creating an even bigger problem concerning the enforceability of the rights over the AI’s
output.1177
In between the “no copyright” and “all copyright” to the programmer’s, a middle ground
approach might help to resolve the issue. Similar to patents and Parchomovsky’s model, the
programmer could be granted a neighbouring right in the AI’s output for a limited time.1178 The
Canadian Copyright Act contains several neighbouring rights. Between the songwriter and the
maker of the recording, the latter retains neighbouring rights solely in the recording, while the
songwriter retains authorship rights in the composed music.
Translating this model to AI, the songwriter becomes the programmer – the musical
composition assimilated to the AI program – and is thus entitled to copyright for that program.
Neighbouring rights in the AI’s output then falls to the programmer, the user, or the AI depending
on the circumstances of the output’s generation.

laws governing the software she or he develops … On the other hand, this entitlement does not automatically result
in ownership over the products and processes created by AI systems.”
1176
Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 90.
1177
Wu addressed these concerns back in 1997 arguing that “[a] major practical problem with awarding copyright
ownership to the programmer is enforceability. Is the user expected to notify the programmer and voluntary pay
royalties every time the user uses the program to generate another work? More likely, the user will have an incentive
to conceal the output, and the programmer will have a choice of licensing the software into a shroud of distrust and
suspicion or avoid licensing the software altogether.” However, as Wu pointed out, this situation is no different from
enforcing any licensing agreement. Wu, supra note 14 at 171.
1178
Part II to the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, supra note 590, outlines the legal framework for protecting neighbouring
rights (for example performance and sound recording).
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In reflecting between the different models I have presented above, and will discuss below,
under our present level of computer-generated or AI development programmers and users – are
better candidates for AI’s neighbouring rights. As for those neighbouring right’s protection terms,
the EU database protection of fifteen years might serve as a benchmark.1179 I would suggest a
limited term of no more than five years because that length is more appealing to current legal and
technological levels and thus could be applied without posing significant difficulties.1180
3.3.2

The User

Deciding authorship between AI, users and programmers reminds me of the famous Bible story,
the Judgment of Solomon:1181 Two women claim to be a baby’s mother and, to resolve the dispute,
King Solomon suggests cutting the baby in half to give one half to each mother (only the true
mother, of course, refuses the offer by demanding that her beloved child remain intact). Here,
instead of a baby, users and programmers both have claims to a computer-generated or AI
“baby”.1182
As with the Bible story, determining ownership (parenthood) is difficult, because “[t]he
resulting work might be virtually identical to the program, or it might be virtually identical to the
user’s input, or it might be similar to both, but identical to neither, and we will have to inspect the
expression in the program, the input, and the work to say for sure which is the case.”1183
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EU, Commission Directive (EC) 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, [1996] OJ, L
77/20 at art 10(1) [Database Directive].
1180
Five years might seem arbitrary. In a way it is. There are reasons to limit protection to software. As I explained in
Part II, programs have a very limited lifespan. The lifespan of a smartphone’s application, for example, is only a few
weeks. We can expect that with advancements in technology AI and machine-learning programs’ lifespan would be
even shorter. Under this assumption, offering the programmer longer protection is not justified and less reasonable to
sustain under the utilitarian approach (which is the strongest basis for assigning copyright protection to the
programmer).
1181
1 Kings 3:16–28.
1182
Some authors, however, compare a song to a baby – Yehonatan Geffen, a famous Israeli composer, for example,
wrote in The Sixteen Sheep album – “How a song is born? Like a newborn baby.”
1183
Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, supra note 1149 at 411.
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Bruce Boyden suggests seeing authorship as a spectrum where, as “the programmer
contribution increases, the user’s decreases and vice versa.”1184 Accordingly he says that,1185
“[D]etermining the authorship of a work will depend on whose meaning or message is
embodied in that work … whether a computer-generated work transmits a person’s
meaning or message correlates with whether they would be able to predict the output of
the computer program in operation.”

In our current stage of AI development, computer-generated output derived from simple software
– akin to a Microsoft Word document or Adobe Photoshop image – falls into the user-heavy
extreme of the spectrum. Once the program is released, the resulting documents or images are
exclusively created by users, not the programmers.1186
At the other programmer-heavy extreme, we might find a CD played by a software
program, or a “Choose Your Own Adventure” story in which the user can choose a path from an
infinite number of options.1187 Boyden concludes that “at least at the extremes what determines
authorship of the output of a computer is whether a person’s intended meaning reliably or
predictably forms part of that output.”1188
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Boyden, supra note 714 at 387.
Ibid at 385.
1186
Unless the programmer happens to be a user, and in such a case the programmer would simply be classified as a
user.
1187
Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 35, further explain: “We might conclude that the reader [i.e., the user]
is not the author of the sequence because he has contributed nothing that the initial author [i.e., the programmer] has
not foreseen; the author has preset the content of each option, and the combinations of options, though numerous,
remain a very finite universe.” In other words, even if the user is in fact the creator of the output, given that its creation
was limited to the programmer’s conceptions and ideas, and could not exceed the programmer’s plan, the user could
not be labled as the “author” of the output. The courts reached a similar outcome in videogames cases. In Midway Mfg
Co v Artic Int’l Inc, 704 F (2d) 1009 at 1012 (7th Cir 1983) the court held: “Playing a video game is more like changing
channels on a television than it is like writing a novel or painting a picture. The player of a video game does not have
control over the sequence of images that appears on the video game screen. He cannot create any sequence he wants
out of the images stored on the game’s circuit boards. The most he can do is choose one of the limited number of
sequences the game allows him to choose. He is unlike a writer or a painter because the video game in effect writes
the sentences and paints the painting for him; he merely chooses one of the sentences stored in its memory, one of the
paintings stored in its collection.”
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Boyden, supra note 714 at 387.
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Ginsburg & Budiardjo provide a somewhat similar view on the matter. Instead of a
spectrum, they suggest a binary model between upstream and downstream creators. The upstream
creator will be the sole author if he or she controls “the downstream contributor’s process of
execution,” reducing the latter to a “[…] ‘mere amanuensis’, or to selecting among outcomes the
upstream contributor has anticipated and build into the work.” The downstream creator would be
the sole author if the upstream creator “provided only an unprotected idea, which the downstream
creator has elaborated into detailed conception.”1189 The upstream might be considered “the
programmer” and the downstream “the user”.
There are several good arguments that favour granting users AI authorship. In computerassisted works (e.g., Microsoft Word), the case for a user’s authorship is self-explanatory: The
program operates as a pen,1190 and the user – not the programmer – authors the work. As
Grimmelmann suggests, “[W]here the program is Finale [musical composition software] and the
work is a string quartet, the user is the author of that musical work.”1191 As long as the user employs
his or her skill, labour and creativity in creating the work, it is logical that authorship should be
assigned to the user,1192 who – as Samuelson adds – should then “be free to exploit this product
commercially.”1193
Conversely, the user’s claim to authorship weakens when his role becomes insignificant or
trivial and his input in the creative process diminishes. An example would be cases where the user
1189

Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 34.
As Justice Whitford expressed in Express Newspapers, supra note 728 at 1093.
1191
Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work, supra note 1149 at 409-410.
Grimmelmann further explains that there is no real issue with the fact that in some cases the only difference between
users who are authors and users who are not is a push of a button: “The user who pushes a button on a music box to
start it playing is not an author; the user who pushes a button on a camera to take photograph is.”
1192
Obviously, as the role of the user diminishes, and other contenders appear, the user’s claim for authorship is
weakened.
1193
Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1192. The only exception, Samuelson explains, “should be for instances in which
the work generated by a computer incorporates a substantial block of recognizable expression from the copyrighted
program.”
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only initiates the program that then performs its own self-sufficient AI program or pre-conditioned
codes.1194 Indeed, “where the program displays a fifteen-second animation of fireworks whenever
the user pushes the space bar, the programmer is the author of that audiovisual work.” Jane
Ginsburg echoes Grimmelmann, stating that while “Pope Julius II may have commissioned the
painting of the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel … the author of the frescos remains Michelangelo.”1195
As technology and AI progresses, a user’s claim (or AI) for authorship in the output might
wane where the programmer’s claim grows. This will occur particularly where the program
expresses more independence, clearly increasing the programmer’s influence on the outcome.
Guadamuz aims to solve this ambiguity by simply “reading the letter of the law and applying it on
a case by case basis.1196 If the artificial agent is directly started by the programmer, and it creates
a work of art, then the programmer is clearly the author … However, if a user acquires a program
capable of producing computer-generated works, and uses it to generate a new work, then
ownership would go to the user.”1197
Guadamuz’s distinction seems reasonable. A user’s influence on the creative process might
justify allocating copyright to him and not to the programmer or the AI. Ginsburg and Budiardjo
explain that “[t]he user’s creative contribution interrupts the designer’s authorship claim.”1198 Thus,
a “potential distinction is whether the user supplies anything new to the machine, or whether the
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Ibid at 1201: “It is difficult to justify user authorship when the role of the user of a generator program has been
reduced to merely causing the output to be generated (for example, typing the word ‘compose’ in a music generator
program).”
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Ginsburg, People Not Machines, supra note 795 at 134. Ginsburg adds: “Were a future Julius IV to instruct a
computer to interrogate its comprehensive database of religious art to devise and paint a sequence of Old Testament
scenes, that Julius would no more be the author of the output than was his forebear.”
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In Toronto Real Estate Board v Commissioner of Competition, 2017 FCA 236 (CanLII), online:
<http://canlii.ca/t/hp34l>, the Federal Court of Appeal of Ontario, reached a similar conclusion, stating, para 185:
“The point of demarcation between a work of sufficient skill and judgment to warrant a finding of originality and
something less than that – a mere mechanical exercise – is not always self-evident. This is particularly so in the case
of compilations. It is, however, within the parameters of the legal test, a highly contextual and factual determination.”
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Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 176.
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Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 83.
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output is necessarily a rearrangement of elements already within the machine.”1199 Samuelson
agrees, “Whatever the user does to the text thereafter to edit or change it will, of course, create the
basis for saying that the user may be an author of those portions of the text that he modified.” She
argues that users cannot be authors of or claim IP rights to unmodified portions, or “perfect” raw
output.1200
Ginsburg and Budiardjo offer a different distinction – the possible anticipation test. When
the programmers “define and bound the downstream creator’s role” (i.e., the user), the user “does
not disrupt the upstream creator’s claim of authorship”, and thus the programmers would be
designated as authors.1201 However, “when the upstream creator’s creative plan for the work does
not limit the downstream user’s creative autonomy, and instead relies on the downstream creator
to endow the work with additional (and unforeseeable) creative content, the upstream creator
cannot claim to be the sole author of the resulting work.”1202 In determining ownership, the
Ginsburg and Budiardjo model apply torts foreseeability reasoning, asking “whether the upstream
creator could have anticipated what the downstream user would do to ‘complete’ the work.”1203
An argument against user-authorship model is the “free rider” principle. Assigning
copyright to users – especially those with minimal contributions to the creation process –
disincentivizes programmers and other players from investing in technology (as discussed later,
this argument also applies when assigning copyright to the AI or to the public).1204 In response to
1199

Ibid at 86.
Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1201: “Under the traditional paradigm of copyright, the answer to these questions
would seem to be ‘no’.”
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Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 88. In this scenario, “the upstream creator has effected a limited
delegation of creative control to the downstream creator, who simply completes the upstream creator’s creative plan
by making a relatively foreseeable choice – pushing a button, choosing between a limited set of parameters or settings,
or moving a joystick to proceed through a simple videogame.”
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Ibid at 88-9.
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Ibid at 89. Ginsburg & Budiardjo explain that the test “would not inquire whether the machine’s designer actually
anticipated the result.”
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Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 91; See also Perry & Margoni, supra note 779.
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this argument, Wu endorses a basic contractual arrangement to balance the claims of programmers
and users, “A programmer could always make the program more attractive to users by specifying
in the software license that the user has certain rights to works generated by the program.”1205 If
the parties behave rationally, we can assume that the market would drive the program’s price and
reflect an arrangement that maintains incentives to create and improve the program, while
providing a worthwhile enough user experience that users continue purchasing or entering a
licensing agreement for that program.
Other arguments against user-authorship include Hristov’s position that since users “have
the smallest contribution to the initial development of AI, their claim for authorship is the least
compelling”,1206 so “[b]y losing copyright claims to end users, owners and programmers may
restrict the use of AI by third parties.”1207
Despite this, there are still good statutory reasons to allocate authorship to users. One is
that “the user will have been the instrument of fixation”, which copyright law traditionally grants
as the author. US courts share a narrower view on fixation,1208 rejecting user-authorship arguments
in Stern Electronics and William Electronics that the user – not the programmer – fixed the work
and is entitled to authorship.1209 Nichols argues, however, that the factual basis that led the US
courts to that conclusion is quickly disintegrating, “The vastly enhanced complexity of today’s
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Wu, supra note 14 at 162-163.
Hristov, supra note 422 at 444.
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Wu, supra note 14 at 151: “The Second Circuit rejected the argument because ‘many aspects of the display remain
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games makes the fixation inquiry for the purposes of a game publisher’s claim to an audiovisual
work much more difficult.”1210
Samuelson provides this policy consideration as a counter to the disincentivization
argument: The program’s programmer or owner was already compensated for the right to use the
program, either by the user’s purchase or license.1211
Moreover, users “are in the best position to take the initial steps that will bring a work into
the marketplace.”1212 Thus, the user authorship model serves society’s interests better. As
Samuelson noted before Feist,1213 many jurisdictions’ low originality standards support user
authorship.1214 Under the US’s current originality standard, it would be more difficult to justify
originality for mere button-pushing, but in the UK and other jurisdictions, user-authorship through
low-originality standards has a stronger foothold.1215
Looking for guidance in the case law toward user-authorship provides little help, as
jurisprudence on it is scant. In the UK, Kitchin L. J. acknowledged the user’s impact on the creation
process, stating in Nova Productions v Mazooma Games that “[t]he appearance of any particular
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W Joss Nicholas, “Painting through Pixels: The Case for a Copyright in Videogame Play” (2007) 30 Colum J L
& Arts 101 at 115. Nicholas further suggests, ibid at 116: “Today, videogame play lies on a spectrum of interaction
ranging between ‘changing channels on a television’ and ‘writing a novel’. As it approaches the latter, a game
producer’s claim to the game itself as an audiovisual work diminishes. Instead, the focus turns to the videogame play:
who creates it and who, if anyone, owns it? Thus, we are back to the issue first discussed in the introduction of this
Article: what are the copyright implications when third parties complete the novel?” I would add that Nicholas’ paper
dated more than a decade ago and, if anything, his conclusion is more relevant today.
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Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1203. Samuelson offers further policy considerations. For example, the ability of
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the program for functions that are beyond the programmer’s expertise” (utilize a program for developing some
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Ibid at 1227.
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Feist, supra note 440.
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Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1202: “One who tape-records a live performance of improvised jazz, for example,
is considered the ‘author’ of the sound recording thereby under copyright law, even though the creative input by the
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I will address AI copyright standard in the following chapters.
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screen depends to some extent on the way the game is being played.”1216 Even if the user has some
impact, however, Kitchin L. J. ruled against any authorship claim since the user’s “input is not
artistic in nature and he has contributed no skill or labour of an artistic kind. Nor has he undertaken
any of the arrangements necessary for the creation of the frame images. All he has done is to play
the game.”1217
On the first reading of Nova, it seems that Kitchin L. J.’s view on the user’s artistic
contribution to the computer-generated or AI sets the bar high for a user’s authorship. This high
bar makes programmers – at least in the UK – natural candidates for authorship in both the program
and its output. On a second reading, however, I suggest that Nova’s ruling offers guidance to a
user’s authorship in computer-generated or AI works, depending on the user’s influence on the
creative process. In Nova, the user’s impact was limited to following the original design dictated
by the programmer and can be distinguished from cases where the user has more liberty in the
creation process and effectively changes the outset of the program’s output.
In Torah Soft Ltd v Drosnin,1218 and Rearden, LLC v Walt Disney,1219 the US courts
established “whether the user’s contribution constituted the ‘lion’s share of the creativity’ and thus
superseded the authorship claim of the designer of the program.”1220 And, although in Walt Disney
the court relied on the Torah Soft decision, it reached a different outcome, concluding that “unlike
in Torah Soft, where the user merely inputs a word into the program, MOVA Contour’s user inputs

1216
Guadamuz, supra note 422 at 177; Nova Productions [2006], supra note 746. See also Navitaire v EasyJet, [2004]
EWHC 1725 (Ch).
1217
Nova Productions [2006], ibid at para 106.
1218
136 F Supp (2d) 276 (SDNY 2001).
1219
293 F Supp (3d) 963 (Dist Ct Cal 2018).
1220
Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 85.
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a two dimensional camera capture that may range from [an actor’s] facial expressions … to the
[actor’s] subtle and dynamic motions.”1221
The Australian Federal Court addressed a case similar to Nova in Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp
Pty Ltd.1222 In that case, Judge Jessup dismissed Acohs’ appeal of a copyright infringement and
upheld the finding that the very basic computer program’s output is not protected under copyright
law,1223 since “the source code as a work … was not written by any single human author” but,
rather, was generated by a computer.1224 Acohs follows a rigorous and conservative approach
toward computer programs. Judge Jessup held that users could not be the authors of the program’s
output since “[t]hey were not computer programmers, and there is no suggestion that they either
understood source code or ever had a perception of the body of source code which was relevant to
the MSDSs [i.e., the program’s output] on which they worked.”1225
This false equivalency between programming capabilities and the creative process is
problematic. A painter need not understand basic chemistry to be assigned copyright in his or her
painting; nor must a writer have a mechanical understanding of typewriters or the code underlying
Microsoft Word.
Where an AI is self-sufficient – capable of performing without any human influence or
guidance – a different user-related issue arises. Here, the user might supervise the AI, ensuring it
causes no harm or does not diverge from its purpose designation. Under this framework, a user’s
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Walt Disney, supra note 1219 at 971. In Torah Soft the user only insert terms in a “google translate” style and the
program searched the biblical database, re-organized the terms according to its designed algorithm and created a matrix
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1222
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note 422 at 183-4.
1223
The program provided guidelines for preparing Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”).
1224
Acohs, supra note 1222 at para 50.
1225
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authorship might seem unjustified, and the authorship pendulum might shift to the programmer
depending on the autonomous level of the program.1226 In a recent paper, Yanisky-Ravid argues
for a user-authorship model in which the users “bear accountability for the systems’ production,
in addition to the benefits thereof.”1227
Yanisky-Ravid model is rooted in incentive theory and claims – similarly to Samuelson –
that a “legally sanctioned monopoly allows the users to use, sell, or distribute the works more
efficiently, as well as to be accountable for avoiding infringements and counterfeits.”1228
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For example, if the program follows the programmer’s instructions or even if the program accomplished the
programmer original purpose.
1227
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programmers. Obviously, if an AI causes damages, there must be a way to compensate the affected parties. To resolve
this harmful potential, we must address several issues. First, resolving data barriers, which I discussed in the previous
chapter. Second, creating a database that would be available for AI and machine-learning programs for assessment of
infringing potential. However, this solution also poses a challenge – by creating this database, individuals and
companies would also expose their innovations, which might not be well accepted. On the other hand, there are
government database for patent and we might find a way to develop a method to employ the government database for
this purpose. Third, contractual or insurance solutions might present alternative approaches. We could require
programmers to insure their AI for possible infringements in the future. See e.g. Bridget Watson, “A Mind of Its Own
- Direct Infringement by Users of Artificial Intelligence Systems” (2017) 58:1 IDEA 65 at 69 (in the context of patent
infringements). Peter Menell offered a different suggestion to implant specific standards as part of the algorithms
code. We could consider creating an algorithm that would be able to provide similar guidelines for AI and machinelearning systems or using these standards in other AI technology. Further, by enabling an AI hybrid standard
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While Yanisky-Ravid user-authorship approach might seems a prudent legal solution, it is
actually far from satisfactory. Her model assumes that the user affects the AI output and thus is
the better candidate for authorship. Given expected developments in technology, her model
remains either irrelevant or mostly relevant to present computer-generated developments and not
to the expected self-sufficient, independent AI, under which the user might become a supervisor.
Yanisky-Ravid’s arguments follow CONTU’s reasoning, albeit partially. CONTU’s report
advised awarding authorship to the user since the user is the computer “employer”. However, as
pointed out by Samuelson, this is easier said than done, given that more than one person uses the
program with varying degrees of responsibility.1229 CONTU noted, however, that the same
company usually employs all persons as part of the creation process, making copyright allocation
more practical.1230
At the beginning of this section, I compared the programmer-user scenario to the two
maternal candidates before King Solomon. Wise Solomon “solved” the issue by suggesting cutting
the boy in two and giving each woman a half. The story ended with Solomon ruling in favour of
the mother who refused to cut the baby because she would rather give the baby to the other mother
than kill him. Given the complexities described above, perhaps adopting a Solomon ruling is not
a bad idea for programs and users: “cut” the rights in two,1231 giving half to the programmer and
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Samuelson, supra note 423 at 1195, footnote 34. Samuelson is critical that “CONTU thus hints at joint authorship
as a solution without indicating just who the joint authors might be.”
1230
CONTU, supra note 621 at 45: “When the authors work together as a voluntary team and not as employees of a
common employer, the copyright law with respect to works of joint authorship is as applicable here as to works created
in more conventional ways, and the team itself may define by agreement the relative rights of the individuals
involved.”
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In this scenario, I relate to the AI output rights only (and not the rights in the AI program).
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half to the user.1232 Though, as I further explain in the next chapters, this situation might create a
different set of co-authorship problems.
3.3.3

The AI

The US Copyrights Office introduced the idea of allocating authorship to a computer back in
1965.1233 A decade later, CONTU rejected these notions, stating that even if computers could
create works independently, they “should not be copyrightable because they had no human
author.”1234 As Samuelson aptly notes, CONTU’s conclusion incorrectly thought that completely
independent computer creation was too speculative and remote to take seriously.1235
In the early 1990s, Miller further rejected AI authorship, claiming that “an artificial
intelligence expert says that these systems have not yet been able to emulate the capacities of a
cockroach.”1236 Miller misses a few important facts: cockroaches are among the most intelligent
insects; more importantly, intelligence is not the only factor we should consider.1237
True, current legal regimes cannot assign authorship to AI because it lacks legal rights. As
I indicated in Part II, however, there are easy legislative solutions to change that. The EU
Parliament, for example, urged the EU Commission to consider creating a legal status for robots

1232

I understand Solomon’s outcome turned out a bit different from what I suggested. Solomon’s actual ruling was to
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“so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status
of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations.”1238 The EU Commission, however,
rejected this motion. Nevertheless, there are voices in the EU that favours these ideas. The UK, for
example, is more susceptive to the EU Parliament’s ideas, at least partially.1239
Here are several arguments supporting AI authorship. First, as Samuelson posits, if it “is
impossible to tell by hearing the music whether it was composed by a computer or by a human,
one might wonder whether the notion of machine authorship ought to be accepted.”1240 Second,
the concept of authorship need not be restricted to humans (as I argued in earlier parts). Thirdly,
“[a]lthough both the programmer and the user might contribute to the framework within which the
computer makes its selections or arrangements of data, the computer actually makes the
selections.”1241 Boyden further opines that in cases where the programmer could not predict the
computer-generated outcome, and the user only pushes a button, the computer truly “authored” the
work.1242
Arguments against AI authorship tend to relate to lack of personhood.1243 Granting AI
authorship might set a precedent for granting AIs other legal rights and duties which we might not
be willing to do, at least presently. Personhood is a legal concept, though, and our willingness to
change other legal concepts changes over time; perhaps we might consider adopting personhood
for AIs. Among copyright scholars, Grimmelmann and Miller have both expressed unwillingness
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to recognize the possibility of AI authorship.1244 Grimmelmann explicitly states that “[c]opyright
law doesn’t recognize computer programs as authors, and it shouldn’t.”1245
The strongest argument against AI authorship is that computers create without any need
for incentive. One solution to this would involve coding the program to do as we bid, or in more
sophisticated AIs, to make the AI believe through coding that its true purpose and destiny is to
create works. As speculative as it sounds, this might produce interesting results. AIs might develop
to follow human creativity similarly or identically to humans.1246 Grimmelmann explains:1247
“Robots that act indistinguishably from humans can also be expected to respond
indistinguishably from them in response to legal pressures. A robot that says it cares about
not being sanctioned for copying without permission and acts accordingly is a robot that
can effectively be deterred from copying.”

Further, even if AI authorship lacks any utilitarian justifications, there are other justifications to
consider.1248 We should be reminded that in the future it might be difficult to justify discriminatory
treatment toward AIs and, as Samuelson opines, “unless the Constitution were construed to bar
machine authorship, perhaps the copyright statute should be construed to permit it.”1249
It is clear, in any case, AI authorship would shake copyright’s core and force us to reevaluate basic principles we hold dear. A key question to answer is how to assign copyright to AIs
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without devaluing the motivation for programmers and users to develop programs or to deliver
works to the public. In a human-governed world, ownership is an important element of innovation.
But let me temper the above concern. First, no one is arguing in favour of assigning copyright to
AIs today, since AI has not reached a worthy level of technological advancement. On the contrary,
I share Abbott’s proposal to strengthen human ownership by extending protection to include a
computer program as a possible inventor or author.1250 Second, by the time computer programs
and AIs reach an appropriate level of development that enables human-invention-free creation, the
incentive basis for copyright might become obsolete for human creations too – AIs would be able
to create independently (fixing and improving its codes).
As Lemley argues, incentive theories might lose their grip for both humans and machines
in the future (if not already, to some extent, today) with post-scarcity world where economic
incentives no longer foster innovation.1251 In fact, many humans already choose to create without
any real gain (or are over-incentives).1252
3.3.4

Joint Authorship

AI authorship could comprise a collaborative framework between the above three players, namely:
the programmer, the user, and the AI.1253 In the future, there are circumstances where a user’s
1250
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contribution will likely be more significant. Video gamers, for example, would “do more than
simply react to the story presented onscreen, but participate in creating that story as it unfolds,
somewhat like the holodeck on the starship Enterprise.”1254
Boyden argues that in these cases, the programmer and the player both contribute to any
resulting creation with ideas, plots, and other elements, “in ways that perhaps neither party could
fully predict”. Boyden concludes that such creations constitute a joint authorship that emerges
“from the operation of the program, instead of a close collaboration between authors.”1255
The user-programmer joint authorship model is appealing because it resolves the need to
choose between the two AI authorship frontrunners.1256 CONTU agreed that joint authorship
constitutes a plausible solution – albeit leaving ambiguous the identity of “authors”1257 – since:1258
“When the authors work together as a voluntary team and not as employees of a common
employer, the copyright law with respect to works of joint authorship is as applicable here
as to works created in more conventional ways, and the team itself may define by agreement
the relative rights of the individual involved.”

A few years later, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (COTA) expressed the
same idea as CONTU but specified what “authors” it had in mind by explicitly contemplating that
computer programs could be considered as co-creators:1259, 1260
“[T]he programmer’s, the user’s, and even the computer’s expressions are intermingled

must be copyrightable or whether no individual copyright is required as long as the joint work might be. Nimmer
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in the process of creation, separating rights in the products of interaction with a program
from those in the program itself will become increasingly difficult.”

Concerning a programmer-user joint authorship model, the recognition of such a model faces
several doctrinal difficulties. For starters, the definition of joint authorship does not match in the
US, UK, Canada and other jurisdictions:


Lacking a definition for “joint authorship”, the US defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or independent parts of a unitary whole.”1261



Meanwhile, the Canadian Copyright Act defines a work of joint authorship as “a work
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of one author
is not distinct from the contribution of the other author or authors”;1262 The UK’s CDPA offers
a definition nearly identical to that of Canada.1263

As Vaver explains, intention is crucial under the US joint work approach, “authors must intend
their contributions to be merged into a unitary whole before their work is considered joint.”1264
Wu further provides that “the courts have interpreted this to mean that they must intend to be joint
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authors … they must intend for each contributor to have an interest in the copyright.”1265 Ginsburg
and Budiardjo conclude that given the non-collaborative nature of the relations between the
programmer and the user:1266
“[T]he 1976 Act’s requirement of contemporaneous intent to merge specific contributions
may deny joint work status to the outputs … And because in many cases the individual
contributions of designer and user may be insufficient to justify a claim of sole authorship,
the denial of joint work status to these outputs would leave them authorless’.”

A joint programmer-user authorship model also creates practical problems by fractioning
ownership rights: “[I]f the programmer of the generator program is given rights because of his
contribution,”1267 other programmers responsible for other parts of the programming might also be
considered as joint authors. Joint authorship becomes a never-ending story.1268
Finally, there is no general industry standard to make formal agreements between
programmers and users for creating a joint work, unlike other joint authorship scenarios like
songwriters and performers. Without such a standard, evidencing intention under the US joint work
model becomes impossible.1269 Hence, as Samuelson concludes, the joint authorship model seems
“more satisfactory in theory than it would prove in practice.”1270 Moreover, given that a joint
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authorship is based on co-ownership, it could also result in disagreements between the parties, and
exploitation of the work by one party.
The above issues are compounded when contemplating joint authorship between the
programmer-user-AI trio. It is not less complex, however, when limiting the discussion to userprogrammer joint authorship either. Under the US joint work approach, a user-programmer-AI
authorship seems too improbable, as AI possesses no potential for intentionality.1271 And, as Solum
admits, it would be speculative to think that AI could be developed to possess such capabilities, or
even prove that AI indeed had an intention if it or its creator claimed it did.
Then again, perhaps these arguments are short-sighted. Future AIs might indeed
demonstrate some level of human-like free will, which should satisfy intentionality. Moreover, the
rejection of the intent requirement by other jurisdictions makes clear that such intent is not an
essential part of the joint authorship equation. In other words, joint authorship for AI is not an
impossibility.
In my view, however, a joint authorship model makes a weak basis for AI authorship. My
concern is that it imports all the problems encountered in assigning copyright individually to
programmers, users, or AIs, with an additional set of difficulties specific to joint authorship.
3.3.5

No Authorship

3.3.5.1 Public Domain
Since choosing authorship seems so difficult, perhaps an ideal solution is to “[l]et the raw output
be in the public domain, just as a found object would be.”1272 Here are a few arguments we should
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consider.
First, the public domain model avoids immediate challenges to the IP regime, and it is
consistent with the approach shared in many jurisdictions (i.e., AI works are not copyrightable).1273
Second, building on the theoretical justifications discussed in Part II, IP law is designed to
protect human creations only: “If it is not clearly necessary to grant the exclusive rights to stimulate
creativity, traditional principles would seem to argue that the set of exclusive rights not be awarded
to anyone.”1274 As Clifford argues, a “[m]achine itself is not able to claim the copyright because
such claims are limited to humans.” Since no one has a claim for non-human creations, he contends
that the works enter the public domain by default.1275 Ricketson agrees with Clifford, unconvinced
that “such productions should be entitled to any protection at all”.1276 Ricketson and Clifford both
express a prominent argument in AI personhood debates: “[O]nly natural humans deserve legal
rights.”1277 I challenged this argument in Part I.1278
Both American and Canadian copyright frameworks seem to favour the no-authorship
approach for AI. The US Copyright Office stated explicitly that copyright law only protects
creative human works founded in the mind.1279 Under Canada’s Copyright Act, Mark Perry and

interfaces are themselves languages--the languages people use to operate their computers. Because user interfaces
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Thomas Margoni endorse works belonging to the public domain, “in absence of direct human
intervention.”1280 In short, no-authorship models seem entirely possible under existing
frameworks.
The public domain model also conforms with theoretical IP justification. A primary
concern of IP law is increasing and spreading the public pool of knowledge. Such a goal is certainly
achieved by relinquishing computer-generated/AI works to the public domain. Yochai Benkler
discusses the importance of the free distribution of information, knowledge, and culture for
society,1281 and suggests that “enforcing copyright law leads to inefficient underutilization of
copyrighted information.”1282
Ginsburg also encourages knowledge distribution, noting the evolution of the creative
process and the diffusion of creativity due to the increase of the “Wikipediafication of content.”
Thus, Ginsburg contends, maybe “no one can fairly own a copyright, either.”1283 I discussed
similar IP and copyright ideas, challenging copyright regimes in earlier parts.1284
As noted above, there is little consistency about who the author is of computergenerated/AI. As Samuelson explains, it is also unclear if allocating computer-generated/AI
output’s rights to either the programmer or the user would motivate creations. The programmer is
rewarded for creating the program (through selling or licensing it) and the user is motivated by
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transforming the raw material into something he or she can sell or promote to the public. Hristov
disagrees, stating that “[w]ithout an established period of protection, there is no tangible incentive
for developers of AI machines to continue creating, using and improving their capabilities”, which
could “ultimately limit innovation […] resulting not only in the decline of AI but also in the decline
of innovation across a number of related sectors.”1285 Hristov, however, fails to acknowledge the
effect of patents and design law protection, which might be available to programmers and
developers.
I find Samuelson’s argument more persuasive between the two positions. First, there is a
consensus that an AI program is patentable or copyrightable, which means that only the output’s
authorship, inventorship or ownership presents an issue. Thus, contrary to what Hristov says,
programmers and inventors are incentivized for their creations.1286 Second, Hristov’s argument is
more relevant to the present stage of developments, and he does not consider a future where AI is
coded to be incentivized.
A clear issue with the public domain model is that it diminishes the user’s incentives to
bring their creation to the public. As Samuelson observes, “the best reason to allocate ownership
interests to someone … is that someone must be motivated”,1287 if not to create the work, then at
least to make it publicly available. Without ownership rights, users might be motivated to withhold,
falsify, or change the work so they can be assigned authorship, which is the worst possible
outcome.
Rewarding “those who bring innovation to the market has always been part of the realities
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of the intellectual property system, even if not part of the sentimental ideology that pervades public
thinking about intellectual property.”1288 Samuelson’s view here relates mainly to current
developments, however, and even in our current landscape, we organize information systems to
share and connect. This is a good indication that future AI creativity would spread through similar
means of communication; in other words, there is no reason to assume that future AI would lack
motivation to share its creations with the public. Moreover, if future AIs possess human traits, its
motivations to share its creations would likely be humanized. Admittedly, some of my above
assumptions are loosely grounded. But my point is that we should not preclude the possibility that
AIs – not users – may equally or more so take responsibility for bringing innovation to the public,
and those allocating rights needs to anticipate this possibility.
There is yet more support for no-authorship or public domain models. In a recent paper,
Yanisky-Ravid and Liu argue in favour of abolishing the patent law system for AI inventions,
because AI inventorship poses significant problems through its multiple potential rightsholders.1289 They contend that granting exclusive rights to inventors does not “significantly
incentivize investors”. Among other claims, they argue that patent law is inflexible and may
“impede future technological progress by making it harder for other AI systems to build on earlier
inventions.”1290
While Yanisky-Ravid and Liu focus on patents and not copyright law, they share core
arguments with the no-authorship model. First, AI’s output could produce patentable, design
rights, and copyrightable material simultaneously. Second, the development environment is
1288
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similar and involves many contributors, including other significant entities such as data suppliers,
“trainers”, operators of the AI systems, and investors.
3.3.5.2 Government Ownership1291,1292
Another solution similar to the public domain model is the government model, in which ownership
of computer-generated or AI output falls to the state by default. Canada already embraces some
default government ownership: Section 12 of the Copyright Act provides circumstances in which
the Crown owns copyright.1293 In Canada, this mechanism is based on a different rationale. Vaver
suggests that section’s 12 opening “without prejudice to any rights or privileges of the Crown” is
a reference to an ancient English prerogative – the Crown’s sole right to print whatever is
written.1294
One can argue that the government should benefit from its investments in projects and
employees. The government is part of the people, and its officials serve the people. However, as
Vaver points out, people may still be charged for government’s works.1295 Regardless, there is an
existing legal framework to draw on, and it might be argued that the government could serve public
needs most efficiently and effectively.1296
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Granting the state ownership to AI output might seem like a more radical approach than
the public domain model since it assumes that only the government can decide how to allocate
rights. Further, a government model might hinder free speech and become an effective censorship
tool in cases in which the government prefers to prevent access to specific creations.1297 Additional
arguments can also be made against the claim that the government would be best at allocating
rights. Governments might not be that efficient, and this could lead to higher taxes.
On the other hand, a government model establishes ownership for the public benefit. The
state could establish trust funds for public causes. As already suggested, the AI could be named
the work’s “author”, while the government retains entitlement to use the AI’s output for social
purposes, like Norway’s use of oil revenues in establishing its Government Pension Fund.1298
The challenges between private and public ownership models on a relatively small scale
were discussed for ownership of university IP (mostly patents). This discourse produced similar
arguments to those detailed above.1299 Under the American Bayh-Dole Act, for example,
universities ought to take the title for inventions where the Federal Government funded the
research for those inventions.1300
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Then again, even the university model is weak. Estreicher and Yost argue that default
university ownership can shift a university’s research focus to revenue and commercialized
research,1301 and more profitable research areas.1302 Other concerns arise that governments are not
in the best position to pursue licensing.1303
Though a sole government ownership model has lower transaction costs than a multiple
ownership model like joint authorship,1304 this seems the only reason in support of such ideas.
Otherwise, government ownership model seems problematic and unwieldy.
3.3.6

Authors in Law

Earlier sections in this part discussed authors-in-fact: Those who directly had a hand in creating a
copyright-entitled work. Authors-in-fact for AI output may include the user, programmer, and AI,
depending on their influence on the final product. In this section, I look beyond authors-in-fact to
authors-in-law: Fictitious “authors” granted legal authorship for AI creations despite not
necessarily being involved in the creation process.
In this chapter, I consider the most frequently discussed author-in-law classes in an AI
context: derivative work, work-made-for-hire, and fictitious human authors. These classes could
establish a legal basis for computer-generated/AI copyright either by creating an alternative human
author or by considering the creation part of the original work (program).

1301

Ibid at 1091.
Estreicher & Yost, ibid at 1095; Pat K Chew, “Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?” (1992)
Wis L Rev 259 at 305-6.
1303
As shown, universities slow down the commercialization process and create a bottleneck in the process. See e.g.
Teresa Amabile et al, “The HBR List: Breakthrough Ideas for 2010: A Faster Path from Lab to Market” (JanuaryFebruary 2010), online: Harvard Business Review <hbr.org/2010/01/the-hbr-list-breakthrough-ideas-for-2010>.
1304
Estreicher & Yost, supra note 1300 at 1100-1.
1302

266

Authors-in-law is a tempting route, but I believe it will lead to adverse outcomes. It also
provides an example of how the legal community sometimes tries to resolve challenges of
computer-generated/AI by avoiding the real issues.
3.3.6.1 Derivative Works
The derivative work doctrine is based on creating a fictitious author.1305 Derivative work
encompasses any expressive work based on pre-existing works – either singular or multiple (e.g.,
mash-ups) – and in any form under US laws in which the pre-existing work is “recast, transformed,
or adapted.”1306 Copyright law defines derivative works in the US broadly, and “appears to reach
all works ‘based upon’ a copyrighted work, regardless of how it transformed or recast.”1307 In
contrast, the Canadian Copyright Act does not provide a broad definition, though nevertheless
might reach similar results.1308
For AI, we can argue that the basic code originated from the programmer, so every work
that the AI creates is derivative from the original code. All AI output is therefore derivative work
under copyright law.1309 This argument, though reasonable, is not persuasive. AI code is no
1305
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different from DNA; it is the basis for the AI’s “body”. As AI technology evolves, considering an
AI’s creation as a derivative work becomes more equivalent to attributing any work by a child to
his or her parents. Dorotheou agrees:1310
“The connection between the programmer’s work … and the final work is too remote …
the device is thinking entirely by itself. There can no longer be a link to the programmer,
irrespective of whether the programmer was the original creator.”

Perhaps more importantly, AI works would not contain the original code that produces them, as
Bridy explained, “[t]hey are not copied from the underlying code, and they are not substantially
similar to the underlying code.”1311 Legislators could, of course, amend the derivative work
definition to include “works that do not borrow from the original work.”1312 But such amendments
are not warranted. As Bridy admitted, “removing the requirements of actual borrowing would
unduly exacerbate existing boundary problems, making a wider range of conduct actionable as
infringement and potentially inhibiting creativity”, especially in the digital environment.1313
Finally, recognizing computer-generated or AI works as derivative works would not
resolve any ownership issues, since “such a classification would not automatically make the owner

from the operation of the generator program.” Perry & Margoni, supra note 779 at 8 concludes: “[E]ven if Canadian
law recognizes a specific right of derivative work and vests it to the author of the original work, such right is limited,
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of the copyright in the generative code the owner of the copyright in the procedurally generated
work derived from it.”1314
Where derivative works do not incorporate any element from the code that produced it, the
copyright in the work is fully owned by the work’s author (i.e., the computer-generated, AI or
user). In Bridy’s words, there is “no preexisting material in the new work to sustain a copyright
claim by the author of the original work, leaving a non-legal person as the only copyright
claimant.”1315
3.3.6.2 Work Made for Hire
The second author-in-law option for AI is the “work made for hire” [WMFH] doctrine.1316 This is
where parties agree – beforehand – that the person commissioning or funding the work will take
authorship despite not authoring the work (e.g., a ghost-writer penning a celebrity’s autobiography
will sign a WMFH contract to maintain the story that the celebrity wrote it)..1317 Hence, “the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes
of this title”,1318 and the copyright in any work that was created “within the scope of employment
or commissioned by independent contractors” belongs to the employer.1319
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Several scholars have reflected on the applicability of the WMFH doctrine to computergenerated or AI works.1320 The doctrine might enable attributing the copyright ownership of the
AI’s work, to the programmer, on the assumption that the programmer is the AI’s employer. This
makes the doctrine “the least disruptive and most practical solution to the issue of AI generated
works falling into the public domain.”1321 In that way, Bridy explains, we can “avoid the expedient
logic that conflates the author’s author (i.e., the programmer) with the actual author (i.e., the
generative program).”1322
Bridy favours WMFH over derivative works since WMFH “can be more easily modified
without undue collateral expansion of the scope of copyrightable subject matter”,1323 and1324
“[I]s a more fitting framework within which to situate the problem of AI authorship
because it represents an existing mechanism for directly vesting ownership of copyright in
a legal person who is not the author-in-fact of the work in question.”

Hristov echoes Bridy’s proposal, arguing for applying WMFH to AI programs by a flexible
interpretation of the terms “employee” and “employer” in a way “that an ‘employer’ may be
considered as someone who employs the services of another entity in order to achieve a goal or
complete a task.”1325 Under this interpretation, an AI’s programmer might be considered its
employer. This approach, however, is not a comprehensive solution. For example, Hristov’s
suggestion is too broad in scope and will effectively include all freelances.1326
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Bridy claims that her suggestion is no different from the exceptions to computer-generated
works found in other jurisdictions that create a “legal fiction of authorship by means which
copyright vests as a matter of law in a party who is not the author-in-fact.”1327 Section 178 of the
CDPA (reading with section 9(3)), for example, establishes that a computer-generated work is
protected under the UK copyright laws.
Bridy’s argument sounds appealing, but the WMFH might de facto recognize AI as an
employee and thus create a new working class, which is a far-reaching proposition. Bridy
acknowledge this problem, stating that current copyright laws do not catch computer-generated
works (or AI) in their legal definitions (sections 101(1) and (2)) “because the relationship between
the programmer and the authoring code is not an employment relationship in the agency sense
[and] they are not among the nine categories of commissioned works.”1328 Bridy suggests
incorporating the UK computer-generated model by stating that a WMFH is “a work generated by
a computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.” In that case, the
owner of the work might be the programmer who would be considered the AI’s employer.
However, as I explain below, allocating ownership to the programmer might be
normatively unjust. And as Bridy herself pointed out, the user, the program, and the programmer’s
employer of the programmer are all worthy candidates for authorship or ownership.1329 Bridy’s
argument also ignores other computer-generated/AI authorship models such as joint-authorship or
public domain models. Vaver adds that Bridy’s model is far from adequate for Canada, because of
the significant difference between the WMFH doctrines in the US and Canada.1330 Hence, Bridy’s
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proposition is not a comprehensive global solution. Even if one makes necessary changes to the
doctrine, it is inadequate normatively: We can allocate legal rights to AI, or we can reject the idea,
but WMFH only avoids the real issues.
Yanisky-Ravid also developed WMFH as a prime model for AI authorship. In a recent
paper, she suggested a “new” model “that sees AI systems as independent workers or employees
of the users.”1331 Her model builds on Bridy’s argument but instead leans more towards the user,
and not the programmer, as the employee.1332 Her gist is that the user operates the program (i.e.,
gives it directions), takes the financial risk, and supplies the energy. Yanisky-Ravid justifies her
take from a policy and practicality perspective, stating that “it makes sense to incentivize people
or firms as well as other entities to use creative AI systems to create works of authorship because
doing so will most efficiently promote the proliferation of the devices and the works they
produce.”1333
Yanisky-Ravid argues that “most of the time, the candidates who are involved in the
development and manufacture of the AI system do not meet the threshold of authorship.”1334 Thus,
she concludes, the programmer and other players should not be the beneficiaries (employees) of
the AI creation, because “[t]he large number of players significantly weakens each player’s
individual contribution and thus the bond between the software programmers and the products
produced by the AI systems.”1335
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Yanisky-Ravid’s vision is narrow-minded; it might be useful at our current computergenerated phase, but not to more advanced stages of AI. For example, part of the model is based
on the instructions a user could or would give to the program. In the future, however, an AI might
create works with no human influence, therefore with no instructions. Further, she claims that this
model “also solves the inherent problem of multiple players being involved in the development of
AI systems.”1336 But, there is no real reason why more than one user cannot “employ” the AI
program, or why a multiplayer model presents such a problem to copyright. AI does not change
our current development process, which involves as many players as Yanisky-Ravid describes.
From a policy perspective, Yanisky-Ravid’s WMFH model is “safe” – it provides stability
and preserves the basic principles of copyright law. It solves liability issues by establishing that
the user, as the AI’s main contractors, is responsible for the outcomes. On the other hand, as Bridy
remarks, implementing the model will require changes to current legislation.
Even if we accept one of the WMFH proposals, normative concerns arise that we should
consider. Bridy and Yanisky-Ravid each establish a working status – and maybe even a limited
personhood status – for AI. Several scholars argue that these scenarios might create a “slave” status
for AIs and robots.
Joanna Bryson suggests “that robots should be built, marketed and considered legally as
slaves, not companion peers.”1337 Bryson pointing to the risks that AIs or robots pose to society.
First, over-identification (personalization or humanization) with AIs or robots is time-consuming,
requires allocating resources, and might result in social isolation. On the other hand, there are

1336

Ibid at 713.
Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, supra note 244 at 63. Bryson might use a provocative tone, however, she does
not mean to make any comparison – nor do I – between human slavery and robots’ so-called slavery, as she further
explains: “[W]hen I say ‘Robots should be slaves’, I by no means mean ‘Robots should be people you own’. What I
mean to say is ‘Robots should be servants you own’.”

1337

273

benefits like providing companionship for the elderly. Second, Bryson expresses concern on an
institutional and government level about the risks AI or robots pose to legal personhood by making
them liable for their actions and removing liability for the human programmer or user, or a
government or corporation.
Bryson’s argument is appealing, but there are social costs in treating AIs or robots as
“slaves”. We can assume that as technology evolves AIs or robots will likely anthropomorphize,
as they are modelled to resemble humans. In that scenario, treating AI or robots as servants might
affect the way humans treat each other by inciting violent tendencies or become indifferent to other
people.1338
3.3.6.3 The Fictitious Human Author
The third author-in-law model is the fictitious human author, discussed in papers by Wu and
Timothy Butler. Under the fictitious human author model, whenever a court finds a computer/AI
as the author of a given work, “the court should presume the existence of a fictitious human author
and assign copyright to the owner of the AI.”1339
Butler introduced this theory in 1982,1340 but Wu developed it furthermore recently. While
Butler assumed that copyright would be assigned to the owner of the AI program, which is the
“problem-specifier or the computer owner, either individually, jointly or in part,”1341 Wu suggests
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a broader vision that includes (and maybe even favours) the user. According to Wu, ownership
“should be assigned to whoever owns the copyright to the AI, on the assumption that this will
usually be the person who decides whether the AI should generate future works.”1342 The fictitious
human author model’s greatest advantage is that it avoids the somewhat “painful” discussion of
AI personhood.
Wu offers this model as a last resort, stating that “if the computer program generates a
poem that is not repetitive or predictable [i.e., no fixation], and the user’s contribution is minimal
[or there is no user at all like an AI humanoid robot], then the author of the poem may be the
computer program (the AI) itself.”1343
Declaring AI authorship, however, is not the end of the discussion. The court must still
determine if the AI reaches a level of sophistication enabling it to generate further works: “If
awarding the copyright to the AI will stimulate the AI to create future works, then the AI should
receive copyright protection; if not, then the court should assign the copyright to the owner of the
computer program under the Fictional Human Author Theory.”1344
3.3.7

A Moral Rights Model

For my final authorship consideration, I want to return to moral rights doctrine, discussed earlier
in Part II. There, I explained why the moral rights model poses an alternative to other ownership
models. First, it recognizes the personal connection that future AI might develop toward its works
and creations.
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Second, by recognizing the AI’s contribution and providing limited protection to those
works, we could differentiate and prevent any confusion between AI and human works. Third, by
allocating moral rights to AI creations, we resolve concerns about human appropriation of AI’s
works. While moral rights model is not a fulsome solution to AI authorship, it might provide an
alternative to the next phase of AI development and is worth exploring.
Any AI moral rights model should be implemented in phases. Our current stage of
development needs no moral rights extended to computer-generated programs since no attachment
could be established.
Moral rights should engage only when we reach an independent level of computergenerated or AI development in which there would be very limited human involvement (or no
human involvement). Then, and only then, we should consider extending limited moral rights
(attribution and integrity rights only) to computer-generated or AI creations, either as sole or joint
authors.
My moral rights endorsement is likely to face criticism.1345 As I explained in Part II, moral
rights historically were designed to protect human rights. Even if countries that acknowledged
moral rights become willing to accept AI moral rights, those jurisdictions that do not (especially
for computer programs) will frustrate any attempt at global change.
Still, the moral rights doctrine contains advantages that we can use to enhance AI
authorship. First, it allows us to distinguish between a creation’s recognition and integrity, and its
ownership. Even if AI cannot comprehend creation as humans do, we strengthen the integrity of
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Boyden, supra note 714 at 391: “Emergent works likewise need no protection under a moral rights theory as the
expression of a human being’s personhood, not under a natural rights theory as intellectual labor, because again there
is neither human creativity nor labor involved in their production.”
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those creations and make falsification or false attribution of AI art to humans more difficult by
assigning moral rights.
Second, the moral rights arguments are an extension of developing AI personhood in
copyright. If we accept AI personhood and AI’s entitlement to limited legal rights, we should not
exclude the implementation of AI moral rights.
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3.4 RESHAPING COPYRIGHT
Any AI authorship model must also consider other copyright standards. Originality serves as a
copyright guardian – if a work is not original, it is barred from protection. Originality dictates the
presence of certain elements for a work to be considered “original”, and in many jurisdictions,
such elements may include creativity.
Originality is an important criterion of any creation, AI included. However, establishing
originality might prove difficult for non-humans. Dan Burk expresses the paradox and absurdities
in copyright, which urge us to accept impossible and nonsensical assertions.1346 Machine works
were always considered inferior to human works – how could a simple processor of data satisfy
the originality standard? However, with the advance in computer programs, these perceptions are
changing. Machine-learning algorithms prove that a machine can make original and creative
decisions, which could even surprise its programmers.1347
My argument is simple and straightforward: We should determine mechanical labour as
original in the same manner we establish non-mechanical originality. Indeed, there are works made
by machines that should not be considered original. However, not any mechanical work is
unoriginal per se. Similarly to programmers, AI could express originality in changing its code,
offering creative ways to produce works, or making decisions in selecting its sources. There are
many creative works generated by computers/AI systems in music, art, literature, etc.1348
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Dan L Burk, “Method and Madness in Copyright Law” (2007) 3 Utah L Rev 587.
As with the program that beat the top Chinese Go player in a move no one anticipated, see Gibbs, supra note 772.
1348
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, “Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative
Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model” (2018) 19 Minn J L Sci & Tech 1 at 7. However, as Yanisky
Ravid & Velez-Hernandez have offered, at least in the US, the legislator did not provide a clear definition for artwork
or art. Ibid at 31.
1347
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Unfortunately, the current legal discourse in copyright law is more interested in
establishing how we can obtain originality in a more technical sense instead of how we can
perceive what is original.1349 It is a subjective process, which is more biased toward non-human
creations.
There are several innovative suggestions to change copyright standards to accommodate
AI authorship. Abbott, Joseph Miller, Jeffrey Harrison, Edward Lee, Boyden and, recently,
Yanisky-Ravid and Antonio Velez-Hernandez argue for adopting a more inclusive benchmark
facing the difficulties with the current copyright framework.1350 Indeed, as Wu observes, “as
computer programs become more and more sophisticated … it becomes clear that a more
sophisticated test is required to serve the interests of justice and the goals of copyright laws.”1351
The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, I briefly survey the originality standard as it
developed across jurisdictions. Originality is not a coherent concept. It varies between different
systems of law, reflecting local cultural and legal norms.1352 As with many other legal concepts,
originality is a living and breathing concept, adapting and evolving over time.1353 I will contend
that the originality standard should apply to all creations without discriminating between humans
and non-humans. Abbott agrees, stating that “it should be irrelevant whether the content comes
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Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, ibid at 32.
Edward Lee, “Digital Originality” (2012) 14 Vand J Ent & Tech 920 at 924; Joseph S Miller, “Hoisting
Originality” (2009) 31 Cardozo L R 451 at 457-463 [Miller, Hoisting Originality]. Miller and Abbott are relying on
patent law and non-obviousness requirements. Harrison expresses similar views suggesting tweaking Feist’s modicum
of creativity, introducing the “modicum-times-2”, which “might be articulated as ‘requiring more than minimal
expertise, skill, taste, or judgment’ and that the work be ‘capable of being distinguished from other ordinary objects’.”
See Jeffrey L Harrison, “Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright” (2004) 32 Hofstra L
Rev 853 at 867. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 427, ties between the level of originality (and creativity) to
copyright protection.
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Wu, supra note 14 at 134.
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Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 94, explain, “it is worth bearing in mind that, whatever test is applied, the
question of whether a work is original inevitably depends on the particular culture, social, and political context in
which the judgement is made … what is seen as original may change over time.”
1353
Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (New York: Clarendon Press,
1994).
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from a person or machine, or particular type of machine.”1354 We should, therefore, develop a new
standard for originality based on the concept of creativity.1355 Second, I will explore the “enigma”
of machine creativity, challenging the misconceptions about the “inferiority” of machines works.
Finally, I will discuss the element of intent as a factor in originality and authorship. I will argue
that, given current developments in computer-generated works, intent should be deemed irrelevant
for establishing originality.
This chapter also provides the basis for my concluding arguments in Part IV, which is the
final part of my dissertation.
3.4.1

Framing Originality

3.4.1.1 The Legal Standard
The standard of originality goes back a long way. Vaver provides that for a work to be considered
original it must “(a) originate from its author, (b) not be copied, and (c) involve more than trivial
or mechanical intellectual effort.”1356 Novelty “in the sense of the patent law is not required.”1357
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Abbott, Everything is Obvious, supra note 806 at 27.
The US Feist creativity approach to originality, though promising, still does not provide sufficient reasoning.
Regrettably, SCOTUS has not taken the necessary leap forward in developing the concept of creativity, which is vital
to the originality standard. The SCC ruling in CCH represents an important step in the right direction.
1356
Vaver, supra note 237 at 100. Except where the work is so simple that the expression and the idea are merged.
See Morrissey v Procter & Gamble Co, 379 F (2d) 675 (1st Cir 1967); Durham, supra note 939 at 622: “If there is
only one way, or a few ways, to express an idea or to communicate a fact, so that exclusive rights to the expression
would effectively preempt the idea or the fact, then ‘merger’ is said to apply and the expression is uncopyrightable.”
1357
Vaver, ibid; See e.g. Medforms Inc v Healthcare Management Solutions Inc, 290 F (3d) 98 (2nd Cir 2002); Urantia
Foundation, supra note 1020; See also Nimmer, Nimmer On Copyright, supra note 1253 at § 2.01[A] (2-7): “Although
in some early copyright cases, the distinction was not recognized, it is now clearly established, both as a matter of
congressional intent and judicial construction, that the originality necessary to support a copyright merely calls for
independent creation, not novelty […].” Nimmer further explains that “originality in the copyright sense means only
that the work owes its origin to the author … is independently created, and not copied from other works.” Nimmer,
Nimmer On Copyright, ibid § 2.01[A] (2-9).
1355
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Creativity1358 is an important criterion, though its importance varies by jurisprudence. Bridy
explains that “[a] work is creative if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual labor.”1359
The originality debate is divided into two main factions: supporters of the UK’s “sweat of
the brow” (and much pre-Feist US’s) criteria on the one hand, generally represented by Lockean
labour theory; and those supporting the creativity-oriented criteria on the other.1360 Between these
two, the SCC has chosen a third way, commonly known as the “skill and judgment” approach.1361
From a natural rights perspective, the requirement of originality is one that “merely reflects
the premise that copyright ought to protect the personality of authors as expressed in their
work.”1362 According to this view, there is no justification for copyright protection without traces
of personality. The utilitarian perspective, on the other hand, justifies the protection of works that
would have not been produced without providing incentives to authors to create.1363 These
incentives are usually reflected by the financial benefit (“copyright tax”) to authors from acquiring
their creations for a limited time. However, as Bently and Sherman observe, the legal tests for
originality “do not reflect with precision any particular theoretical perspective”, though it seems
that they have influenced the development of the originality standard.1364
Seeking a common ground for originality might be deemed unnecessary, excruciating, and
perhaps impossible. Even under the current standard, Litman explains, applying originality is very
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Without creativity, there can be no work of art. See e.g. Gardenia Flowers Inc v Joseph Markovits, Inc, 280 F
Supp 776 (SDNY 1968). This depends on what one means by “creativity”.
1359
Bridy, supra note 423 at 16.
1360
Creativity-oriented criteria are inspired both by SCOTUS (Feist, supra note 440) and the EU’s Software Directive,
supra note 641 at art 1(3) (the author’s own intellectual creation).
1361
Craig, supra note 489 at 104. Vaver, supra note 237 at 100 explains further that “[t]he intellectual effort required
for originality implies skill and judgment in expressing an idea, namely, using one’s ‘knowledge, developed aptitude
or practised ability’ to decide how to produce a work from among available options. Mere industry or ‘sweat of the
brow’ is not enough; nor is creativity necessary.”
1362
Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 95.
1363
Ibid.
1364
Ibid at 96.
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difficult.1365 However, adopting a common originality standard has its advantages. First, a
generalized standard will contribute to coherence among different nations and states, “both
horizontally (treating different works according to a single standard) and vertically (in creating a
coherent relationship between standards of infringement and subsistence).”1366 Second, delving
into originality deliberations may create a better standard and have a bearing on the ongoing debate
concerning the balance between an author’s rights and the public domain (as reflected by the
struggle between the “sweat of the brow” and creativity approaches). Drassinower further offers
that the common standard for originality takes balance into account; however, “balance is both
insufficient and counterproductive as a category grounding the transition” (i.e., from labour to
authorship).1367 Third, the current low and vague standard for originality is no longer acceptable:
“[T]he concept of originality is a poor substitute for tangible boundaries among parcels of
intellectual property because it inherently unascertainable.”1368
Originality could serve as the “valve” for AI copyright. From a normative perspective,
copyright bars should be decided on merit – an objective standard as Yanisky-Ravid and VelezHernandez suggest – and not on conceptual beliefs that deny AI any legal rights. By adopting a
consistent standard for originality, we may develop a better system for allocating rights on that
basis.
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Litman, supra note 994 at 975: “the principle of limiting copyright protection to only those aspects of a work that
are original with its author, while remarkably easy to state, proves to be impossible to apply.”
1366
Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 99.
1367
Drassinower, supra note 442 at 57. Drassinower suggests that the current model of copyright protection (the
“balance model”) is insufficient, stating that “both Feist and CCH propose the transition in the name of balance. Yet
balance is both insufficient and counterproductive as a category grounding the transition.” Ibid at 219. Drassinower
argues for the development of a new model – the dialogue model – which, “by contrast, centers its attention on the
distinction between a thing (whether tangible or intangible) and an act. It sees copyright as juridical protection of the
integrity of an author’s choice whether to publish or not. Its starting point is thus the specificity of a work of authorship
as a communicative act.” Ibid at 225-6.
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Litman, supra note 994 at 1004.
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The originality standard might serve another purpose as well. The principal test for
machine intelligence is the Turing test, which aims to distinguish between humans and AI or robots
by assessing the responses of the test subject to given questions. The originality standard can
piggy-back on this test, using it as a creativity standard to seek out whether it is possible to
differentiate between human and AI creations. If the test cannot ascertain which is which, it might
serve to strengthen the AI’s authorship claim.
Highlighting several key assumptions is important. First, this discussion assumes copyright
law would retain its current principles, at least in the short run – an assumption scholars have
challenged. In a world without copyright, no originality standard is needed. Further, the originality
standard might be weakening under the no authorship model I have suggested and maybe even
become irrelevant.
Second, under the AI authorship model, in which the AI is recognized as the author, the
originality standard would either become as important as today or, as I suggested, more important.
Third, under any other model – programmer, user or AI authorship – machine creativity is an
essential element in the authorship discussion and should be addressed properly.
3.4.1.2 Original and Inconsistent
Originality is a multicultural standard with different colours and tones across continents and states.
The basic structure and substance are similar, but on the creativity scale, there are variations. The
US, the UK, the EU, Canada, and Israel reflect these changes. Thus, I will briefly describe each
state’s originality model. This discussion opens the way to the following chapter in which I will
further develop the concept of creativity.
The US Copyright Act of 1976 states that “copyright protection subsists … in original
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works of authorship.”1369 In the Trademark Cases, SCOTUS “limited ‘writings’ as found in the
Copyright Clause in the US Constitution to ‘only such as are original and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind’.”1370 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v Sarony,1371 SCOTUS further
defined copyright as “the exclusive right of a man to the production of his genius or intellect.”1372
In Burrow-Giles, the court constructed a broader definition for the concepts of “author” and
“writing”, stating that writings mean the literary productions of those authors and “include all
forms of writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression.”1373
Hence, an “author” is one “to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who
completes a work of science or literature.”1374 The landmark decision of Burrow-Giles shaped the
legal boundaries of authorship and established the “dichotomy between creative work and
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Copyright Law of the United States, supra note 627 § 102(a). Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note
1348 at 24, observe that “the congressional intent behind the Copyright Act was to leave the originality concept
undefined in order to clear the path for courts to maintain their existing standards of originality.”
1370
Bridy, supra note 423 at 9. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 US 82 (1879) at 94: “The ordinary trademark has no
necessary relation to invention or discovery. The trademark recognized by the common law is generally the growth of
a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It is often the result of accident, rather than design, and
when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither originality, invention, discovery,
science, nor art is in any way essential to the right conferred by that act. If we should endeavor to classify it under the
head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this as in regard to inventions, originality is required.
And while the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings,
prints, &c., it is only such as are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The
trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the
party using it.”
1371
Burrow-Giles, supra note 715.
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Ibid at 54-60: “Plaintiff is a lithographer, and defendant a photographer ... [T]he plaintiff … under an agreement
with Oscar Wilde, became and was the author, inventor, designer, and proprietor of the photograph in suit, the title of
which is Oscar Wilde … and that said plaintiff made the same at his place of business … [F]rom his own original
mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression,
and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he produced the picture in
suit.”
1373
Ibid at 58.
1374
Ibid.
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mechanical labor” in the US.1375
In Bleistein,1376 Alfred Bell & Co v Catalda Fine Arts Inc,1377 and Ansehl v Puritan
Pharmaceutical Co,1378 the originality standard “reached a low watermark.”1379 In Bell, the court
explained that “an ‘original’ in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work
‘owes its origin’ to the ‘author’. No large measure of novelty is necessary,”1380 even in a situation
in which the author would depart substantially from the paintings and this diversion would be
inadvertent – the new work would be copyrightable: “A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable
variations.”1381
In Ansehl, the court relied on Justice Holmes’ opinion in Bleistein1382 and concluded that a
work “requires very little originality, indeed, to render proposed advertising matter copyrightable
… The tendency of the modern cases is to increase rather than to restrict the subject matter of
copyright.” The court then quoted Copinger’s Law of Copyright,1383 stating that “the artistic work
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Bridy, supra note 423 at 11. Bridy further explains that “according to the court’s reasoning … the machine taking
the picture mediated but neither negated nor co-opted the process of artistic production, which could be traced quite
directly back to the governing consciousness and sensibility of the photographer, the person behind the lens who posed
the subject just so and altered the lighting just so.”
1376
Bleistein, supra note 1018.
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are, by itself, copyright protected (i.e., not only a mere copy of the paintings). The court reflects on the “originality”
of those engravings.
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Ibid at para 2.
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Bleistein, supra note 1018 at 251: “Again, the act, however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters are not
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(6th ed, 1927).
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must be ‘original’, but this means no more than that the work must not be copied from another
artistic work of the same character.”1384
These decisions contributed to the confusion surrounding the originality standard in the
US. The task of shaping originality and providing essential clarity ultimately fell to SCOTUS in
Feist Publication, Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co.1385
Feist is considered the most important and influential decision in the US on the concept of
originality (and maybe even copyright), “hailed both as a landmark decision and a legal
‘bomb’.”1386 In Feist, the court considered whether the white pages of a telephone directory1387 –
or any such compilation of facts – are original and thus deserve copyright protection. The court
clarified that “original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”1388 Justice O’Connor relied heavily on the BurrowGiles definition of the author as the person to whom we owe the origin of a work.1389 However,
SCOTUS extended the originality definition of Burrow-Giles to include creativity, even if only a
minimal degree.1390
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Copinger, supra note 936 at 75. It should be noted that there were other cases that required a higher standard for
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Bridy, supra note 423 at 16. Bridy further offers that in this case, “the Seventh Circuit echoes Bell’s conclusion that
novelty in the patent sense is not required in copyright law; however, the court pointedly teases apart the concepts of
originality and creativity, thus departing from Bell’s unitary focus on originality and its conflation of two discrete
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deserve copyright protection, Feist, supra note 440 at 347-8: “It is this bedrock principle of copyright that mandates
the law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual compilations. ‘No one may claim originality as to facts.’
... This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and
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Under UK copyright law the originality bar is very low. The CDPA provides that
“copyright is a property right which subsists … in the following descriptions of work – (a) original
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.”1391 Hence, establishing originality requires that the
work of the author is not a copy and that the work will be “the result of [the author’s] ‘labour, skill
and judgment’” and constitutes an individual’s effort.1392 The UK’s originality standard does “not
require original or inventive thought, but only that the work should not be copied and should
originate from the author.”1393
Bently and Sherman explain that “the amount of ‘labour, skill, and judgement’ must be
‘substantial’ – or at least not trivial.”1394 However, labour by itself cannot satisfy the originality
standard and “it is clear that the reason why tracing and photocopying do not produce original
works is not that there is no labour; rather, it is that it is not the right type of labour.”1395
In Walter v Lane,1396 the House of Lords granted copyright protection to a note-taking
process because it “required an ‘industrious collection’ effort.”1397 In University of London Press
Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd,1398 the court gave a basic, ambiguous definition of originality
which required an author only to prove that the work is not a copy of something else. In Sawkins
v Hyperion, the court stated that “a work need only be ‘original’ in the limited sense that the author

discovery: the first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered
its existence. To borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its ‘maker’ or ‘originator.’… The same
is true of all facts – scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day […].”
1391
CDPA, s 1(1). There is no need for originality in entrepreneurial works (films, sound recording, broadcasts and
typographical arrangements).
1392
Bently & Sherman, supra note 406 at 93; Dorotheou, supra note 423 at 85-93. See e.g. Ascot Jockey Club Ltd v
Simons, [1968] 64 WWR 411, 56 CPR 122 (BCSC); Ladbroke, supra note 743.
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Ibid, quotes Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Wilf Gilbert (Staffs) Ltd, [1994] FSR 723 (Ch D.).
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Bently & Sherman, ibid at 97. See also Merchandising Corporation v Harpbond, [1983] FSR 32.
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Bently & Sherman, ibid at 98.
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[1900] AC 539 (HL (Eng)) (discussed under “author” and not “original”); See also Morris v Ashbee (1868) LR 7
Eq 34, and Kelly v Morris (1866) LR 1 Eq 697 as quoted in Gervais, supra note 440, footnote 51.
1397
Gervais, supra note 440 at 958.
1398
University of London Press Ltd, supra note 743.
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originated it by his efforts rather than slavishly copying it from the work produced by the efforts
of another person.”1399
The UK’s “sweat of the brow” approach may not (and should not) endure foreseeable
changes in copyright. As Vaver offers, “In deciding on originality, courts should realize the value
judgment they are being asked to make: Has the author spent enough intellectual effort on the
product to deserve protection from others’ copying it for his lifetime and another fifty years beyond
that?”1400 I accede to Vaver’s notion of intellectual effort. Copyright should be awarded, from a
normative perspective, only to creators that show an intellectual effort in their work. Mechanical,
“simple” works should not reward the creator copyright protection, and we should not regard such
works as original under copyright law.1401
EU-UK relations were always difficult. ECJ’s rulings – most significantly Infopaq –
“illustrate a certain British resistance to accepting CJEU jurisprudence tout court.”1402 Though, as
Bently and Sherman offer, in Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater, UK courts were inclined
to adopt the EU Infopaq ruling.1403 Dorotheou views the situation differently, claiming that these
decisions have not changed the UK treatment of originality, at least not yet.1404
With the coming Brexit, it remains to be seen whether the UK will retreat to its laxer
originality standard, adopt the EU model or formulate a new standard to bridge the differences
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[2005] 1 WLR 3281 at 3288.
Vaver, supra note 237 at 101.
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It is true that in recent decades, copyright protection has been granted to authors and creators for what might be
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between the EU and the UK.1405 A return to the “skill, labour or judgment” standard “would depend
as well on how UK courts will apply originality after Brexit.”1406
Harmonization and integration among EU member states have always been considered a
key objective in the EU’s aspirations to constitute a Eurotopia,1407 and “[d]uring the 1990s, it
became clear that copyright was to play a pivotal role in this respect.”1408 Until not long ago, the
development of copyright law was placed under the jurisdiction of the national law of each member
of the EU.1409
Concerning copyright protection, many argue that originality should play a significant role
in harmonization among EU members.1410 However, there is no general standard for originality
among members, and the originality concept varies between continental approaches and the UK’s
“labour, skill and judgment” standard.1411
The EU’s Software Directive provides the general guideline for EU originality, stating that
a computer program would be considered original if “it is the author’s own intellectual
creation.”1412 The Database Directive and the Term Directive address EU originality as well,1413
1405
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using similar terms to the one that the Software Directive uses, emphasizing the author’s own
intellectual creation. Reading the Term Directive in context brings Guadamuz to conclude that
“not only does the author need to be human, the copyright work must reflect the author’s
personality.”1414
In the landmark Infopaq1415 decision, the ECJ, in reciting the Software Directive, held that
this criterion applies to all types of copyright subject matter.1416 Infopaq provides a gloomy
prospect for EU AI authorship. By adhering to a higher originality standard (even compared to
other EU members) that is based on the author’s “own intellectual creation”, it is less likely that
computer-generated or AI works would be deemed original in the near future.1417
The ECJ has followed this decision in subsequent cases as well.1418 In Painer, for example,
the court clarifies the meaning of “author’s own intellectual creation” by saying that “the author
was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by making free and creative
choices.”1419 In these cases, the ECJ has adopted a continental approach to originality based on the
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author’s intellectual creation not only for subject matters defined in EU directives (such as
computer programs, databases, or photographs) but for other creative works as well.1420
Under Canadian copyright law, the SCC determined in CCH1421 that for a work to be
considered original, the work “must be more than a mere copy of another work.”1422 However, the
work does not need to be creative “in the sense of being novel or unique.”1423 Hence, copyright
protection requires proving “an exercise of skill and judgment.”1424 The decision, as Vaver
explains, “required an intellectual effort that involved the exercise of skill and judgment beyond
the mechanical or trivial.”1425
The concept of originality in Canada has shifted from the traditional “sweat of the brow”
standard toward that of “skill and judgement.”1426 The SCC refused to side with “either school by
invoking a vision of the purpose of copyright as a ‘balance’ between ‘promoting the public interest’
and ‘obtaining a just reward for the creator’.”1427 However, former SCC Chief Justice McLachlin
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argued for a lower bar of originality than Feist, stating that “I would not, however, go as far as
O’Connor J […] in requiring that a work possess a minimal degree of creativity to be considered
original.”1428 The SCC might abandon the UK conceptual “sweat of the brow” standard but seems
reluctant to “go all the way” in adopting the US creativity requirements.
Israel’s originality standard inclines more toward Feist than CCH. Up until 2007, Israel’s
copyright law was governed by the UK 1911 Copyright Act and, thus, Israel was considered the
last “colony” to operate under the jurisdiction and influence of British copyright laws.1429 During
that time, Israel’s Supreme Court had taken an activist role that eventually shaped Israel’s
copyright perceptions; this enabled the formulation and adoption of a new Copyright Act and,
subsequently, the departure from the imperial grip of the UK copyright regime.1430
In 2007, Israel’s parliament enacted a new copyright law.1431 The 2007 Act does not define
originality, stating that copyright protection “shall subsist in … original works which are literary
works, artistic works.”1432 Hence, the Supreme Court decisions that precede the 2007 Act are still
the most relevant source for understanding originality under Israeli copyright law. Birnhack, Neil
Wilkof, and Joshua Weisman provide that “[a]ccording to the case law, a work is only to be
regarded as original if (i) it originated with the author (as opposed to being copied), (ii) it embodies
the author’s labor, and (iii) it is (minimally) creative. All three elements must be present.”1433
In the landmark Interlego decision, the court rejected the “sweat of the brow” approach
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and adopted the US Feist model.1434 Former Chief Justice Meir Shamgar held that original “means
that the creativity is the fruit of the creator’s intellectual effort, not that it is novel over existing
works.”1435 In a later case, the court explicitly stated that Israel’s copyright law “accepted [an
approach that] conditions copyright protection on the presence of a minimal degree of creativity
and rejects protection of a work based purely on labour. This approach is based on the leading rule
established in the United States in Feist.”1436 Not only has the originality definition not changed
upon adoption of the 2007 Act, but a recent Supreme Court decision has re-embraced the Interlego
Feist ruling.1437
3.4.2

The “Enigma” Machine

3.4.2.1 The Concept of Creativity
The concept of creativity is important, perhaps essential, to the development of originality, and is
actively debated.1438 Recent attempts to define creativity, however, have not proven sufficient and,
“[f]or more than a century, the threshold for creativity has purposefully been kept at a minimal
level.”1439
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We consider a work creative “if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual labor.”1440
Determining a “modest amount” is harder than it seems, though. Maybe we should apply Justice
Stewart’s approach to obscurity, to creativity: “I know it [creativity] when I see it.”1441
Margaret Boden observes that while we could disagree “about whether some ideas, or
person, is creative” it would be hard to deny that “creativity does, sometimes, happen[s]” though
how it happens is puzzling.1442 In seeking to define what is creativity, “[w]e shall see that creativity
is not a single ability, or talent, any more than intelligence is. Nor it is confined to a chosen
few.”1443 Indeed, defining creativity is difficult, as “creativity is not the same as novelty. A work
may be indistinguishable from its predecessors, but still creative and original, so long as the
similarity is ‘fortuitous, not the result of copying’.”1444
Developing creativity as a legal concept, as Nimmer suggested, “is purely a matter of
policy.”1445 Shaping the concept of originality by adopting a higher creativity standard might be
the right move, but we must approach the issue with caution, keeping in mind Justice Holmes’s
warning in Bleistein that “it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations […] At the one
extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.”1446
Creative ideas, as stated by Kaufman and Sternberg, “must represent something different,
new or innovative”, be “of high quality”, and be “appropriate to the task at hand or some
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redefinition of that task.”1447 Robert Weisberg suggested we define creativity as “goal-directed”,
in contrast to Durham’s1448 argument for an accidental “clap of a thunder” creation, which cannot
be defined as creative.1449
Gervais’ approach to legal creativity is based on the author’s creative choice, and “is not
dictated by the function of the work, the method or technique used, or by applicable standards or
relevant ‘good practice.’ Conversely, purely arbitrary or insignificant selection is still insufficient;
a conscious, human choice still must be made, even though it may be irrational.”1450 As Gervais
points out, however, one controversial element of the legal definition for creativity “is the
exclusion of choices dictated by the function of the work. This, in fact, is very close to the test of
‘practical inevitability’ in Feist: if function dictates the course to be followed, there is no room for
creativity.”1451
Kwall’s approach follows that of Gervais but taking a more practical path. Kwall
recommends a statutory originality standard “that depends upon ‘substantial creativity’”,1452 but
exempts certain subjects that are typically “characterized by low levels of creativity, thus raising
the bar in a transparent manner.”1453
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Kwall’s statement that an “originality determination should not be made to depend entirely
on the judge’s subjective perception”,1454 is in line with previous scholarship emphasizing the
problems arising from judge’s injecting personal creativity biases into decisions.1455 In Kwall’s
words, “I would prefer to see an approach that is more nuanced and capable of greater creativity
in application.”1456
Joseph Miller presents another approach:1457 Adopting patent law characteristics to define
the creative segment of originality by “draw[ing] on patent law’s non-obviousness requirement –
with its focus on departure from conventional wisdom as the mark of a protectable invention – to
dissolve the sterile dichotomy between near-total abdication and orthodox aesthetics that Holmes
posed in Bleistein.”1458
Michael Madison’s approach to copyright is a mechanism for disseminating and producing
knowledge.1459 He argues that “as creativity law, copyright is oversold. The ubiquity of copyright
and the ubiquity of creativity suggest that society has more creativity than it needs … copyright
should be reconsidered as a species of knowledge law.”1460
As already introduced, Parchomovsky and Stein’s creativity model aims to “calibrate[…]s
authors’ protection and liability to the originality level of their works.”1461 Under it, “authors of
highly original works will not only receive greater protection, but will also be sheltered from
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liability if sued for infringement by owners of preexisting works.”1462
In Feist, SCOTUS opined that establishing creativity “seems to require not just ‘work of
the brain’ but an exercise of the imagination – the formation of a mental conception ultimately
given tangible expression in a work of authorship.”1463 Creativity appears, rather, to require some
“work of the brain,” or “intellectual labor”.1464
Feist’s creativity concept might also hint at novelty. In Feist, a telephone directory was
found to lack creativity for being “entirely typical”, “garden-variety”, and “an age-old practice,
firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of
course.”1465 The court added that establishing creativity requires a “spark of creativity” that might
be “crude, humble or obvious”.1466 Criticizing the “spark” requirement, Clifford suggests that
“creativity does not usually represent a startling break-through of new thoughts as, more often, it
results from the reworking of pre-existing ideas and facts.”1467
The court in Feist appeared reluctant to provide a clear definition for creativity, stating that
“originality is not a stringent standard; it does not require that facts be presented in an innovative
or surprising way” and that “the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or
routine.”1468
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While the court distinguished the US’s approach to creativity – maintaining its importance
in the originality equation – from the UK’s “sweat of the brow” doctrine. Feist does not, however,
take the necessary extra leap to establish what creativity is, making it “virtually impossible to
discern […] where on the spectrum between the surprising and the routine to locate the break
between eligible and ineligible subject matter.”1469
Feist stated that creativity is important for establishing originality1470 but was reluctant to
define creativity beyond general remarks. It seems that the court only ended “the long division
among federal circuits concerning the protection under copyright of factual compilations.”1471
Clifford argues, for example, that following the decision, courts misinterpreted Feist’s language
by “expecting a level of creativity worthy of Beethoven before the work will pass intellectual
creativity.”1472 Canada’s Supreme Court in CCH tried to provide a clearer path to creativity but
with little success. The SCC’s originality definition explicitly omitted requirements for creativity,
leaving “skill and judgment and the omission of labour … to activities performable only by
humans.”.1473
In Part IV, I will offer my thoughts regarding the AI authorship standard. At this point, my
vision for an AI authorship model includes creativity as an important criterion, in contrast to CCH.
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3.4.2.2 Creative Machines
Creative machines pose significant challenges for originality. Any AI authorship standard would
require establishing if interactions with machines could produce “a pattern of output that would be
considered creative or original if done by a human being.”1474
This part discusses a machine’s ability to express creativity. I do not address other
intriguing questions such as a machine’s ability to appreciate creativity. This argument belongs to
earlier parts where I discussed the Turning test.1475
Machines and other computer programs are generating content – music, artwork and
literature – that, would likely be considered original if produced by humans. Current originality
standards, however, label machine creativity as inferior, slavish versions of human works. As
Ginsburg and Budiardjo argue, “[n]o machine is itself a source of creativity … Every unanticipated
machine output arises directly from some human instruction programmed into the machine.”1476
Machine creativity could differ from human creativity and yet be creative itself.
Furthermore, even in perceiving machine works today as unworthy of copyright protection lacking
in creative design, future human perceptions might change to increase machine creation’s value
(as happened with human creators that were only appreciated years after they died).
The unequal treatment between machine and computer output is even more substantial in
involuntary creations. The low bar for originality and creativity for human works was highlighted
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in the US’s Bell and Israel’s Qimron decisions. In Bell, Justice Frank remarked that “[a] copyist’s
bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield
sufficiently distinguishable variations.”1477
In Qimron, Israel’s Supreme Court granted copyright protection to Qimron’s work –
uniting and deciphering the pieces of the Dead Sea Scrolls – despite being no different from what
a machine could do.1478 Undoubtedly, the court would have reached a different outcome under
current legal standards if the same process would have been performed by a computer.
Given expected developments in AI, we are likely to see more and more works that express
random or involuntary creation without programmers dictating the parameters of such creation.
These works would probably exhibit creativity, but I fear it would not be protected under the
current standard of originality. As Boyden observes, computer-generated works with no human
impact challenge copyright law in two ways: First, excluding a machine’s creation from copyright
protection goes against the non-discriminatory principle in copyright law: “copyright protection
should not depend on judicial determinations of artistic merit.”1479 Second, there is no need to
prove a connection “between acts of authorship and the creative elements present in the work.”1480
Recognizing machine creativity could also hasten the forsaking of romantic perceptions
about creativity since, “[i]f the source of creativity is superhuman or divine, or if it springs
inexplicably from some special human genius, computers must be utterly irrelevant.”1481
Bridy further explains that “[i]f we define creativity as a quintessentially human faculty,
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then computers can never be authors, and we can basically stop there. But if we define creativity
alternatively as a set of traits or behaviors, then maybe creativity can be coded.”1482 Indeed,
“creativity isn’t a special faculty, possessed only by a tiny Romantic elite. Rather, it’s a feature of
human intelligence in general.”1483
One of the reasons to avoid romantic perceptions about creativity is that, as with other
human traits, we still do not understand human creativity. Many philosophers “argue that no
naturalistic explanation of any of our psychological capacities is possible … In short, the
philosophical respectability of ‘strong’ AI, and of cognitive science in general, is hotly
disputed.”1484 Accordingly, arguments about creativity are difficult to prove.1485
I argue that we can – and should – accept that machines can express creativity. However,
not all machine’s (as not all human’s) output can and should be described as creative. As with the
“missing something” arguments that seek to exclude AIs simply because of their inability to
possess human elements, we should avoid adopting similar arguments regarding intelligence and
creativity.1486 For example, when a program, like Microsoft Excel, “applies a known body of
knowledge to solve problems with known solutions in a predictable fashion” it is not innovative
or creative. However, when a machine “is given unpublished clinical data on patent genetics and
actual drug responses, and tasked with determining whether a drug works for a genetic mutation
in a way that has not yet been recognized” it should be considered innovative and creative and
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awarded legal protection accordingly, human or non-human alike.1487
Nancy Andreasen’s long study on human creativity might help us understand creativity
better.1488 Andreasen sought to decipher this elusive mystery: What makes certain people more
creative than others? Through brain scans and interviews, she examined creative people from
different fields, which led to her establishing interesting conclusions about the creative human
mind.
Andreasen outlined earlier studies on intelligence and creativity, including Lewis Terman’s
extensive IQ study.1489 Although Terman’s subjects grew up to become well established, having
high salaries and a happy life, their high IQs did not predict high levels of creative achievement
later in life. Only a few made significant creative contributions to society.”1490 Terman’s study,
reinforced by subsequent research, refutes the connection between intelligence and creativity:
High intelligence does not have a significant effect on creativity.
Andreasen describes several alternative approaches to predicting creativity, in the absence
of an intelligence-based explanation. First, is the “little c” approach: a quantitative assessment of
creativity. The little c approach uses tests to score people’s capacity to be creative. For example,
subjects would be asked to answer the question, “How many uses can you think of for a brick?” A
person would score high results if he or she came up with many different responses (which the
little c approach labels as a person with “divergent thinking”). Higher scores equal greater creative
potential. Given the difficulties already discussed above in defining creativity, and that certain
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assumptions about creativity must be accepted (for example that creativity can be measured using
tests), the little c approach is a weak approach to creativity assessment.
Second is the “duck test” where “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be
a duck”. This approach relies on a selective group of well-established, creative and accomplished
individuals. However, as with the little c approach, the duck test is facing criticism due to its
inherent subjectivity. The duck test relies on personal taste and is time-sensitive due to evolving
standards and artistic value. Further, creativity might vary between different fields (e.g., creativity
in the arts might not be equated with creativity in science or business).1491
In searching for human creativity, Andreasen finds that “creative people [from both groups
– scientists and artists] have shown stronger activations in their association cortices during all four
tasks than the controls have.”1492 Andreasen explains that creative people are autodidacts,
polymaths, and persistent. Their creativity happens in unusual moments like an afternoon nap or a
shower. Creative people also seem to have a broad interest in many fields and areas and are
adventurous risk-takers.
Andreasen further establishes a connection between mental illness and creativity: “The
creative subjects and their relatives have a higher rate of mental illness than the controls and their
relatives do […] The most common diagnoses include bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety or
panic disorder, and alcoholism.”1493 As Theseus said in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s
Dream play, “The lunatic, the lover, and the poet Are of imagination all compact.”1494
While Andreasen’s studies explore human creativity, Boden focuses on machine creativity.
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Boden offers a roadmap for machine creativity by distinguishing between psychological (P) and
historical (H) creativity.1495 While P creativity “is one that’s new to the person who generated it.
It doesn’t matter how many times, if any, other people have had that idea before”, H creativity “is
one that is P-creative and has never occurred in history before.”1496 For example, Harold Cohen’s
AARON program, which generates drawings, might be considered H creative.1497 However, even
if it does, it might still not be considered creative under copyright standards. As Ginsburg and
Budiardjo explain in analyzing AARON’s program: “[T]he ability of these machines to generate
outputs ‘on their own’ does not justify the logical leap to the concept of “machine authorship’.”1498
Machine creativity is inspired by the different ways in which human creativity occurs:
combination, exploration or transformation. Combinational creativity means producing unfamiliar
combinations of familiar ideas (creating collage or mimicry parrots). Exploratory creativity vests
on “culturally accepted style of thinking, or ‘conceptual space’,” which “is defined (and
constrained) by a set of generative rules” (style of painting or a national cuisine).1499
Transformative creativity is altering the style or space by changing its defining elements, resulting
in new ideas that could not be generated before. Boden prefers transformational creativity since
“it can give rise to ideas that are not only new but fundamentally different from any that went
before. As such, they are often highly counterintuitive.”1500
Combinational creativity is most complex for machines. AI can make novel combinations
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from existing data. But it is difficult to “generate and prune these combinations in such a way that
most, or even many, of them are interesting – that is, valuable.”1501 The challenge is that machines
or computer programs lack human’s vast cultural and world knowledge that often is involved in
the process.
AI could develop innovative algorithms, like The Deep Blue program that beat Kasparov
or the AI program that won the Chinese Go game. But no AI system today has the vast knowledge,
developed concepts and richness of a human being.
Explanatory creativity could be modified for AI if the relevant rules and styles are specified
clearly on. Boden claims that in comparison to combinational creativity, explanatory creativity
proved a greater success, as “the computer comes up with results that are comparable to those of
highly competent, sometimes even superlative, human professionals.”1502
Human scientists not only explored different fields and subjects, but also transformed these
fields. Will AI be able to do that?
I share Boden’s view that it is misleading to claim that computers can only follow strict
programming code and instructions. A computer “can do only what the program enables it to do.
But if its programmer could explicitly tell it what to do, there’d be no bugs – and no ‘world-class’
color prints from AARON surpassing the handmade productions of Cohen himself.”1503 By
enabling randomness in its code and the ability to make changes, we could enable programs to
exceed its original programming.1504
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These changes and adaptations might not suffice to deem an AI creative, at least by human
standards, but with progress in big-data and deep-learning, AI might develop ways to process
different styles and vast knowledge,1505 and subsequently, as Boden opines, a “program may
include rules for changing itself.”1506 Ginsburg and Budiardjo, however, are not convinced. For
them even the “more sophisticated ‘learning’ models which we may not precisely understand or
supervise … does not change … [the] initial conclusion that machines are not ‘creative’.”1507
Boden, Andreasen, Abbott and others offer a broader view on creativity and intelligence
and pose intriguing questions about developing creative AI and defining machine creativity. If we
assume machine creativity might develop in a similar way to human creativity, then we might
consider Andreasen’s observations on creativity.
As I suggested, developing randomness and intuition in AI’s codes might produce similar
results in human creativity. Herbert Simon, for example, concluded that since humans and
machines share a similar decision-making process, intuition could – theoretically – be
programmed.1508 For ethical reasons, we should not design AI with inherent mental illness, but we
can try to impose certain traits associated with human creativity.
Progress might be achieved when AI can process data from a broader spectrum of sources
developing what I described in Part I – artificial general intelligence. A different observation might
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result from studies about intelligence and creativity. It seems that even if AI can surpass the Turing
test and other criteria for intelligence, that does not mean AI would become creative under
Andreasen’s terms; nor would it be able to achieve transformative creativity under Boden’s terms.
Further, even if we could develop random patterns in AI, the courts might be reluctant to award
copyright to random creations anyway.1509
Alternatively, perhaps we should abandon the quest for creativity as part of the originalitycopyright standard both for human and non-human alike, and focus more on the process rather
than the outcome – leaving less room for human objectivities and artistic taste. In this regard,
maybe the right approach is to incorporate patent law novelty and non-obviousness requirement in
lieu of creative elements. I will further develop these ideas in Part IV.
The discussion I outlined in this chapter is fascinating, posing conflicting and intriguing
issues concerning creativity. However, when addressing the legal boundaries of copyright law,
which centred around the originality standard, one does not need to aspire for either Einstein’s or
Picasso’s “eureka”.
The legal definition for creativity is very limited and “a spark of creativity” – taking
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SCOTUS’ words in Feist – would satisfy originality in most cases and most countries. In other
jurisdictions, originality could be established even with a smidgen of creativity or no creativity at
all. However, this low creativity bar is for human creations only. Computer-generated and
machines require a higher standard to be deemed creative. These approaches are not normatively
justified, nor should we sustain these discriminatory standards for AI authorship.
3.4.2.3 Intentionality
On the outskirts of this discussion one issue remains – Should AI show intention in order to be
deemed an author? And if so, how could we possibly prove AI intention exists? Wu suggests that
intentionality is an important element for AI authorship: “If an AI cannot make value judgements
… then perhaps something is missing.”1510 However, intention and randomness might not coexist.
Thus, giving that randomness might prove important to AI creativity, the intent requirement for
authorship should be reconsidered.
Lawrence Becker distinguishes between works of art and other labour that is not the
product of an intellectual process. Becker suggests excluding “objects that we merely appropriate”
(like picking strawberries), incidental discoveries or unintentional by-products (such as an
unplanned child, Becker’s example not mine).1511 He suggests adopting a narrower conception for
the mental elements that are involved in the labour process. A thing, Becker offers, can constitute
authorship when it satisfies three conditions:1512
“(1) its causal history is traceable to (or through) the intentional states of an agent or
agents; (2) those agents, in the process of making their causal contribution to producing
the thing, are also creating or realizing their mental representations of it; (3) those
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representations either constitute the artifact itself (as when the ‘thing’ is an idea), or play
a substantial causal role in its production.”

Under condition 1, natural objects are excluded, while conditions 2 and 3 rule out mere physical
labour and fruitful accidents. Becker’s conditions emphasize causality and intentionality as crucial
elements for authorship, which are determined by the agent’s intentions and eventual mental
representations.1513
Following the Israel Supreme Court’s decision in Qimron, Nimmer offered to distinguish
between intent to create a work and intent to create a work of authorship, arguing that only a work
of authorship should be copyrightable.1514 Intentionality, Nimmer explains, is a vital part for
authorship: “Copyright protection arises only for works that reflect an intent to produce something
personal or subjective. By contrast, works that are objective, whether in fact or as presented, fail
to qualify as works of ‘authorship’ in the copyright sense.”1515
Both Becker and Nimmer emphasize intent (or intent to create) as vital for establishing
authorship. These positions, as I already explained, are difficult to reconcile with the current trends
in machine creativity. Maybe in the future, AI will develop consciousness, which encompasses
some level of intuition. However, this time might not come soon.
In his work, Zemer raises similar concerns regarding collective intentionality by the
public.1516 Zemer proposes observing the public “as having a collective intention to retain a right
in every copyrighted entity.”1517 Indeed, any AI authorship model would have to either forsake
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intent and causation requirements or shape its theories differently. As I already discussed, on the
surface, it seems difficult to develop an AI creative program that would both perform randomly –
which is an important element in developing machine creativity – and demonstrate intent.
Causation might prove to be even more difficult to determine. I criticized the GDPR for its
“right to explanation” for machine-learning algorithms, which is somewhat dubious in wording.1518
Many programmers expressed concern about these obligations, claiming that machine-learning
programs are intended to be sporadic and thus explaining that the process is considered a
significant challenge.1519 If programmers cannot explain how the AI program achieved certain
goals (as with the Chinese Go AI program) how can we prove causation for establishing
authorship?
On the other hand, programmers might enable coding AI to aspire to create a work of
authorship, i.e., coding the program to believe it is an author. However, even if this is possible in
theory, given AI’s inherent “hive mind” and collective abilities (as I explained in Part I, we can
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assume that any AI will share its knowledge with other AIs), individual intent would be even more
tricky (i.e., to prove specific AI intention to create a work of authorship). Zemer’s theory for
collective public intentionality could, however, be applicable to AI’s collective net.
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PART IV: NEW VISION FOR AI COPYRIGHT
“We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done” (Alan Turing)

4.1 THE AI AUTHOR
Who is the AI author? This question might be difficult to answer today. My dissertation offers
several alternative paths to AI authorship. All are possible, and all could change the way we
perceived our legal concepts and, subsequently, IP and copyright law. The AI author might turn to
be very much like the human author: Expressing creativity in a similar manner and thus, as I have
explained above, might be accorded the same legal protection as humans.
We should not expect changes to be abrupt and sudden. Every day we encounter new
innovative inventions and every day our computers learn to do something new. The process might
be slow or fast. We could reach singularity within the next five, thirty or hundred years. I do not
wish to engage in the futuristic discussion, my research aims to outline not only the legal
consequences of an AI author but also what might happen along the development way. As people
say, sometimes the journey is more important than the destination.
Allocating legal rights to AIs for their creations seem unprobeable at our current stage of
technological development.1520 As Samuelson and others suggested, in searching for the right
model for AI ownership, legal scholars offer several alternatives such as the AI user-authorship
model, derivative works, or WMFH doctrines. I discussed the supporting reasons for adopting
those models in Part III. I also explained why some of these models are better than others.
When I sat to write Part III, I had a very specific model for AI authorship in mind. At first,
I thought computer-generated programs should be awarded authorship, albeit limited in scope,
provided that its works are original and creative. I resented the fact that the concept of creativity
1520
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within copyright’s legal standard is limited and, as a pro-public domain scholar, I thought that by
awarding authorship to AIs, even early development of AIs (and subsequently limiting the
programmer’s and user’s copyright), AI could also serve as a new social instrument for improving
public access to works, music, and art.
That was a very optimistic vision. Delving into the scholarly papers, my ideas took a
different path. Given that AI is a very general concept (as I explained in Part I), crediting any
computer-generated work as an AI (or AI author) is not the right approach at present. There is a
bridge we must cross, and there are differences we must settle between diverse ideals for copyright
and different legal structures among many countries and jurisdictions.
There are, however, several conclusions to be drawn at that point. First, a programmer AIauthorship model is misguided and unwarranted – both from doctrinal and normative perspectives.
There is no reason to provide programmers (or companies) the same copyright protection in their
computer-generated or AI works. Programmers enjoy – and should continue to enjoy – patent
rights (if eligible) for their creations and should be able to enjoy copyright protection for a limited
time according to a more balanced model that takes the level of originality and sophistication of
the program into consideration.
Second, a user-authorship model for the interim period in computer-generated and pre-AIs
stages is a more reasonable and prudent approach. I share Samuelson’s argument that the user is
best positioned to deliver creations to the public and thus is more favourable for authorship at the
current level of development. I also agree with Yanisky-Ravid’s view on the importance of users
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in the next stages of development, which could serve as the “supervisors” of the AI program and
thus more suitable for ownership, albeit partially.1521
Third, on a theoretical level, joint authorship models between the programmers and users
might be applicable as well. However, on a practical level, I do not think this approach is
warranted. As I explained in Part III, there are many challenges in applying the joint authorship
model for user-programmer. If a joint model is indeed necessary or wanted – licences are a better
legal mechanism to implement such collaborations.
Fourth, moral rights can serve as a supplementary legal mechanism to support AI
authorship in the coming decade. I developed the moral rights model in Part II and III. I presented
the advantages of assigning moral rights to AI or the computer programs on two levels. First, with
computer-generated and AI automated creations (i.e., with no human influence), a limited set of
moral rights (like the right of attribution and the right of integrity) could prevent falsification or
exploitation of the digital works. Second, on the next level of development, when AI is able to
create independently and express some level of awareness and maybe even attachment to its
creations, moral rights might be justified on a normative level as with human authors.
Fifth, even if we do concede to one or two alternative models for AI authorship, there
might be still works that would not be fitted to those categories. However, this outcome should not
be considered as wrong, since those “authorless” works would serve a different and important
purpose – strengthening the public domain.
Indeed, the answer to the question of who the author is, might be “Its complicated”.
However, in bridging the legal history of computer development and IP we can provide some
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insights and predictions for the process of legal protection. As indicated, I share the understanding
that we should not expect a significant shift in copyright within the next decade. Having stated
that, I should also clarify that we should not read “significant” as “none”. On the contrary, I expect
changes which would establish that any non-human creation is indeed worthy of protection even
if created with no human influence. I believe that – either through the courts or by the legislators
– IP laws will recognize any computer-generated output (that is considered original under
copyright laws) as copyrightable per se.
Ownership is a different matter though. I believe copyright laws should be amended to a
user-favourable model, but I do not see that happening soon. I expect that in the coming years, the
ownership model would remain pretty much the same. Eventually, however, a user-authorship
model might be implemented as an interim legal mechanism for highly developed computer
programs (though not yet AIs). This could happen in the next decade.
In a practical sense, I do not expect significant changes to the current legal protection for
computer-generated output. This outcome is not desirable and should be challenged. One way to
enable a more inclusive approach to computer-generated and AI creations is to implement a data
policy that would enable uses of computer-generated creations for the public.
As I have outlined in Part III, data barriers expect to affect the development of AI and thus
governments should consider exempting data for AI training purposes.1522 However, any such
policy should also make sure to provide public access to AI creations that were created with these
data. A different result would further strengthen the major corporations, as well as limiting
competition and innovation in the field.
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One possible solution I presented in Part III is to create a royalty-based system that can
make sure that part of the revenue from AI companies and initiatives using the excepted data will
benefit the public. However, tracking the data in the process might be very difficult and even
unrealistic.
There are also other concerns with establishing a royalty-based system such as with
limiting user rights.1523 This is where new technologies might prove useful, as with the recent Earth
Bank of Codes.1524 The project is using blockchain technology to map and classify biological data
from every species and animal in the Amazon basin, coding their genetic sequences using
cryptography on the blockchain.
The blockchain data could be accessible to scientists and companies worldwide and, in
theory, would enable the tracing of the data, thereby creating platforms for a fairer system of
sharing and royalties. The Earth Bank of Codes project could be implemented on any data. Thus,
for example, we could register books, songs, pictures and any kind of IP on the blockchain, creating
a database for AI training purposes.
In the next chapter, I will further develop the AI standard. I believe that adopting a new
standard for copyright protection would serve copyright law better. Indeed, it is important to
differentiate between the different levels of development (i.e., not any computer should be
considered as an inventor or as an author).
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4.2 FORMULATING AN AI STANDARD
Building upon the last three parts, and the previous AI Author chapter, my next step is to revisit
the copyright standard. In Part III, I outlined the scholarly originality debate. I argued that two
important changes ought to be implemented (not necessarily linked to AI). One is a higher
originality and creativity-based standard; the second is bridging the originality gap between
jurisdictions.
There are several challenges in formulating a new standard for copyright. I addressed some
of those challenges earlier. However, there are also a few ideas presented recently that could
provide further insights that might enable a new vision for authorship. Further, it seems somewhat
likely that, without a higher originality bar, recognizing AIs as authors might create an imbalance
in copyright law given that more works would be awarded protection, dwindling the works
available for the public to enjoy.
4.2.1

Looking Back on the Doctrinal Challenges

As suggested in Part II, computer programs and copyright have never been a good match.1525 In
rethinking originality, we should distinguish between “simple” programs1526 and highly complex
and creative programs. Not all programs are the same and not all should be considered original
under copyright law. Copyright protection for basic programs “is not only a poor fit doctrinally,
but also in many ways normatively.”1527
Tailoring the right legal mechanism according to the levels of ingenuity and sophistication
would benefit developments in the field. In considering changes to copyright standard, we should
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also account for the length of protection afforded to computer programs. I have suggested that the
duration of copyright protection to computer programs should be limited. Further, we should also
assign copyright for creative programs, even if the author or inventor of the program is not human.
Indeed, as several scholars have suggested through the 1970s and 1990s, copyright law
might not be the best legal doctrine for computer programs. Stephen Breyer offers several reasons.
First, a significant difference between the production cost and the cost of copying “is not alone
sufficient to show that copyright protection is desirable.”1528 Second, the computer program
industry is flourishing without IP protection.1529 Third, no copyright protection is warranted due
to the customized nature of programs, which were tailor-made for specific needs.1530
Samuelson shows that Breyer’s conclusion is not far from the truth and most programs are
developed in-house for custom users in modern times.1531 It is also important to point out Breyer’s
claim that “much (but not all) systems software is now, and should continue to be, created by
hardware manufacturers and sold along with their hardware at a single price.”1532 Many of these
programs require “updates” and a user is “often buying services and expertise as much as he is
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buying a particular computer program.”1533 These conditions have not changed and are expected
to become even more prominent in the future.
The long-term (and much needed) relationship decreases the necessity of legal protection.
As Samuelson suggests, “If no one but the developer of such software ever has access to a machineexecutable form of the program, copyright protection is arguably unnecessary.”1534 The
characteristic mentioned above, along with the rapid progress of computer programs, which is
probably only expected to become even more rapid in the future, weigh against the
disproportionate length of copyright protection.1535
Setting aside the long-relationship subscription potential of computer-programs, there are
also other technological measures that could secure programs in an effective way, making copying
very difficult and, more importantly, not worthwhile. Contract law, trade secrets, patent law, and
other technological means provide additional layers of protection.1536 And, as Menell explains: “If
these means of protecting research and development are inexpensive and effective, then legal
protection may not be needed to ensure efficient provision of the good.”1537
4.2.2

Alternative Models for Originality

My approach for a higher originality standard might seem like an attempt to nullify copyright
protection for computer programs. It is not my intention. However, if eventually that would be the
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outcome, these programs probably should not have been protected under copyright law in the first
place.
Copyright made sense in an era when programming was based, to some extent, on literature
codes. With advancement in technology where most of the coding does not necessarily require
actual “writing”, this rationale might not prevail. Indeed, programming styles and methods are
changing, and new environments “allow users to avoid directly typing virtually any code for some
programs. Instead, they select icons that visually represent functions.”1538
Formulating a new standard for copyright law requires a modular approach that would
exclude simple programs (as well as mechanical “sweat of the brow” creations) from copyright
protection. As I have explained, this does not mean that basic programs and slavish human works
would not be legally protected – we could offer protection under a different legal mechanism like
contract law and trade secrets. However, copyright protection should be reserved for creative
creation only.
I am aware of the difficulties in establishing creativity. As many have argued before, we
would not wish for judges to decide what is creative and what is not. Legal protection should not
be determined by artistic taste. I am also aware that my proposal might borrow more elements
from patent law’s non-obviousness criteria for patentability.
A different argument is that my proposal de facto nullifies copyright law since it might not
be worthwhile to claim or pursue copyright protection. Again, I agree that that eventually might
be the outcome. However, formulating the perfect balance between what can, and should be,
protected and what should not, and cannot, be protected is complex. In my dissertation, I only wish
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to point out several routes we could take to correct the flaws in our current legal framework. I am
inclined to suggest a change in copyright law that would effectively exclude basic computer
programs from copyright protection. Creative machine-learning algorithms and AI, on the other
hand, would be able to copyright their creations if they meet the originality-creativity standard.
Maybe the time has come to revisit Menell’s and Samuelson’s suggestions for sui-generis
protection for computer programs once more.1539 Providing a thorough and detailed analysis of the
economic and competitive implications that legal protection might have on the development of
computer programs in the mid-1980s, Menell reached the conclusion that “there does not seem to
be any economic justification for bestowing copyright protection on these products.”1540 He further
suggests that “patent law is more appropriate” as a legal mechanism for protection of computer
programs,1541 arguing for “creating a hybrid form of patent protection specifically tailored to
accommodate the market failures endemic to the provision of computer operating systems.”1542
Menell, too, is aware of the relatively short life span of computer programs, thus offering that the
patent protection would be “shorter in duration than traditional patent protection.”1543
Menell concludes that the hybrid patent protection would allow certain uses such as reverse
engineering and “contain a flexible compulsory licensing provision.”1544 Menell wishes to promote
innovation by adequately awarding protection for “truly innovative and useful operating systems.”
He further explains that limiting the scope of protection under certain conditions, like “moderate
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duration, reverse engineering, adaptation – and the provision for compulsory licensing”, would
promote the industry.1545
Menell’s statement that “legal protection should be significantly shorter in duration than
traditional copyright protection” seems to support my earlier suggestion to limit copyright
protection. And other suggestions to allow reverse engineering and compulsory licensing are
compatible with Menell’s belief that “[i]n order to realize the benefits of networks externalities
and to promote creativity in the integration of software programs, it would seem worthwhile to
allow limited access to application programs, particularly those that emerge as industry
standards.”1546
Indeed, as I have indicated in several parts, patent law might present a better model for a
copyright standard for the next phase of technological development. In a recent paper, Abbott
framed a new standard for patent law in the AI era which incorporates the expected changes in
technology, making a new formula for both human and non-human patents – the inventive machine
standard.1547
As with AI authorship, an inventive machine “should be one which generated patentable
output while meeting traditional inventorship criteria.”1548 Abbott argues that the source of the
invention is irrelevant – whether it came from a human or a machine. He further contends that
“[h]aving inventive machines replace the skilled person may better correspond with real world
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conditions.”1549 Abbott explains that once highly advanced machines – like IBM Watson – replace
the average worker, the average worker would become inventive.1550
In other words, when AI and highly advanced computers become the standard in the
industry, capable of outperforming the human worker in any field, inventive machines would be
the new standard, making the bar for obviousness higher in a way that simple machine and humans
will no longer qualify as inventive.1551 Given AI unlimited potential, everything might be obvious.
And if everything is obvious, nothing can be patented.
Abbott’s argument is based on two propositions. The first pushes for amending patent laws
to recognize computers as inventors. Today, this approach is important to encourage the
development of inventive and sophisticated AI computers, which serve the patent system. Given
that under the current legal framework a computer-generated patent is not patentable (since we
cannot register a computer as an inventor), it is important to consider amending patent law so that
AI’s programmers will be willing to invest the time and resources needed for the development of
the field.
The second, which is intertwined with other scholarly debates, is that in the future we might
reach the point where patents might not be required to facilitate inventions or creations since both
humans and non-humans would not require incentives to create.1552 This reasoning could apply to
authorship as well. As machines produce more and more works, incentive theories might become
less and less important.1553 Other scholars have echoed this statement recently, arguing that “IP

1549

Ibid at 29.
Ibid at 30.
1551
Ibid.
1552
Ibid at 39-40: “Once inventive machines set the baseline for patentability, standard inventive machines, as well as
people, would generally be unable to obtain patents.” Though, patent might still be desirable in certain industries and
for development of certain products (like in the biotechnology and pharma industries).
1553
I have addressed these arguments earlier in Part II, chapter IV(A).
1550

323

law applies [to digital creations] less than many believe, and its incentive is less necessary than
many would expect.”1554
In challenging the copyright standard, Boyden offers a different alternative for originality.
Boyden argues for using tort law principles in copyright law – mainly the concepts of causation
and predictability. A person should be assigned authorship in a computer-generated or AI output
only if he could predict or foresee the output based on the development of the concepts of
negligence in tort law. Under Boyden’s model, an author would be required to prove that “the
output foreseeably includes a meaning or message that the author wishes to convey to his or her
audience.”1555
Like the foreseeability test in torts, establishing authorship would require assessing
whether a reasonable person, “knowing what the putative author knew, would have tried to convey
a given meaning to an audience through the computer program.”1556 The test should be “whether
the putative author foreseeably communicated that meaning to the audience.”1557 A similar test
was recently suggested by Ginsburg and Budiardjo to distinguish between upstream (i.e., the
programmer) and downstream (i.e., the user) creators.1558
Boyden’s suggestion is refreshing. His approach tackles one of the issues I addressed
earlier, especially – the assigning of authorship (and copyright protection) of computer-generated
works to the authors or owners of the program. Boyden’s approach would strengthen the relation
between the author or programmer and the work. In cases in which the author or programmer (or

1554

Osborn, supra note 686 at 1306. See also Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, supra note 27.
Boyden, supra note 714 at 393-4: “When it comes to torts, the necessary foreseeability for negligence liability is
whether a reasonable person, knowing what the defendant knew, would have perceived the risk.”
1556
Ibid at 394.
1557
Ibid.
1558
Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 714 at 88. I have discussed their suggestin in Part III.
1555

324

the designer) is able to explain the creation’s process – he or she would be assigned copyright.
However, Boyden’s approach is limited to very specific computer programs and does not fit into
my vision for a higher originality standard (as I do not think that simple creations – made by
computers or humans – are worthy of copyright protection).
Further, AI technology is based on the unpredictability of the outcome. This excludes
authors, programmers, or designers – who neither explain nor foresee the outcome of the process,
thus making Boyden’s model unsatisfactory for future technological developments which would
incorporate machine-learning algorithms.
Even if creators do need “some appropriability mechanism to recoup their costs to maintain
incentives to create”, that does not mean that they necessarily need IP laws – contracts and other
legal doctrines provide an alternative.1559 In the coming years, the computer program market is
expected to face many changes. We can expect that most programs will be automated, presenting
a very simple and utilitarian model for computer programs. Other programs might be more
complex and tailored made for specific organizations, sellers or individuals. We can also expect
more machine-learning based programs that will be able to express some degree of creativity.
Lee presented a different approach to originality for the digital age. His suggestion could
be applicable to AI and computer-generated works. Under Lee’s new digital originality formula, a
“work must be (1) independently (2) created, and (3) possess at least a modicum of creativity.”1560
Lee suggests bifurcating the phrase “independently created” (as in Feist) to emphasize individual
contribution.1561
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This logic is actually better construed with earlier remarks concerning putting more
emphasis on the process of the creation rather than the result in order to determine originality, as
Lee noted, “Contrary to the analysis in Meshwerks, the independence requirement focuses on the
process of what the person in fact did instead of the end product.”1562 This element of the test – “to
highlight that the process of how the creator came up with the work is key”1563 – is subjective.
The second part of Lee’s test is creating a copyrightable work, meaning – a work that falls
under copyright subject matter. This part of the test is objective and focuses on the product itself
(i.e., the outcome and not the process). As Lee further explains, although it seems that Meshwerks’
work could be considered a work given the human influence in the process, this element of the test
could face difficulties with AI and computer-generated works, given the legal barriers to AI
authorship that I have discussed in earlier parts. 1564 In this regard, Lee’s model is very limited in
scope and does not offer an innovative approach for non-human creations.
The third and last part is the modicum of creativity, which is also objective and focuses on
the product and not the process. In confronting the weaknesses in Feist – most noticeably Feist’s
reluctance to define what constitutes a creative “spark” – Lee draws some conclusions from the
clues that Feist did provide for what could not constitute this spark: “(1) works that are so
‘commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course’ and (2) works that are ‘so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’.”1565
Given that very few courts found works that actually fell below this threshold, Lee
concludes that “courts need not engage in searching review for originality.” He calls for the courts
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to apply a “generous approach to the originality analysis” and suggests that “probing questions on
the level of creativity involved in a work are avoided unless the work is of doubtful creativity.”1566
Lee’s conclusion seems to correlate with that of other scholars I mentioned earlier, such as
Subotnick.
4.2.3

Heightening Originality

Low creativity and inventorship standards serve IP law poorly.1567 The alternative of raising the
originality or inventorship bar is to establish that AIs are incapable of inventive or creative activity.
The US Copyright Office, for example, has already ruled that non-human authors are not qualified
for copyright protection.1568 As I explained in Parts I & II, I believe that disqualifying AIs works
and inventions produces dire outcomes for innovations, hindering the development of technology,
which will result in fewer inventions and fewer creations for the benefit of humanity.
A different set of issues is whether raising the originality standard would benefit
development in the AI field. While advocating for a higher standard might be considered
reasonable for humans and AIs, some suggest that making changes to the copyright standard might
cause more harm than good and would serve technological developments poorly.
Osborn suggests that changes in programming methods make programs less eligible for
copyright protection. He explains that programmers rely more and more on “default structures to
do much of the coding, with the programmer simply filling in the blanks.”1569 This programming
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process for utilitarian programs “highlights how little authorship occurs in the textual level.”1570
Osborn describes the copyright challenge in adapting these methods by comparing programming
to cooking:1571
“If simple ordering choices could constitute sufficient creativity, then even simple listing
of ingredients would qualify for copyright protection. After all, one could list flour first and
eggs second or vice versa. One could alphabetize the ingredients or organize them by
weight. And yet, we are told that mere listings of ingredients are not copyrightable.”

Adopting a higher originality standard, in the current level of computer development, might
exclude these programs from copyright since the programmer’s “work” is too simplistic and
technical. Consider Qimron’s work for example – a higher originality standard would no doubt
have resulted in a different outcome in his case.1572
However, both doctrinally and normatively, adopting a higher originality standard might
be the right approach after all. Several scholars have argued in favour of heightening originality.
Diane Zimmerman, for example, views Feist as “half a revolution” given that “it neither gives us
an originality standard with real teeth nor an explication of the core nub of copyright into which
those teeth (were they to erupt) would be intended to bite.”1573
Zimmerman argues that Feist’s decision reflected the court’s “dismay at the quantities of
work of trivial merit that now receive lengthy and virtually airtight statutory protection.”1574
Harrison and Joseph Miller also express similar notions, sharing some commonalities with the
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non-obviousness requirement in patents. As I have argued earlier, non-obviousness could serve as
an alternative mechanism for originality in the AI era.1575
Then again, perhaps we should forsake attempts to change the originality standard both for
humans and non-humans, given Eva Subotnick’s argument that, “courts are ultimately doomed to
fail in the quest to explain, in a satisfying way, how a work of authorship is original in and of
itself.” 1576 Subotnick criticizes Miller’s and Harrison’s proposals, arguing that changing the legal
standard for originality would result in raising the level of uncertainty in litigation and might distort
artistic production.1577 Subotnick suggests that under the current copyright laws, a court can only
identify originality through “proxies for the legal concept.”1578 Her paper focuses on photographs
but can easily apply to other works, computer-generated included. Given what Subotnick describes
as “the courts’ inability to reach originality in an unmediated fashion” and that a decisive account
of the legal concept of originality is not within reach, the most practical approach is to leave the
originality standard is it is.1579
Subotnick also tosses cold water on the idea of raising the originality bar to incorporate
more creative elements, arguing that this change would only “result in greater manipulation of the
proxies, determinations based on judicial subjectivity, and/or undesirable distortions of behavior
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to comply with a legal rule.”1580 Heightening originality might also erode the potential income for
creators from the low quality works they use to foster challenging creative works.
To put this argument in the AI context: If we raise originality, excluding basic computer
programs and computer-generated works, we will decrease programmers’ control and income from
these works, making it more difficult to invest in more creative works. In other words, basic
programs support highly creative and unorthodox programs.1581
Maybe we should focus more on the process rather than the outcome, leaving less room for
human subjectivities and artistic tastes. In that regard, Justice Holmes’s attempt in Bleistein to
protect works “of little merit or of humble degree”1582 under copyright laws effectively reduced
courts’ role as “artistic critics.”1583 As I have explained in Part III, Feist’s spark of creativity
requirement did not prove to be of much use and, as Subotnick and others have argued, might only
be used to “deny copyright protection to sufficiently creative works.”1584
In considering early attempts to challenge originality in the digital era, the Meshwerks
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decision is probably one of the leading cases.1585 Though the 3D digital art in Meshwerks is inferior
to AI works; it is still presents exciting and challenging arguments to be considered as part of any
attempt to reshape originality.
In short, Meshwerks created digital copies of Toyota’s cars by taking the cars’
measurements using a grid of tape that was processed to a computer. Meshwerks’ employees
“sculpted” the images on the computer, in what the court described as an extensive stage.1586 In
considering the new medium (i.e., digital creation), the court concluded that “Meshwerks’ models
are not so much independent creations as (very good) copies of Toyota’s vehicles.”1587 However,
as Lee noted, the court’s decision “is not a model of clarity” and its opinion “ambled between (1)
originality cases involving photographs and (2) originality cases involving factual
compilations.”1588
There are several flaws in the court’s decision. First, the decision seems to follow the
unequal treatment of digital and computer-generated works as slavish copies.1589 Lee further
concludes that “[i]f the court’s analysis were correct, then every realistic pencil sketch of objects
in the world, such as the kind Leonardo da Vinci was famous for, could never qualify for
copyright.”1590
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In equating digital modeling with photography, Lee argues that even if there are similarities
in the end product, the process is different: “[D]igital modeling of wire frames involves extensive
measuring, computer modeling, and then human sculpting of data points that may require
considerable human input, skill, and judgement […].”1591 Moreover, using photography cases as
the leading approach for digital originality would have resulted in a different outcome, given that
“the prevailing approach is that virtually any photograph – even from an automatic, point-andshoot camera – satisfies the originality requirement […].”1592
In the more recent case of Home Legend, the Eleventh Circuit reached a different
conclusion concerning another digital work – the “Time Crafted Maple” design. Home Legend’s
design is a digital copy of wooden planks that were selected and moulded to give an old “timeworn” look. Like in Meshwerks, following the digital adaptation, Mannington’s employees made
changes to the processed images. However, in Home Legend, the court distinguishes Meshwerks,
stating that “by contrast, the evidence shows that Mannington did not have another work in mind.
At most, it had in mind a genre: rustic flooring. It created a digital artwork in that genre. The
creative work was all Mannington’s.”1593
I find Home Legend more convincing and befitting to the user-authorship model that I have
suggested. If anything, these decisions only reflect the challenges that courts and legal scholars are
facing when applying copyright laws to new technologies.
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4.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
My dissertation sought to discuss AI implications for IP and copyright law. In Part I, I outlined the
main issues and historical developments of AI technology, as well as addressed the conceptual
challenge of the AI concept. In Part II, I further developed the theoretical IP discussion framing
possible routes for AI-IP theory. Part III provided the central thesis for my dissertation considering
the different models for AI authorship and discussing copyright standards for originality. In this
part, I revisited some of my earlier ideas and questions, building upon my arguments and providing
some considerations and conclusions regarding AI authorship.
My dissertation is only the first step of a long journey to understand machine creativity and
AI better within a theoretical discussion in IP law. I have only aspired to provide possible
directions, as well as to point out both the opportunities and the difficulties that would result from
any suggested changes to IP laws. As I have already stated, I have faith in the competency of the
copyright legal framework to withstand the coming storm. I also believe that there is so much more
we can do to amend flaws in our legal systems.
Indeed, the pace of technology is often too fast for our legal structures to adapt. Both the
legislators and the courts are often too slow in making required changes. However, this is precisely
what is expected from us in academia – to point out what ought to be changed and to voice our
concerns offering alternative solutions. I hope my research was able to do this, albeit partially.
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